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Chapter 1
Introduction
Leonid Gokhberg, Merton J. Peck, and Ja´nos Ga´cs
1.1 Why Applied R&D Matters
In the decades following World War II the USSR was one of the two great powers
in research and development (R&D); the other was the United States. In 1990 the
USSR had over 1 million researchers, more than any other nation except the United
States. Its achievements (especially in nuclear and space R&D) contributed to the
picture of the USSR as an R&D superpower. The Soviet economy was research
intensive, and after the breakup of the Soviet Union many observers considered the
R&D sector to be one of the most valuable assets bequeathed to the new Russia.
Science and technology (S&T), freed of the rigidities of central planning, was held
to provide the basis for high-technology exports and eventual economic growth.
Like many of the rosy hopes for Central and Eastern Europe, the prediction was
wrong. The R&D sector went into a precipitous decline that continued until at least
1995. Neither the promised exports nor the growth materialized.
This collection of papers contributes to answering the question, What went
wrong? We stress the word “contributes.” Recently Russia has experienced a
downturn in real output that is greater than that of the worldwide depression of the
1930s. Obviously the R&D sector could not be insulated from its consequences,
and for our purposes we take that event with its complex origins as given. The
impact on the R&D sector, however, was particularly severe, indicating a particular
vulnerability of the sector to the adverse economic conditions between 1991 and
1994. Certainly its inherited main features impelled this decay. R&D was financed
centrally by the government at a time when fiscal austerity prevailed. R&D was
organized under industrial ministries at a time when their powers were declining.
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R&D had a weak voice in the government and parliament when lobbies of industry
and agriculture were speaking loudly. These factors are well known, but the
detailed ways in which these general factors worked to radically downsize and
partially destroy the R&D sector inherited by Russia are less understood. The
chapters in this report add to the understanding of these complex events.
It is a painful story to tell, for the careers of many scientists and engineers were
ruined. It may also be a costly situation to remedy; R&D teams and organizations,
once disbanded, cannot be easily reassembled nor can expertise, once unused, be
regained. A loss in the R&D sectors then is harder to offset than in other sectors.
The decline was more pronounced in the applied R&D sector than in basic
research. Thus the number of researchers in the Russian Academy of Sciences
(RAS), engaged primarily in basic research, declined from 137,000 in 1990 to
112,000 in 1994 (18 percent), while the total number of researchers in Russia fell
from 1,227,000 to 540,000 (53 percent).
Although applied R&D accounts for nearly 90 percent of Russia’s R&D ex-
penditure, it is not just size that gives it greater economic significance than basic
R&D. Applied R&D is the basis for innovations – namely, the introduction of new
products and processes into the economy. It is only when innovation occurs that the
population benefits from science and technology. Despite this, basic research has
always had the attention of the media. R&D is visualized by many as an Einstein
at his chalkboard, a Fleming in his laboratory, or a Szilard at his cyclotron. Yet
it is the more mundane activities such as designing a faster machine to produce
disposable diapers or a better operating system for a computer that account for the
billions of dollars spent on R&D in every industrialized economy. Such applied
R&D activities raise productivity, which is the ultimate source of improved living
standards.
There is another significant characteristic of applied R&D that differentiates it
from basic R&D. The results of basic research are usually published; the tradition
of sharing results is long and strong in academic science. A company can benefit
from published basic research whether the authors are in Cambridge, England, or
Cambridge, Massachusetts. Not so in applied R&D. The results are often patented,
giving exclusive use to the inventor, or kept as a trade secret. Applied R&D is
considered a weapon in the competitive struggle among corporations and its value
depends on maintaining its exclusivity. Companies seldom give away the results
of applied research. In the high-technology sectors, every competitor devotes
substantial applied R&D activity to its exclusive needs. The same logic applies
to nations. If a nation wants to rely on high-technology exports and advanced
technology for economic growth, it will need an effective applied R&D sector for
the same reasons that companies do. Alternatively it can purchase applied research
by paying for know-how, patents, and the like or access applied R&D by inviting
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a multinational corporation to locate a plant within its boundaries. One way or
another, a nation must pay for applied R&D; there is no free lunch.
A nation’s applied R&D capability, however, is only a necessary condition
for economic advancement. It is not a sufficient condition. Introducing new
products or processes requires good manufacturing techniques, marketing skills,
and aggressive competitive strategies; capabilities neither developed nor prized in
the former Soviet Union.
In spite of all the changes since 1991 the Soviet system of R&D organization
is still in force and is shaping the emerging R&D sector in Russia. It is already
evident that only part of the vast Soviet R&D sector can and should be saved. Given
that Russia needs an applied R&D sector and given that it will be smaller than the
Soviet one, the first question considered in this volume is whether the dramatic
decline of the applied R&D sector since 1991 has proceeded too far or is the sector
still oversized.
The concern, however, is not merely about the size of the applied R&D sector.
There is also the question of what R&D structure and organization will best serve
Russia in the long run. What is to be saved is being determined in part by
governmental policy and in part by the actions of R&D organizations themselves.
The organizations are not inert boxes on an organizational chart but collections
of talented individuals able to adapt to new conditions. The struggle to survive
is clearly occurring. It may not have as its outcome a good organization for
the R&D sector. The chances of survival depend in part on the economic and
political positions that these organizations inherited from the Soviet era, in part
on the entrepreneurial skill of managers and staffs, and in part on their influence
in the political and bureaucratic process. None of these attributes are necessarily
correlated with the long-run value of an organization to the Russian economy. In
asking what kind of applied R&D sector will best serve Russia, we are, of course,
asking how does this ideal compare with what is emerging.
The third question considered here deals with the present and future role of
government policy. If this volume were about applied R&D in the United States
or Japan it would be mostly about large companies such as IBM or Mitsubishi
Electric and the small ones that have been highly innovative. This is because
most applied R&D in market economies (apart from that for defense) is company
financed, company directed, and company performed. In a competitive market
profit prospects determine the level and direction of R&D spending.
In the Soviet Union, however, enterprises did not have this role but rather
they maintained the tradition of passivity with respect to R&D. R&D was largely
supplied to the enterprise as a free good. The Soviet applied R&D system was
linear with a progression from the R&D institutes, which did the research, to the
design bureaus, which used research results to design a product or process, to
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the experimental plants, which carried out pilot production, and to the enterprise
that carried out the mass production and so introduced the new product or process
into the economy. The chain was held together by participating organizations that
were subordinate to the industrial or branch ministries which were responsible for
various sectors of the economy. R&D, like most everything else in the Soviet era,
was government directed and financed.
The expectation was that with the transition to a market system manufacturing
enterprises would take over the ministry role of coordinating R&D with the needs
of manufacturing. Enterprises would direct R&D and finance applied R&D in
response to market signals and pressures. In the process the enterprises would
support the separate R&D organizations, obtaining their services by contracts.
None of this has happened on a significant scale. The enterprises, like the R&D
organizations, were dramatically affected by the overall downturn in the economy.
They too became involved in a desperate struggle for survival. Support of R&D,
with its long-term payoffs, was considered a postponable luxury. The institutions
that make enterprises effective in market economies are missing. The financial
system is in infancy and fails to provide long-term capital. Ownership rules
and corporate governance are primitive. Macroeconomic stability is inadequate
for long-run decision-making. Corporate law is yet to be developed, let alone
implemented. Property rights of all types are threatened by the Russian mafia.
The consequence has been that the government has had to keep on providing
the funding for most R&D. The choice was either government funding or none at
all. And with the funding came the governmental setting of priorities for applied
R&D. The story of Russian applied R&D in the transition thus is one of government
policy. The avowed long-run objective of policy still remains the creation of an
applied R&D system more like the enterprise-financed and directed organizations
in industrialized economies. The difficult questions are, How can public policy en-
courage this evolution from government support of R&D to enterprise sponsorship
of R&D? What should public policy be in the interim? Should the role played by
the Russian government in the long run be different from or larger than the role
played by governments in other market economies.
To sum up, this report is concerned with three broad questions:
1. Was the decline in applied R&D from 1991 to 1995 too steep or too modest
for the welfare of the Russian economy?
2. How should the organization and structure of Russian applied R&D develop
over the long run?
3. What role should public policy play in Russian applied R&D?
The chapters that follow do not explicitly or directly answer these three ques-
tions. Rather they examine particular aspects of the applied R&D system as it
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developed in the first four years of the transition from its Soviet character. They
also describe the Soviet system, focusing on its legacy to Russia and particularly the
unsuccessful changes introduced in the perestroika era to decentralize decisions.
Only implicit answers are given in the chapters, but in the concluding chapter we
confront the three questions directly.
The remainder of this introduction discusses the origins and organization of
the volume and defines a few concepts used in the chapters.
1.2 The Origins and Organization of the Volume
This report traces its origin back to the spring of 1990 when then Soviet Deputy
Prime Minister Nikolay Laverov asked the International Institute for Applied Sys-
tems Analysis (IIASA) to do a study of the Soviet R&D sector. This work was to
be done in collaboration with the USSR State Committee for Science and Technol-
ogy and the USSR Academy of Sciences under the general title of “Research and
Development Management in the Transition to a Market Economy.” In November
1990 and in March 1992 conferences on this topic were held with participants from
the USSR (first conference) and Russia (second conference) together with scholars
from the West.
The conclusions from these two conferences were summarized by Peter de
Ja´nosi and Vladimir Mikhailov in several propositions in an earlier IIASA volume
(Glaziev and Schneider, 1993):
1. Basic scientific research will need continued support by the state, both in
the transition period and beyond.
2. Most applied research and development should eventually be financed by
the private sector: : : .
3. The lack of adequate demand for all forms of research is a major problem
of the transition: : : . Consequently there may well be a need for transitional
subsidies.
4. International experience has shown that a diversity of organizational forms
is desirable: : : . The predominant organizational form, the one most impor-
tant, is the in-house proprietary form done within large corporations.
5. Finally, there is a fundamental dependence of science and technology reform
on the success of overall legal and economic reform.
The chapters in this volume, written three and one-half years later, still support
these five propositions. The difference, as already suggested, is that the transition
proved to be more lengthy and more difficult than expected in 1991. The shift
from transitional governmental support to that from enterprises that follows from
the first and second proposition remains to be accomplished. There is little demand
for R&D, so the transitional subsidies continue. Organizational forms are still
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largely the independent R&D institutes of the Soviet era. Enterprise R&D (in-
house proprietary R&D) is uncommon. And the economic and legal reforms of
proposition five are still to be implemented.
Since the first publication, much has happened that deserves analysis beyond
simply the observation that reality has proved more difficult and unpredictable than
anticipated. Accordingly it seemed worthwhile to the IIASA leadership and the
senior officials of the then Ministry on Science and Technological Policy (MSTP)
to have a second report focused on applied R&D. (In March 1997, the Ministry was
renamed the Ministry for Science and Technology of the Russian Federation.) This
volume is that report. The chapters were written by Russian senior officials and
established scholars. It was recognized that the project would also benefit from the
expertise of scholars of R&D policy from outside Russia. The two types of experts
worked together during the three conferences that were organized. Chapter outlines
were the subject of the first conference in July 1995; first drafts were presented at
the second conference in December 1995; and final drafts were discussed at the
third conference in April 1996. Since then, the April drafts have been extensively
edited.
The chapters trace the complicated story of the transitional years, 1991 to
1995. In Chapter 2 Leonid Gokhberg describes the main features of the Soviet
system and why it was inefficient and so alien to the principles of a market system.
He shows that many features of the Soviet system have persisted and continue to
plague the efforts of Russian officials to restructure the R&D sector. In Chapter
3, Viacheslav Alimpiev and Alexander Sokolov describe the past and current
institutional structure for applied R&D, including the changes in the Soviet era
and in the transition. They show that it is an oversimplification to think of a single
Soviet or transitional R&D system; rather there were repeated modifications and
experiments, all retaining, however, the fundamental features of a planned economy.
These two authors also report on the emergence of new organizational forms that
relate to R&D, particularly the creation of financial and industrial groups that bring
together financial institutions, manufacturing enterprises, and R&D institutes in
ways analogous to Japanese keiretsus such as Mitsubishi or Mitsui.
In the next chapter Leonid Gokhberg reports that the signs of recovery in a few
sectors will have a favorable impact on applied R&D. Exports often play a major
role in the recovery. Some sectors – particularly those in light industry – continue
to decline with few prospects for a turnaround. The economic situation of a sector
is a major determinant of its R&D activity, thus showing on a sectoral level the
proposition mentioned earlier for the entire economy – a high level of R&D activity
requires at least some economic health.
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In the fifth chapter the authors, Serguei Glaziev, Il’dar Karimov, and Irina
Kuznetsova examine innovation activity. They find that its significant decline in
the transition is primarily due to the poor financial health of enterprises. They offer
several policy prescriptions, going beyond R&D policy to consider the implications
of macroeconomic policy for innovation activity.
The sixth chapter by Levan Mindeli discusses the integration of Russian R&D
into the international economy. The USSR deliberately isolated itself from the
international R&D activity that emerged after World War II. Western nations added
to the isolation by limiting exports to the Soviet Union of some high-technology
goods that might have strategic value. After 1991 most barriers were removed,
and the new Russia began to be part of the international system. International
R&D activities in industrial economies are carried out by enterprise-to-enterprise
transactions for mutual profits. Russia’s participation in this process is limited
by the financial weakness of its enterprises. Direct investment by multinational
corporations – another way for the international diffusion of technology – has also
been low, reflecting greater economic and political uncertainties in Russia than in
other economies in transition. The Russian government has instituted policies to
encourage international R&D activities and to offset the weakness of enterprise
involvement. Still given the size of the economy, Russian participation in the
international R&D system has been modest though it is growing from its low
starting point.
Chapter 7 by Andrey Fonotov and Lioudmila Pipiia critically examines current
and proposed public policy. The authors point out that any support for R&D has the
opportunity cost of less support for activities serving other economic or social goals.
It is not enough to show that some R&D activity is desirable; it must be shown
that R&D support on the margin is more beneficial for society than the activity that
will be forgone. Inevitably, R&D support will be politically controversial. The
second major point in this chapter is that governmental support should no longer
be distributed among organizations on the basis of their financial requirements.
Instead it should be allocated according to the importance of their research for
Russian society. Competition should be used as far as possible in allocation
decisions. The authors also propose a system of repayment of government support
from the revenues of successful projects. Such radical changes naturally have
encountered opposition among research organizations, and the change is likely to
occur gradually.
This quick tour through the chapters fails to do justice to the many issues
discussed. We can do no better than to invite the reader to turn to them.
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1.3 Caveats and Definitions
Before doing so, however, we need to say a word about the editorial process. We
regard the volume as an integrated report on Russian applied R&D rather than a
collection of conference papers. As a result we have been bold in the editing. We
have rewritten some pages to clarify their message. We have cut out sections that
duplicated material in other chapters. We have even moved material from one
chapter to another. Still we have tried to preserve the essence of each author’s
original paper, and we have given each author an opportunity to review the final
version.
The definitions of various terms are given in the chapters in which they are used.
There are some terms, however, that occur in almost every chapter including this
one – terms such as basic research, applied research, development, and innovation.
All these terms have been standardized by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), and we adopt its definitions. Basic research
is activity aimed at obtaining new knowledge of the underlying foundation of
phenomena and observable facts without any particular application or use in view
(cf. OECD, 1994c). It can be either experimental or theoretical, and it usually
takes as its starting point existing scientific literature. In contrast, applied research,
while also aimed at acquiring new knowledge, is directed primarily toward a specific
practical aim or objective. Note that the difference between the two kinds of activity
is the objectives that are sought. In practice the distinction is less subjective than
first appears since the two kinds of research are often carried out by distinct types
of organizations that correspond to the two objectives.
Development (or experimental development) is the activity directed at the cre-
ation of specific new products or processes, or at the substantial improvement of
those already produced or installed. Much of the work of engineers in designing,
say, the Boeing 767 would be classified as development. Innovation is the trans-
formation of an idea into a new or improved product introduced to the market, or
to a new process used in industry and commerce. To the reader unfamiliar with
this terminology our definitions are likely to be unsatisfactory. There is no precise
boundary that separates basic from applied research or applied research from de-
velopment, despite the substantial literature on these definitions. All we can offer
in defense is that R&D statistics for Russia and every other country are based on
these definitions and they have proved their worth. Other terms used almost as
frequently in this volume are applied R&D and S&T activity or policy. Applied
R&D simply means the combination of applied research and development as just
defined. Science and technology is a broader concept that includes scientific and
technical education and scientific and technological services as well as R&D.
Chapter 2
Transformation of the Soviet R&D System
Leonid Gokhberg
The current R&D establishment of the Russian Federation largely reflects its Soviet
origins. The Soviet R&D system had three special characteristics: it was very large;
it was centrally directed; and it was government financed. These features are ill-
suited to a market economy, so it was not surprising that the R&D sector underwent
a crisis in the first years of the transition (1990–1994).
This chapter presents a brief description of the transformation of the Soviet
R&D system. In the first section the major features of the Soviet system are
described. The impact of the transition from central planning to a market economy
on R&D is then examined in Section 2.2. In the R&D sector, as elsewhere, the
transition has not been easy. Only a part of the R&D sector inherited from the
Soviet era can and should be preserved. This chapter addresses two questions:
Will the decline in the R&D sector stop before it becomes so extensive as to be an
irreversible loss for Russia? How can the R&D system be transformed to meet the
requirements of a market economy? The chapter concludes that, while the R&D
sector has made some major adjustments, many more remain.
2.1 The Soviet System
2.1.1 Historical background
The R&D potential which Russia currently possesses has its origins in the prerevo-
lutionary era. The czarist period established a tradition of excellence and provided
exceptional contributions to the world’s stock of knowledge. The practice of
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performing most R&D in institutes of the Academy of Sciences, leading univer-
sities, and military laboratories was also established during this era. Only a few
of the largest industrial enterprises had R&D departments to serve their internal
needs.
The institutional characteristics of the czarist era became the basic elements
of the R&D system set up after 1917. The political objectives of accelerated
development of R&D to serve military requirements and the industrialization of the
economy led to strengthening existing research institutes and establishing new ones.
Universities responded to political directives aimed at tailoring higher education
for the masses and the training of “proletarian specialists,” particularly engineers.
Universities, where the most prominent Russian scientists carried out both training
and research, now became almost exclusively training centers with relatively little
R&D activity. Thus, contrary to the pattern of R&D growth taking place in Western
universities and industrial companies during the interwar period, Soviet R&D was
increasingly concentrated in research institutes of the Academy of Sciences and of
the industrial ministries.
The overall growth of the sector was unmistakable. From 1922 to 1940
employment in the Science and Scientific Services sector grew from 35,000 to
362,000, and its share in total employment increased from 0.6 percent to 1.1
percent. Intensive investment was made in R&D facilities and equipment, and it
became possible to carry out research in the most important areas of science and
technology.
During World War II the Soviet R&D system demonstrated its ability to mobi-
lize R&D for the production and improvement of weapons. The need to concentrate
human, material, and financial resources on military R&D increased the govern-
ment’s role in identifying national S&T objectives and in implementing large-scale
R&D projects. The defense R&D complex was formed during World War II. Its
size increased in both absolute and relative terms. This expansion in military R&D
accelerated the growth of total R&D. By 1950, employment in the Science and
Scientific Services sector totaled 714,000 – 82 percent higher than in 1940.
In the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s the R&D sector continued to expand; by 1990
R&D personnel exceeded 2.8 million in the former USSR. The expansion of R&D
was largely in employment rather than in equipment and facilities, but the applied
R&D organizations remained separated from production. About half of the R&D
effort was for military purposes. The 1980s, however, was a decade in which the
Soviet R&D sector lost much of its dynamic character, and the indicators of R&D
inputs and outputs showed decline. The inefficiency of the centrally planned Soviet
R&D system began to take its toll. Simultaneously the overall rate of economic
growth began to slacken, basically for the same reasons: the exhaustion of sources
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for expansion and the lack of adjustment mechanisms in the centrally organized
system.
2.1.2 The problems of the Soviet system
The Soviet R&D sector received increasingly more resources, but the sector lacked
an effective market to direct R&D and to make timely structural changes. Negative
factors, which have only recently been identified, and which still damage Russian
development, were deeply rooted in several features of the Soviet R&D system.
Dominance of Political Objectives
Over a period of decades, Soviet science and technology was guided primarily by
political objectives, especially increasing the military capability of the state. In
addition, the USSR, as a superpower, followed an ambitious strategy in all fields
of science and technology, and an oversized R&D sector was one consequence.
Allocation of resources to particular S&T fields reflected the sectoral structure of
the national economy, notable for large shares of mining, metallurgy, and heavy
machine-building, which itself was ideologically determined. The manufacture of
high-tech products and consumer goods and the provision of services were given
considerably less emphasis; these sectors were relatively small in the Soviet Union
compared with other industrialized economies.
The traditional “technocratic” orientation of Soviet science resulted in a disci-
plinary structure that was, and still is, significantly different from the structures in
other industrialized countries (see Table 2.1). For many years, the Soviet emphasis
was on engineering, a field which accounted for some three-quarters of all R&D. In
the United States the engineering sector does not exceed half of gross expenditures
on R&D (GERD). The differences between the Soviet and US patterns of R&D
expenditures are especially pronounced in medicine and related life sciences (3
percent in Russia and about 10 percent in the United States) and natural sciences
(22 percent and 30 percent, respectively). The share of total agricultural R&D is
also very low – between 3 and 4 percent. The amount of future-oriented engineer-
ing work was modest as indicated by the fact that basic research constituted only
5 percent of total R&D in engineering. This neglect of basic research does not
provide a good basis for future development of technologies (Gokhberg, 1994).
Furthermore, in the 1980s the Soviet system of allocating resources for R&D
was unable to provide adequate facilities and equipment even for internationally
recognized areas. In 1990, 60 percent of R&D institutionsdid not own the buildings
they operated in, and when market conditions emerged these institutions were
threatened with eviction. In the case of biotechnology, for example, 50 percent of
12 Leonid Gokhberg
Table 2.1. Percentage distribution of major R&D indicators in Russia by field of
science.
Researchersa R&D expenditurea R&D equipmentb
Natural sciences 22.2 17.6 21.0
Engineering 65.8 72.6 71.1
Agricultural sciences 3.5 3.6 1.4
Medical sciences 3.4 3.0 3.3
Social sciences, humanities 4.9 3.2 3.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
a1994.
b1989.
Source: Author’s estimates; discrepancies in totals are due to rounding.
the R&D institutions did not have experimental facilities; 35 percent did not own
their buildings; and 20 percent of the research equipment was more than 10 years
old. The proportion of high-cost R&D equipment (as a percentage of the total value)
with specifications equal to or above that of world standards varied in the research
field as follows: only 14 percent in biotechnology, 21 percent in machine-building-
related research, and 24 percent in general physics and astronomy, informatics,
computers, and automatization. This indicator was highest in electrical engineering
(35 percent) and physical chemistry and technology of nonorganic materials (41
percent); but, even these levels were insufficient to achieve the most advanced
scientific results.
Structure and Organization
The Soviet R&D sector was marked by a peculiar institutional structure and orga-
nization that continues to influence its development during the transition period in
Russia.
Research institutes separated from both enterprises and universities were the
principal organizational form for R&D in the Soviet Union, and this is still so
in Russia (see Exhibit A1.1). Along with institutes conducting research as their
primary activity, there were also other units specializing in development (such as
design, construction projects, and experimental work) which worked independently
of industrial enterprises. Only a few universities and enterprises combined R&D
with education or production.
R&D was also guided by the general principles of the Soviet administration.
Like other organizations, R&D institutions were attached to specific branch min-
istries, each of which supervised an industry or sector of the economy. Ministries
had exclusive control over their assigned sectors of the national economy including
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the related R&D. Allocation of resources was influenced by “weights” of particular
ministries in governmental hierarchies and in the political process. In the 1970s,
the years in which the Soviet bureaucratic system flourished, there were some 70
major ministries and other governmental agencies such as state committees and
central departments. Despite recent frequent changes in the central bodies, their
number remained about the same. This situation made scientific communications
and intersectoral R&D projects difficult.
Soviet R&D was organized into four major sectors.
 The Academy Sector: Basic research was concentrated largely in the Academy
sector, which included the Academy of Sciences and branch academies of agri-
cultural sciences, medical sciences, and education. The division of activities
into sectors was not complete, and basic research was also carried out in a
small number of non-Academy R&D institutes, which mostly served military
industries, and in some elite higher education institutes. The Academy also
carried out about 20 percent of total applied research in 1990. Formally, the
highest body in the Soviet Academy was the General Assembly composed of
lifelong members – the academicians. Academicians were outstanding scien-
tists, but the honor was also given to directors of major Academy institutes and
to heads of the most prominent military research units as well as to rectors of
elite universities. Academicians also included some top-level governmental
officers. As representatives of the Soviet Union’s political and intellectual
elites, academicians were included in the network that influenced political
decision-making. The status of academician was extremely prestigious, and
the competition for election to Academy membership was (and still is) intense.
The USSR Academy had a hierarchical structure similar to that of the
branch ministries, with the Presidium at the top, sectoral and regional depart-
ments at the middle level, and research institutes at the bottom. The Presidium
was elected by the General Assembly and was responsible for the operational
management of the Academy including allocation of funds and resources to
the institutes and the review of institute research plans.
 Higher Education Sector: As noted earlier, R&D was largely separated from
higher education. This separation damaged the status and scientific authority
of the universities. As a result the quality of R&D in higher education was
often second-rate. The exceptions were certain elite universities and a few
prestigious engineering colleges that maintained a tradition of high-quality
research. These exceptions were given more resources and enjoyed higher
status than the other educational institutions.
 Industrial R&D Sector: This sector was engaged primarily in applied R&D.
In the Soviet period, each branch ministry established its own network of
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R&D units, most of which served the branch as a whole and its administration
rather than specific enterprises. Most branch research institutes and design
bureaus had a limited range of activities as they were oriented to the needs
of specific industrial sectors. The branch principle of applied R&D resulted
in monopolies in the development of particular technologies and hampered
intersectoral diffusion of technology.
The most advanced part of industrial R&D was devoted to national se-
curity. The R&D infrastructure of the defense industry was represented by
approximately 700 R&D institutions that occupied leading positions in many
technological areas. Defense research units contributed not only advanced
applied R&D, but also achievements in strategic, mission-oriented, basic re-
search in many important fields (nuclear and high-energy physics, mechanics,
space exploration, new materials, computer science, and electronics), which
had been developed as a part of defense R&D.
In 1990, defense R&D constituted some 40 percent of total R&D ex-
penditures in the USSR. Approximately 74 percent of defense industry R&D
institutions were located in Russia. These institutions employed 77 percent
of all the personnel engaged in defense-related research. Some 90 percent of
the USSR defense R&D expenditure was assigned to units located in Russia
(CSRS, 1993, p. 268).
Defense-oriented research institutes together with the Academy sector
received the highest political priorities and were supported by extensive state
actions implemented in various forms – direct budget funding, centralized sup-
ply of imported research equipment, construction of modern buildings for the
most prestigious institutes, hard-currency appropriations for missions abroad
and for scientific literature, high salaries, and even extended holidays. An
extensive social infrastructure within the Academy of Sciences and defense
research units provided employees with better housing, medical and child-care
services, foodstuffs, and consumer goods than generally available. Employ-
ment in the Academy and defense industry was significantly more prestigious
than in civilian industry R&D institutions or in higher education. The result
was that the highest-quality personnel were in the two former sectors. These
practices created a significant stratification of the national R&D establishment.
Civilian industrial institutes were poorly supported compared with the favored
Academy and defense institutions which represented the best of Soviet R&D.
 Enterprise Sector: R&D units in this sector were financed by industrial enter-
prises. Activities were largely directed at the immediate needs of the enterprise,
such as adapting external R&D to specific production conditions and modern-
izing current products. The enterprise sector was the least developed of the
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four major R&D sectors and, in terms of expenditures, by 1990 accounted for
about 8 percent of total Soviet R&D effort.
Taken as a whole, Soviet R&D was carried out in a rigid administrative system.
This created strong interest groups that resisted change. The R&D capability and
efficiency differed from sector to sector. As a result, each R&D institution’s chances
of surviving the subsequent transition varied.
Geographic Concentration
Geographic concentration of R&D in the most developed regions occurred during
the decades of Soviet rule. Among the 15 Soviet republics, Russia dominated
with 58 percent of the R&D institutions, 54 percent of the higher educational
establishments, 69 percent of the post-graduate students, 68 percent of the R&D
personnel, and 75 percent of Soviet R&D expenditure. Russia’s share in the Union’s
R&D expenditure was five times that of Ukraine which ranked second. The R&D
expenditures of Belarus, Kazakstan, and Uzbekistan ranged between 1.3 and 3.4
percent of the Soviet Union’s R&D expenditures, and R&D efforts in Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan did not exceed 0.2 percent of Soviet expenditures.
Within Russia itself, the central economic region around Moscow accounted for
over 30 percent of USSR R&D spending, with Moscow allotted over 30 percent of
the national total.
The uneven geographical distribution of R&D was largely determined by
tradition and political decisions. The network of Academy research institutions
and leading establishments of higher education were concentrated mostly in large
cities – the capitals of the former Union republics and the centers of administrative
regions. This pattern reflected the concentration of governmental bodies under the
Soviet system; in addition, scientist and engineers were attracted to the better living
standards in large cities. The institutions of the Academy and the university system
were first established in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kazan, Kharkov, Kiev, and Lvov.
Major centers of scientific and technological information, libraries, and archives
were also in the main cities. At the same time administrative constraints were placed
on the expansion of existing institutes in established cities which led to the creation
of the so-called science cities on the periphery of the large cities. Thus, the Moscow
region is famous for its centers of academic research in biology (Puschino), physics
(Troitsk), nuclear energy (Dubna, Protvino), chemistry (Noginsk), and agriculture
(Nemchinovka).
The need for secrecy led to the founding of approximately 60 separate closed
defense and nuclear research settlements, some located in remote areas. The highly
qualified staffs residing in these towns were employed at unique research facilities
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and experimental manufacturing plants. The total population of these towns was
over 3 million. The community services of the towns depended on financial support
from the local research institutes.
R&D activities in the newly developing regions (the North, Eastern Siberia,
and the Soviet Far East) were largely in the Academy institutes and in the research
units attached to local authorities. These activities gave political prestige to the
national republics and helped to solve local economic and social problems. In most
cases they were not able to satisfy the local industries’ demands for R&D services,
so many leading mining research institutes and design and project organizations
(e.g., oil, gas, coal industries) in Moscow and St. Petersburg were active in serving
enterprises in distant regions. In fact only about 20 percent of applied R&D
performed in Moscow was directed toward enterprises in the city or its region.
Management and Administration
The administrative system of R&D management did not have the tools to rationalize
at the microlevel. The annual allocation of funds to an R&D institute depended on
its size. As a result, there was no incentive for institute directors to close obsolete
research programs, thereby downsizing the overall budget of their institutes. The
implementation of new research projects often meant establishing new laboratories.
Increasing concentration of R&D in large institutes was characteristic of the
1950–1970 period, when average R&D employment per institution grew fourfold.
An attempt was made to restrict the establishment of new R&D institutions, but
this purely bureaucratic measure could not stop increases in R&D employment.
The average staff size in R&D institutions grew by 66 percent between 1970
and 1988. In the early 1990s, an average R&D institution employed 418 staff
members, including 214 researchers (Table 2.2). The R&D institutions in Russia
were larger than most comparable units in other nations. Research institutes that
were not integrated with enterprises were twice as large as other types of R&D
units. In the atomic and defense industries some research institutes employed a
staff of thousands. Large R&D units were generously provided with funding and
equipment and gradually dominated particular fields of S&T, while small units
fared poorly. Such distortions in the organizational structures of R&D in favor of
large institutions reduced the flexibility of the system.
Bargaining System
The Soviet R&D model shaped under centralized planning was in effect a bargaining
system in the absence of a market. Centralized management and control, multi-
level hierarchical institutional structures, and departmental barriers were based on
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Table 2.2. Average staff size of R&D institutions on 1 January 1991.
Total R&D Personnel Researchers
Research institute 609 321
Design organization 334 155
Higher education institution 240 157
Industrial enterprise 317 153
Median 418 214
Source: Author’s estimates.
noneconomic factors driven by politics. Demand for and supply of R&D services
was set by state plans rather than by orders from producing enterprises.
Perestroika reforms in 1988 and 1989 introduced new economic arrange-
ments for the R&D system; these new arrangements were part of the concept of
khozraschet (self-financing of R&D institutions and enterprises). R&D institutions
became increasingly independent in the selection of research objectives and re-
ceived the right to create project portfolios on the basis of negotiated contracts with
enterprises that used R&D. The reforms brought about the first de-e´tatisation (a
form of denationalization) of research institutes and gave staff members the right
to rent buildings and equipment from the government to address their own research
agenda.
Initially, the changes created new links between R&D and industry via direct
contracts. However, research institutes started to raise contract prices and to focus
on simpler, short-term projects in order to gain premiums for completed work.
Institutes dominating particular R&D areas gained the most: in such institutes
revenues exceeded costs by as much as 60 percent. In 1988, R&D institutions
attached to 18 industry branch ministries completed more than 107,000 contracts
for enterprises, a 2.6-fold increase over 1987, although the average cost of an R&D
project decreased by half. Small-scale R&D projects, particularly those based on
work completed earlier, were the most profitable activities. Less profitable basic
and long-term applied research was neglected. This experience shows that partial
reforms in the absence of a real market environment and institutional changes
cannot correct distortions in an unbalanced R&D system, but rather strengthen the
short-term orientation of R&D.
R&D vs. Innovation
Specific institutional and organizational principles of the USSR’s R&D (depart-
mental barriers and R&D separated from industry) emphasized research at the
expense of innovation. This research and development vs. innovation imbalance
became the crucial factor in the sluggish innovation activity.
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Table 2.3. Growth rates percentages of selected R&D input and output indicators
in the former USSR.
1971–1975 1976–1980 1981–1985 1986–1989
R&D expenditurea 10.4 6.4 6.4 13.9
Number of prototypes
of new machines and
equipment developedb – –7.4 –6.2 –26.4
aAverage annual growth rate for the period (at current prices).
bGrowth during the period compared with the previous period.
Source: Author’s estimates.
Despite an increase in R&D expenditures in absolute terms until 1990, R&D
output and innovation declined steadily from the mid-1970s (see Table 2.3). The
number of major inventions introduced in 1990 was half that in 1985. The level
of quality of innovation activity was also lower in 1990 than previous levels. The
share of products at the highest technical level (defined as higher than the best
compatible products available worldwide) declined from 9.1 percent in 1980 to
4.5 percent in 1989. More than 70 percent of the total number of innovations was
aimed at minor improvements of existing, mostly obsolete, technologies. Such
improvements were implemented relatively quickly, but in two or three years they
were no longer useful. In the 1980s, 25 percent of documented innovations had
already been registered as inventions 6 to 10 years earlier.
Diffusion of innovation was a weak point of Soviet R&D. Generally, innova-
tions were introduced in one or two enterprises, and only 13 percent of innovations
were used by additional enterprises, mainly in allied industries. Even in cases
where the USSR had a leading position in the development of significant inno-
vations (e.g., oxygen converters and continuous steel-pouring technologies) the
country fell behind others in diffusion of the innovations. Thus, in 1960, when the
Martin steel process was beginning to be replaced by the oxygen converter system,
the shares of output from the new process were the same in the USSR and in the
United States. By 1985 almost all of the output in the United States was by the
new process; in Russia, however, by 1993 only half of the output was by the new
process. A similar situation occurred with the use of continuous steel casting: in
the United States, Japan, and Germany the new system accounted for between 75
and 90 percent of the poured steel output in 1990 compared with 30 percent in
Russia (Centre for Economic Conjuncture, 1994, p. 4). The slow diffusion process
of the Soviet era is one reason catch-up remained a dominant theme in the Russian
S&T strategy.
The low rate of innovation and diffusion reflected the lack of incentives for
enterprises to introduce new products and processes. In the Soviet system prices
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were based in part on costs, reducing the incentive for an enterprise to introduce
new processes to lower costs. The centralized planning system ensured that almost
all output would be sold, reducing the incentive for an enterprise to introduce new
products to gain sales volume. The planning system emphasized the increase in the
volume of output, not its quality or cost. There were few provisions for rewards
for managers and staff of an enterprise that introduced an innovation.
Autarkic Policy
The autarkic policy of the Soviet Union was also applied to science and technol-
ogy. Forced economic isolation of the USSR before World War II and negligible
international cooperation during the Cold War gradually resulted in a technology
level that lagged behind the international community, especially in the application
of industrial technology. In some areas domestic programs simply duplicated those
abroad, wasting resources instead of gaining from collaboration in international
efforts. In spite of the prominent achievements in such fields as space research and
nuclear physics, Russia’s contribution to world S&T literature has decreased from
an 8.6 share in 1981 to a 2.7 share in 1993. The country’s ranking in international
patenting indicators is even worse: its share does not exceed 0.1 percent of the total
patents granted in either the USA or Europe (European Commission, 1994).
In this section I’ve listed the features of the Soviet system that continue to cause
inefficiencies in Russian applied R&D activity. The transition to a market economy
has encountered many obstacles in research organizations as managers and officials
seek to maintain obsolete institutional structures. This factor has prevented a timely
reaction to changes in the environment and obfuscated the urgent need for structural
transformations.
2.2 R&D Trends since 1991
2.2.1 Initial impact of the transition
The present-day situation of the Russian R&D sector reflects the impact of eco-
nomic, social, and political factors associated with the dramatic changes of the
transition from the Soviet Union to the Russian Federation and from central plan-
ning to a market system. Several developments that occurred outside the R&D
sector have had a major impact on it. First, the introduction of a market economy
gave a new qualitative characteristic to the Russian economy. The dominance of
state-owned enterprises has fallen sharply. In 1994, private industrial enterprises
accounted for 79 percent of industrial output and 72 percent of industrial em-
ployment (State Committee on Statistics, 1995d, p. 317). Market activity became
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pervasive in all sectors of the economy, even those that remained dominated by
public enterprises. Second, there was a major economic crisis as shown by a fall
of 38 percent in real gross domestic product (GDP) from 1991 to 1995. Inflation
was high, sometimes as much as 25 percent in one month. The economic decline
resulted in an increasing burden on the national budget and, consequently, the
impossibility of maintaining government appropriations for R&D at their previ-
ous real level. (The budget deficit reached approximately 10 percent of GDP in
1994.) Investment by enterprises fell by 73 percent from 1991 to 1995 reflecting
the poor financial position of enterprises, the decline of the domestic market for
capital goods, and increased competition from imports. The economic crisis led to
a drastic decline in the demand for R&D and innovation by enterprises.
In the R&D sector these trends resulted in a major downsizing. This downsizing
was accompanied by a fall of the prestige of R&D employment caused in part by
the decline in real wages, especially when compared with the business sector. In
public opinion surveys, the prestige of scientific activity was considered fairly low
among persons with higher education, especially those under 40. Approximately
67 percent of respondents thought that the role of S&T in Russia was falling, and
among people with advanced degrees this opinion was expressed by 80 percent of
those interviewed (CSRS, 1996a).
The breakup of the Soviet Union created problems for R&D activity because
many institutions were designed to serve all 15 republics. Russia’s R&D institutions
and universities, for example, served the other republics extensively in both R&D
and training. Simultaneously, a number of research institutes, industrial R&D
units, and special facilities (such as the space-launching site in Baikonur and
the Crimean and Armenian observatories) found themselves outside the Russian
Federation without proper links to Russian units. The USSR Academy of Sciences
as a single administrative structure was dissolved. As a result, inter-republic
research programs have been discontinued and R&D contracts between institutes
and enterprises in different republics have been canceled. Furthermore, the R&D
capacities of the newly independent states inherited from the Soviet era are not
matched to the needs of these new national economies.
A further factor has been the decentralization of decisions with a decline in
the role of the state and an increase in that of industrial associations, enterprises,
and local authorities. The unstable political situation and frequent changes in
government policy and replacement of leading officials adversely affect the making
and implementation of strategic and tactical decisions of public policy including
those for S&T. Decisions are often influenced by leaders of research institutes who
are close to powerful politicians.
Finally, Russian R&D is gradually being integrated into the international R&D
community. Participation of Russian scientists and engineers in international S&T
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projects, employment abroad of Russian researchers, the establishment of foreign
companies in Russia, and joint ventures involving Russian and foreign organi-
zations are some of the ways Russia has entered the international S&T market.
As stated in a recent Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) report on Russian R&D,
Many Russian scientists, especially in the younger generation, are becoming
quickly integrated into the international scientific community. The changed situ-
ation has also confirmed that Russia does indeed possess considerable scientific
talent, and this is a source of optimism for the future. [OECD, 1994a, Vol. I,
p. 21]
2.2.2 The downsizing of the Russian R&D sector
All the transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe have experienced re-
ductions in the size and quality of their R&D sectors that have been unparalleled
in recent decades. For example, Russian total R&D expenditure in 1994 was only
23.1 percent of that in 1990 in real terms (Exhibit A3.1). The share of gross do-
mestic expenditure on R&D declined from 2.0 percent in 1990 to 0.82 percent
in 1994. OECD data indicate that by 1994 Russia fell below the median in the
group of countries with low R&D potential such as Ireland, Iceland, Spain, and
New Zealand. Such comparisons alarmingly demonstrate the low level of R&D
financing in Russia. In most other countries in the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) the R&D percentages of GDP were even smaller (Gokhberg, 1996a).
The high level of militarization of Soviet R&D by 1990 has been noted in
several publications (Gokhberg, 1991; CSRS, 1993; OECD, 1994a, Vol. II). In
the transition the share of R&D in total military expenditure decreased from 19.8
percent in 1989 (USSR) to 10.2 percent in 1995 (Russia). Lack of a well-grounded
national military doctrine makes it impossible to judge the rationale of current
expenditures on defense R&D.
The objectives of R&D have changed with the downsizing. In 1991, defense
R&D accounted for nearly 43 percent of total R&D. In 1994 this share decreased
to 26 percent due to the reduction of defense programs (Exhibit A3.2). Russia’s
proportion of R&D spending on defense is now at a level characteristic of other
nuclear powers – the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Within
nondefense R&D, the general advancement of research has increased its share (12.5
percent of GERD in 1994). Within R&D oriented to economic development those
efforts aimed at economic efficiency and technological development of industry
represent 8.8 percent of GERD. However, the shares allocated to strategic goals
such as protection of human health and the rational utilization of energy make up
only 3.2 percent each; environmental protection receives an even smaller share,
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Table 2.4. Percentage distribution of GERD by source of funds.
1986a 1988a 1990a 1991 1992 1993 1994
Budget funds 86.4 78.8 79.4 95.0 91.9 92.5 61.0
Non-budget fundsb 11.4 16.8 18.0 2.6 4.4 4.6 6.3
Funds of enterprises
and R&D institutions 2.2 4.4 2.6 2.4 3.7 2.9 32.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
aData refer to the former USSR.
bBefore 1991, centralized funds.
Source: CSRS, various years.
only 1.6 percent of GERD (these research directions are not itemized in Exhibit
A3.2).
2.2.3 Financing of R&D
The downsizing of Russian R&D after 1990 was accompanied by some shifts in
its sources of financing. Enterprises played a small role – no more than 4 percent
of R&D was financed by enterprises during the 1989–1993 period (Table 2.4).
Between 1990 and 1992 the macroeconomic situation discouraged such spending.
The government has remained the main source of R&D general funds; non-
budget funds were introduced in 1992 to finance R&D of enterprises in specific
sectors. The funds are termed “non-budget” because they are derived from vol-
untary contributions of enterprises at the rate of 1.5 percent of the value of their
sales rather than from taxes. The funds largely support applied R&D of value to
the industry of the contributing enterprises (for details, see Chapter 7). However,
the amount collected in 1992 was lower, by a factor 15, than the level anticipated,
as many enterprises did not pay their share. Moreover, some funds were channeled
to financing the introduction of new products manufactured by enterprises. In our
estimate, the share of these non-budget funds in 1992 and in 1993 accounted for
only 4.4 percent and 4.6 percent, respectively, of Russia’s total R&D expenditures.
The lack of alternatives to government support has compelled the Soviet-
style centralized system of R&D financing to continue into the transition years.
Government funds provided over 90 percent of Russian GERD in 1993. The
government, however, has failed to provide adequate funds to maintain the Soviet
R&D establishment Russia inherited. In 1994 government R&D financing in real
terms was only one-fourth that in 1991 (Exhibit A3.8). The decline in financing was
so pronounced that an orderly restructuring of R&D institutions was impossible.
The provision of government budget support was also characterized by uncertainty
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for only one-half to two-thirds of the planned appropriations for R&D were actually
delivered, making efficient management of their use difficult.
During the Soviet period appropriations for R&D occupied a very modest place
in government budget spending: from 1970 to 1990 their share was between 3.4 and
4.8 percent of the total budget. As the transition proceeded, government budgetary
support of R&D continued to decline with R&D accounting for only 2.8 percent
of the government budget in 1994, the lowest share in 25 years (Exhibit A3.9).
Despite numerous declarations, state policy failed to raise R&D to a high-priority
position in the years of transition. Instead, R&D became a major victim of budget
cuts to reduce the government deficit. In addition, the failure to meet the planned
expenditure was greater for R&D than for other expenditures. R&D spending was
subject to the so-called residual principle of state budgeting carried over from the
Soviet era (Gokhberg, 1991). This principle gives low priority to activities such
as R&D and education; only the residual of the state budgets, after the financial
needs of high-priority activities have been met, are available for these low-priority
activities.
By 1994 two significant changes could be observed in R&D financing (Exhibit
A3.4). First, non-budget funds, introduced in 1992, became a more significant
factor in R&D financing than earlier (particularly, in the more prosperous industry
sectors); they accounted for 6.3 percent of GERD. Second, business enterprise
financing became increasingly significant, accounting for 19.9 percent of GERD.
The enhanced role of enterprises resulted from the sharp decline in government
spending rather than an absolute increase in financing from enterprises. Still both
developments suggest that centralized government financing was gradually being
replaced by a variety of sources of which enterprises were the most significant.
Recently, there have been attempts to change the structure of budget appro-
priations for R&D. The changes were effected through the shift of the three main
budget orientations for civil R&D which are coordinated by the Ministry of Science
and Technological Policy of the Russian Federation (MSTP). These items are:
1. Institutional funding of R&D institutions, aimed at maintaining staffs, facilities,
and equipment.
2. Financing of R&D by priority objectives in the framework of government S&T
programs, programs of federal research centers, and international programs.
3. Financing of specific projects by the newly established goal-oriented budgetary
foundations for basic research, humanities research, and promotion of small
enterprises in S&T.
The budget appropriations for these items are given in Table 2.5. Institutions in
the first category are allocated institutional funding according to their size; funding
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Table 2.5. Structure of budget appropriations for civil R&D (%).
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a
Institutional funding of R&D institutions 79.9 79.2 83.5 81.7 72.0
Priority R&D objectives 18.1 17.8 14.4 14.0 20.3
Specific budgetary funds 2.0 3.0 2.1 4.3 7.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
aPreliminary estimate.
Source: Author’s estimates.
does not depend on the areas or results of research. More than half of this institu-
tional funding is targeted to R&D institutions in the industrial sector, meaning that
budget funds continue to substitute for applied R&D financing by enterprises. In
contrast, the financing of R&D in the framework of government S&T programs and
other priority objectives (the second category) is results-oriented. In this category
funds are distributed by the MSTP directly to R&D institutions for specific research
projects. In spite of the imperfect nature of establishing programs, setting priori-
ties, soliciting tenders, and evaluating results, this approach can concentrate limited
budget resources on priorities that correspond to the urgent tasks for Russia’s de-
velopment. A results-oriented allocation of financing also introduces competition
into the activities of research teams through a system of grants and contract awards.
This is a step toward the formation of a new structure for R&D that corresponds
to the reality of a market economy. The ratio of the results-oriented financing of
R&D to that of R&D institutions is a rough indicator of the effective transforma-
tion of S&T policy in the transition. The MSTP is committed to results-oriented
allocation of R&D funds, but pressures from the Academy, ministries, and depart-
ments have prevented it from moving more radically to distributing R&D funds
competitively. Clearly, a more radical move to results-oriented financing would
decrease the traditional role of the Academy and the ministries in managing the
institutes subordinated to them. Hence the share of the budget appropriation for
civilian R&D to fund institutions rather than projects has declined from 80 percent
in 1991 to only 72 percent in 1995.
Finally, since 1991 numerous R&D projects have been financed by foreign
research centers, commercial companies, and international organizations. In spite
of the small share of foreign funds in total Russian R&D effort (2 percent of GERD,
1.9 percent of that in the business enterprise sector[1]), this financing marks the
beginning of direct links between Russian R&D institutions and foreign partners.
For a number of organizations listed under the defense industry, foreign orders,
largely for civilian R&D, are now their only source of financing.
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2.2.4 Shift in the activities of R&D institutions
Under the impact of the transition to a market economy, activities of R&D in-
stitutions are gradually changing (Table 2.6). This process is connected with the
tendencies of R&D institutions to reorganize themselves to adapt to the new eco-
nomic environment and particularly to survive under severely unfavorable financial
conditions. These changes have altered the four major R&D sectors.
 Academy Sector: The USSR Academy has been transformed into the Russian
Academy of Sciences (RAS). The RAS has largely retained the commanding
position of its USSR predecessor and maintained administrative control over
the activities of its research institutes. To date, the Academy has not signifi-
cantly changed the structure and bureaucratic organization it had in the Soviet
era. Using its considerable political influence, the Academy has managed to
retain its budget financing better than other R&D sectors. Government financ-
ing has largely been in the form of support to basic research. Basic research
amounted to 58 percent of the Academy’s 1994 expenditures, up from 52 per-
cent in 1990 (Figure 2.1). Applied R&D continues to account for more than
one-third of the Academy’s activities. Academy institutes have maintained
some participation in budgetary-financed goal-oriented S&T programs. As
a result, the Academy sector somewhat increased its proportion in the total
value of applied R&D between 1990 and 1994. With respect to development,
Academy institutes are usually not competitive with industry R&D units, so
this is a minor activity accounting for only 7 percent of the 1994 Academy
R&D effort. In 1994 an attempt was made to establish a new administrative
body – the Technological Academy – to manage defense R&D institutions.
The measure would have significantly increased the Academy’s role in applied
R&D, but it was defeated.
 Higher Education Sector: The recent economic difficulties have reduced the
role of university R&D as R&D is no longer considered an economically
“profitable” activity and has become a marginal one in many universities.
R&D is no longer carried out at 40 percent of higher education institutions,
and the 150 newly established private universities have little interest in R&D.
The higher education share in GERD declined from 6 percent in 1990 to 4
percent in 1994.
The universities’ share in basic research increased (in both absolute and
relative terms) because applied R&D performed on contracts with industry
decreased sharply, leaving them more dependent on budget funds for basic
research. The share of basic research in overall R&D in universities doubled
and by the beginning of 1995 had reached 39.6 percent, almost 10 times higher
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Figure 2.1. Percentage distribution of R&D conducted within R&D institutions
by type of activity and sector of performance.
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Table 2.6. Percentage distribution of R&D value performed within R&D institu-
tions by type of activity and sector of performance.
Higher Industrial
Academy education R&D Enterprise Total
Basic research
1990 62.4 12.9 23.8 0.9 100.0
1992 66.4 16.8 16.7 0.1 100.0
1994 58.2 13.3 28.4 0.1 100.0
Applied research
1990 10.6 11.0 75.7 2.6 100.0
1992 18.1 7.8 72.1 2.0 100.0
1994 15.2 6.2 76.7 1.9 100.0
Development
1990 2.4 2.0 88.7 6.9 100.0
1992 1.7 1.5 89.1 7.6 100.0
1994 1.5 1.3 87.5 9.7 100.0
Total
1990 10.5 6.1 78.5 4.9 100.0
1992 13.6 5.1 76.2 5.2 100.0
1994 12.6 4.2 77.0 6.2 100.0
Source: CSRS, various years; discrepancies in totals are due to rounding.
than the sector’s share in the national R&D total. Universities, however, are
having difficulties competing with Academy institutes in basic research and
with industrial organizations in applied R&D; therefore, they are gradually
losing their position in the overall R&D effort. Universities carry out few de-
velopment activities. In 1994 they accounted for 1.3 percent of all development
spending (Table 2.6).
 Industrial R&D: This sector has retained its share of GERD of over 75 percent.
Industrial R&D institutes have retained strong links with enterprises, usually
in the framework of institutional structures that have partly replaced branch
ministries such as associations, financial industrial groups, or large conglom-
erate firms. As a result, these institutes have responded to the short-term
requirements of enterprises. Their share of long-term research has declined as
enterprises have little interest in financing such activity, given the current fi-
nancial situation. Deterioration of the financial position of the large industrial
R&D institutes, however, has forced them to increase their efforts on basic
research financed by the government (especially in the case of the defense
industry), thus competing directly with Academy institutes for support. As a
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consequence the Academy sector’s share in Russian basic research declined
from 62 percent in 1990 to 58 percent in 1994, while the share of industrial
R&D institutions increased from 24 percent to 28 percent (Table 2.6).
 Enterprise Sector: This sector, with a relatively small proportion of R&D, has
increased its emphasis on development activities. Development constituted
80 percent of enterprise R&D activity in 1991 and 91 percent in 1994. These
R&D activities are usually financed by the enterprises themselves. There was
a modest increase in the enterprises’ share of the total R&D effort from 4.9
percent in 1990 to 6.2 percent in 1994 largely because some enterprises needed
to maintain their in-house R&D units (Table 2.6).
At the aggregate level these changes have led to an increase in the share of basic
research in total GERD from 8.8 percent in 1990 to 16.9 percent in 1995. According
to this indicator, Russia comes close to the leading industrial countries; the share
of basic research in total national R&D is 13 percent in the United Kingdom and
Japan, 14 percent in the United States, 19 percent in Germany, and 23 percent in
France (National Science Board, 1991, p. 344). It is important to note that the
increase in basic research is only in its share in total R&D. Expressed at 1990
prices, Russian basic research in 1994 was equal only to 23 percent of its 1990
amount.
A new methodology, developed by the Centre for Science Research and Statis-
tics (CSRS), to survey Russian R&D by OECD standards allows us to glance at the
sectoral pattern of R&D in Russia. This new sectoral classification is based on the
performance of R&D rather than its financing (see Annex 2 for a description of the
sectoral classification).
Data on R&D performance show that the enterprise sector dominates Russian
R&D. Its share in 1994 accounted for 66 percent of GERD, almost the same as
the OECD average of 67.4 percent in 1993. It matches the indicators of large
economies such as the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, and
France (OECD, 1995a, p. 22). The internal composition of the enterprise sector
in Russia, however, is different from that in the OECD, as it comprises mainly
independent research institutes working for industry rather than enterprises. The
share of the government sector performing R&D in Russia was 28.1 percent of
GERD in 1994. This is double the OECD average (12.7 percent in 1993). The
R&D activities of the Academy of Sciences accounts for most of this difference.
The share of the higher education sector in Russia is small in comparison
with other industrialized countries. In 1994 higher education institutes represented
5.9 percent of GERD; the share in OECD member countries was, on average, 3
to 4 times higher. Russia’s private nonprofit sector comprises only 7 research
institutions contributing less than 0.1 percent of GERD in 1994 compared with 2.9
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percent in OECD countries. The rise of scientific societies, nonprofit foundations,
and institutions should contribute to the growth of the nonprofit sector’s R&D
efforts.
2.2.5 The struggle to survive
The sharp fall in government financing made R&D institutions search for alternative
sources of financing. Some of the new activities undertaken to raise revenue
were related to R&D such as information services, testing, quality control, and
consulting. Other activities were remote from R&D such as manufacturing of
products for sale, leasing of equipment and buildings, marketing, and printing
services. These new trends began even before the 1991–1992 reforms (Gokhberg,
1991; CSRS, 1992, 1993). Beginning in 1990, there was a gradual increase in
the share of activities unrelated to R&D and, by 1995, such activities made up 10
percent of the total activity of R&D institutes (Table 2.7). Until 1992, R&D projects
had been more profitable for R&D institutions than other activities, but since then,
according to our estimates, work other than R&D has become more profitable
(CSRS, 1993, p. 221). Some R&D institutions began intensive efforts to occupy
the earlier underdeveloped niches in the rapidly shaping market infrastructure,
and the growth in production and business services outstripped activities with an
S&T orientation. By 1994, a number of R&D institutions managed to reequip
experimental plants for small-scale production and began rendering information,
computer, and marketing services to newly established banks, trade, insurance, and
tourist companies. However, the possibilities of developing non-R&D activities
with the facilities and personnel of R&D institutions have physical limitations. The
most common non-R&D activity has become leasing real estate and equipment.[2]
According to CSRS survey data by the end of 1995, 51 percent of research institutes
were leasing their premises, 15 percent were leasing equipment, and 24 percent
were engaged in production for the market.
There are three main microlevel strategies for R&D institutions:
 Continuation of R&D as the main activity.
 Reorientation to other S&T, production, and related services (which may in-
clude cessation of R&D activity).
 Orientation to commercial operations such as leasing real estate and equipment.
In most cases R&D institutions follow some combination of all three strategies.
However, in 1994 approximately 221 design bureaus and construction project
organizations discontinued all R&D activities.
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Table 2.7. Percentage distribution of the value of projects undertaken by R&D
institutions by type of activity.
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a
Basic research 6.4 8.0 8.4 9.7 9.5 10.5 9.2
Applied research 32.7 31.5 30.0 26.3 25.2 24.9 22.0
Design and projects 35.8 36.1 33.9 34.4 35.9 – –
Production of prototypes 7.8 8.9 10.3 13.9 13.9 48.8 49.7
Construction projecting 8.8 7.0 7.3 4.5 4.7 – –
S&T services 4.0 4.0 5.1 4.4 4.6 7.4 8.7
Others 4.5 4.4 5.0 6.8 6.2 8.4 10.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
aPreliminary estimate.
Source: Author’s estimates.
2.2.6 Human resources of Russian R&D
Microlevel adjustments by R&D institutions to the economic environment explain
to a considerable extent the current trends in R&D employment, which at first
glance look puzzling. From 1990 to 1994 R&D expenditures measured in real
terms were reduced by almost 77 percent, while employment in R&D institutions
decreased by only 43 percent (Exhibit A2.1). This is an indirect indication of the
worsening renumeration of researchers and the decline of actual R&D activity by
the remaining research staff.
The process of reduction in employment in R&D institutions has been uneven.
During the first stage between 1989 and 1991, the employment reductions were
concentrated in the technical and support staffs in an effort to keep research teams
together. The reduced number of technicians, laboratory assistants, and support
workers inevitably reduced the productivity of scientists who were often forced to
combine research with support activities. By 1994, the proportion of support per-
sonnel stabilized at 42 percent of the total employment, compared with 37 percent
in 1990 (Exhibit A2.2). The share of researchers continued to decline, reflecting the
fact that many research institutes are gradually turning toward economic activities
and away from scientific activities.
Most of the staff reductions were voluntary departures, reflecting the outflow
of scientists and engineers to the business sector – the so-called internal brain
drain. The opportunities and rewards in business have made the sector increas-
ingly attractive to qualified and enterprising people. Seventy-one percent of those
leaving R&D employment list higher salaries as a prime reason for their decision.
Highly qualified researchers can easily find employment in the rapidly growing
business sector, and many top-level managers of banks, industrial groups, joint
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ventures, and newly privatized companies have doctoral degrees in scientific fields.
This redistribution of talent in favor of new market segments is probably a gain
for the national economy as a whole but a loss to research. Less-qualified staff
members, experiencing difficulties in employment, are returning to the relatively
low-salaried positions in the budgetary-supported R&D sector, thus restaffing the
support positions.
With the reduction in the number of R&D personnel, the share of researchers
with advanced degrees increased from 7 to 10 percent from 1989 to 1994 (Exhibit
A2.2). Over this same period there was an absolute growth of 16.2 percent in
the number of doctors of science. The change reflects the tendency of the young
staff members without advanced degrees and holding junior positions in the R&D
institutes to leave in large numbers.
The Academy sector has had the smallest reduction in personnel. R&D per-
sonnel in the RAS decreased by only 14 percent from 1990 to 1994, which is almost
one-third of the average decline in Russia (38 percent) and in industrial R&D in-
stitutions (38 percent). Full-time R&D staff declined by 60 percent at universities
and by 42 percent at R&D units in enterprises.
Employment in R&D is determined in part by noneconomic motivations. Ac-
cording to a 1995 survey conducted by the CSRS almost 60 percent of all researchers
and 70 percent of those in the Academy were planning to continue as researchers
since they regard research as a lifelong commitment. Only 3 percent of respon-
dents declared a firm intention to change their jobs. Approximately 72 percent of
respondents emphasized that their interest in the profession is the main reason for
staying in science; 34 percent hoped for an improvement in the R&D situation.
The improvement that they hope for is primarily better salaries. In 1988,
the introduction of a contract-based management mechanism in R&D institutions
contributed to a sharp increase in researchers’ salaries. At the beginning of 1989,
for the first time in many years, the average monthly salary in R&D rose above that
in industry. Salaries began to decline in relative terms in subsequent years, and by
1992 the average salary in R&D was 64 percent of the average for the economy as
a whole. Only special efforts by the government allowed this ratio to increase to
73 percent in 1995.
Averages hide an important fact: salaries in the R&D sector can rarely match
salaries in other sectors, so few talented young researchers will remain in R&D.
Conversely, researchers 60 years and older are less likely to leave R&D institutions
and earn almost 40 percent above the average in the R&D sector. The research
institutes’ inability or unwillingness to offer competitive salaries is an important
factor in the outflow of persons in the more active working-ages and in the reduced
inflow of young scholars. The result is the aging of R&D personnel. As many as 44
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percent of the doctors of science are over 60 and the average age of RAS members
is between 63 (for economists) and 72 (for international relations experts).
Many scientists who continue their research careers frequently supplement their
income with a second salary. Arrears in R&D salary payments by the institutes
leave many without any income for months at a time and even those who are paid
regard their salaries as inadequate. To survive, many researchers take part-time
employment outside their institutes. According to a CSRS estimate, 57 percent of
all researchers have contracts with private firms and 80 percent of these researchers
are mainly employed by the Academy.
In addition to the internal brain drain and diversion of effort from R&D insti-
tutions, there is an international migration of Russian scientists. A recent study by
the CSRS, using data from the Ministry of the Interior, provides a good estimate of
the proportion of R&D personnel that has emigrated from Russia (Exhibit A2.13).
Emigrants accounted for only 0.5 percent of the total outflow of staff from the
R&D sector. This indicates that the process of external brain drain has not taken
on serious dimensions. Furthermore, part of the flow of emigration is driven by
ethnic factors with the economics of the labor market playing only a minor role.
In addition to migration of R&D personnel, there has been an outflow of
researchers for temporary work abroad. The most frequent participants in this
type of migration are researchers from the Academy sector. In 1991–1992, 1,101
researchers of the RAS were on long-term tours abroad, in 1993 the number
increased to 2,639 (3 percent of total RAS employment). Fifty-five percent of these
individuals were under 40; 19 percent were doctors of science; and 51 percent were
candidates of science.
These numbers include the “double-life” scientists who spend considerable
time abroad but retain their connection with the Russian institute and their Russian
residence. While the numbers cited suggest a rather modest quantitative impact,
one should realize that it is the highly qualified, talented specialists who are placing
their efforts abroad rather than in the work of domestic Russian R&D. If they
return with greater skills, Russian R&D gains, but if they do not return to full-time
employment or return only when their productive years are over, Russia loses.
The absence of these researchers may have serious consequences on a number of
highly qualified scientific groups and promising research areas (Gokhberg, 1996b;
Nekipelova et al., 1994).
Our analysis has shown that Russian S&T has approached a turning point: the
demand for R&D has already radically shifted and the supply (including efficiency
and quality) is also going through changes. Its future depends more on the re-
forms for the entire economy than on reforms specific to S&T. These reforms will
determine whether the post-Soviet R&D system becomes a high-value, economi-
cally adjusted, and effectively operating entity in a flourishing industrial state or
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a marginal element in a raw-material-oriented economy. It is obviously important
to create the conditions under which the vital forces of Russian R&D can make
Russia a prosperous member of the international community.
Notes
[1] Such estimates do not include grants and scholarships allocated to separate scientists
for individual research since the statistics are traditionally oriented to legal entities as
reporting units. Besides, such grants, as a rule, are for basic research.
[2] Thus, what we are observing is not simply “polarization of R&D spectrum” (Radosevic,
1994). Between 1989 and 1995, small changes in the shares of the extremes or “poles”
– namely, those of basic research and development – were offset, but now some of the
former share of applied research is filled by non-R&D activities.
Chapter 3
The Institutional Structure
of Applied R&D
Viacheslav Alimpiev and Alexander Sokolov
The institutional structure of Russian applied R&D is best understood as a compli-
cated product of its historical evolution. In order to identify the determinants of the
current institutions, the developments of the Soviet era introduced in Chapter 2 are
further detailed in this chapter. In 1991, the Soviet era ended and the Russian period
began in a dramatic fashion. That change created new institutional structures and
problems which we illustrate in this chapter by describing the R&D organization
for metallurgy. The chapter concludes with a survey of the current legal structures
for S&T.
3.1 The Evolution of R&D in the Soviet Era
3.1.1 The early Soviet era (1917–1955)
As indicated in Chapter 2, the Soviets took control of the institutional science
structure of czarist Russia in 1917. In the 1920s several large research institutes
were established, and these became the primary organizational form for carrying
out R&D. At this time different sectors (Academy, higher education, and industrial
R&D) were established.
In 1931, the Soviet government decided to reorganize the network of research
institutes. Organizations were classified by function as research institutes, design
bureaus, or pilot plants. The reorganization made clear distinctions between central
research institutes in the individual ministries doing advanced research and sectoral
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research institutes carrying out narrower and more applied projects in research in-
stitutes at places of higher education, laboratories in factories, and experimental
facilities tied to production units. Sectoral research institutes were directly sub-
ordinate to ministries or ministerial departments in charge of large parts of the
economy. The Academy of Sciences directed institutes that focused primarily on
basic research.
Regional development of applied R&D was provided by the established af-
filiates of central branch research institutes and new industrial R&D institutions
in regions where industries were developing. For the most part, however, R&D
remained concentrated in large industrial and cultural centers such as Moscow,
Leningrad, Kiev, and Kharkov. In 1939, some 90 percent of R&D personnel was
located in Moscow and Leningrad. The development of industrial R&D in east-
ern regions of Russia occurred only during World War II, when large numbers of
research institutes were moved east.
3.1.2 R&D as a national resource (1955–1985)
The next stage was characterized by the perception of S&T as a powerful resource
for national development. The importance of R&D was demonstrated by the
creation of the State Science and Technology Committee of the USSR in 1957.
In 1965, the Committee was transformed into the State Committee on Science
and Technology (SCST) of the USSR. This body was responsible for developing
a general strategy for R&D and coordinated overall economic policy among the
main governmental agencies, such as the State Planning Committee (Gosplan), the
State Committee on Material and Technical Supplies, and others.
This stage was marked by major growth in technical potential. Many, mostly
small, research institutes were established. The period of economic reforms in the
1950s (characterized by decentralization of management) saw the development of
industrial R&D in peripheral regions. Large industrial research institutes were set
up in places with the largest concentration of industry. In the 1960s, the Siberian
branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences, along with academies of sciences in
many Soviet republics, was established. Applied R&D remained largely within
industrial research institutes. A large proportion of applied R&D served the military
sector, which consumed about one-half of the Soviet Union’s R&D resources.
The infrastructure of R&D institutions had a linear character that was defined
even more precisely as time went on. Applied research was performed within
sectoral research institutes under the control of industrial ministries. The results of
the research were used by design bureaus of the same ministries to design prototypes
for industrial production. The prototypes were tested in experimental production
36 Viacheslav Alimpiev and Alexander Sokolov
before mass production began. The linear structure from research institute to design
bureau, to experimental production, and finally to mass production was similar in
all sectors of manufacturing. Initially this system was efficient because it avoided
duplication of research and ensured that R&D would be oriented to the priorities
of industry. Subsequently, because of the lack of feedbacks in the system and its
inflexible structure, the efficiency of R&D sharply decreased. The output of applied
R&D was often below international standards, but its monopoly character hid this
weakness.
During this period a distinct system of managing industrial applied R&D
was established. Within the framework of industrial ministries, the connection
of science to industry was accomplished by a single organization that managed
the entire cycle from performing applied R&D to the application of its results to
industrial production. An active role was played by sectoral ministries and their
departments, which strove to provide S&T services to all of their activities.
The system of rigid administrative planning that was used elsewhere in the
Soviet system was applied to S&T. Within industrial ministries, S&T departments
were responsible for managing R&D activities. Industrial ministries also super-
vised the All-Union industrial associations (AIA) and industrial associations (IA).
The integration of the R&D stages varied during the Soviet era, but a typical
organizational pattern is shown in Figure 3.1.
The industrial ministries determined research topics and the allocation of R&D
resources. Projects executed by branch research institutes were financed by the
appropriate ministries. In the late 1970s and the early 1980s a new system of
R&D organization was appended to the old one: large and important projects
were implemented within the framework of national S&T programs. This new
approach, however, brought about limited changes. For instance, R&D institutions
responsible for the the fulfillment of these programs had no authority to provide
financing to research institutes in adjacent branches, so there was no stimulus for
the implementation of projects that crossed ministry and industry boundaries.
3.1.3 Perestroika (1985–1991)
By the mid-1980s the growth rate of the gross national product (GNP) had slowed.
This decrease was partly due to reasons not directly related to the planning sys-
tem. The rate of growth in the supply of fuel decreased because new oil and gas
fields required tremendous investments. Only a part of these investments could
be appropriated, but even these outlays were sufficiently large to leave fewer re-
sources for other growth-promoting activities. Increased military spending reduced
resources available for production investments. A lower rate of investment, in turn,
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Figure 3.1. Typical organization of civil industrial R&D in the USSR.
reduced the rate of growth of productive fixed assets. Apart from these factors,
central planning proved to be ill-suited to the requirements of economic growth
of the 1980s, which depended more on sophisticated, fast-changing, manufactured
products, such as integrated circuits, and less on standard commodities like steel.
Development of S&T was hampered by poor feedbacks in the chain from R&D to
the customer, the absence of mechanisms promoting innovation, and the lack of
competition and entrepreneurship. While the reasons for the emergence of pere-
stroika were numerous, this new policy line was in part a response to a disappointing
record of economic growth.
In the perestroika period, R&D expenditures increased in key S&T fields such
as microelectronics and automation. Still, the rigid branch structure of S&T man-
agement and the lack of incentives for enterprises to utilize research results limited
the contribution of S&T activity to economic growth. New organizational forms
were introduced to overcome the barriers between industrial sectors, to promote in-
terdisciplinary R&D, and to accelerate the application of R&D results to the national
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economy. These institutional structures included research and production associ-
ations (RPAs) and intersectoral science and technology complexes. RPAs were
first established in the mid-1960s and proved to be efficient at improving R&D and
innovation activities in pre-reform Russia. RPAs brought together institutes and
enterprises to form, within one organization, the whole cycle from research to mass
production for a sector of industry. Intersectoral S&T complexes included research
institutes, design bureaus, and industrial enterprises from different sectors of the
economy. Their main task was to organize applied interdisciplinary research and to
implement the results in production. In a number of such complexes, technologies
were developed that were above the average world level. Examples of these can
be found in the fields of mechanization, metallurgy, membrane technologies, and
ocular microsurgery. Most applied R&D, however, produced results and designs
below world standards.
During the economic reforms of 1986–1990, several branch R&D institutions
were made subordinate to RPAs and to production associations (PAs). The new
organizations somewhat accelerated the process of innovation as R&D institutions
became engaged in the immediate supervision of the downstream introduction
of their developments into production. However, the associations, as a rule, gave
little attention to strengthening the research capacities of R&D institutions. Priority
was given to solving current problems of enterprises to the detriment of long-run
research.
The perestroika policy reinforced decentralization with more decisions made
at enterprise and departmental levels. As mentioned in Chapter 2, with the in-
troduction of khozraschet (a system of partial independence and self-financing
for enterprises and R&D organizations) contracts between research institutes and
industry became the basis for financing applied R&D. Market relations (contrac-
tual prices on scientific services and independence for R&D institutions to serve
selected customers) and freedom for enterprises to choose their R&D suppliers
were introduced. The 1990 Law on the Enterprise and Entrepreneurial Activity
gave even more leeway to individual enterprises. Disintegration of RPAs was one
consequence of the new freedom, for many enterprises withdrew from their associ-
ations. Enterprises did not consider RPAs important, particularly in the short run.
Experimental units were often separated from associations in order to profit from
small-scale production. Lack of interest in scientific results had a negative impact
on most R&D units of PAs and RPAs.
The state priorities in creating R&D-performing institutes are shown in Table
3.1. The table shows that the industrialization period and the period between 1955
and 1975 were the most active periods for creating new institutions in all fields
of applied R&D except biotechnology and nuclear engineering. From 1976 to
1985 a stagnation in institution-building in R&D was evident by the decrease in
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Table 3.1. Percentage distribution of institutions performing applied R&D in 1995
in fields of S&T by year of establishment.
Year of establishment
To 1926 1936 1946 1956 1966 1976 1986 Total
Field 1925 –35 –45 –55 –65 –75 –85 –95 in 1995
Power engineering 8.2 16.8 8.2 12.5 22.6 18.8 5.8 7.2 100.0
Electrical engineering 9.2 10.8 10.4 14.8 24.4 14.8 7.2 8.4 100.0
Electronics, radio
engineering 7.9 5.1 6.5 11.0 20.2 16.4 12.0 20.9 100.0
Communications 3.9 6.5 3.9 18.2 16.9 23.4 11.7 15.6 100.0
Automatics and
computer engineering 5.2 10.4 6.8 9.3 19.9 24.8 9.7 13.9 100.0
Mining 5.1 10.6 6.4 12.3 29.2 16.9 10.6 8.9 100.0
Metallurgy 4.4 12.7 7.8 8.8 28.3 16.1 9.8 12.2 100.0
Mechanical engineering 5.7 15.3 9.1 11.0 26.2 15.4 8.2 9.1 100.0
Nuclear engineering 5.9 2.9 11.8 14.7 17.6 8.8 14.7 23.5 100.0
Instrument engineering 4.2 6.8 9.4 12.5 26.4 17.4 10.6 12.8 100.0
Printing, documentary
reproduction, film
engineering 6.1 15.2 12.1 9.1 21.2 21.2 9.1 6.1 100.0
Chemical technology,
chemical industry 6.8 14.4 8.6 9.0 26.2 16.9 8.4 9.7 100.0
Biotechnology 13.3 12.0 6.7 6.7 16.0 20.0 9.3 16.0 100.0
Light industry 3.8 29.1 5.1 2.5 31.6 19.0 2.5 6.3 100.0
Food industry 3.7 18.5 9.3 4.6 18.5 12.0 11.1 22.2 100.0
Forestry and wood-
working industry 7.5 20.0 10.0 8.8 28.8 16.3 3.8 5.0 100.0
Construction,
architecture 8.2 15.0 6.4 12.7 24.0 16.8 6.4 10.5 100.0
Agriculture and
forestry 11.6 20.4 4.7 8.8 14.1 16.9 9.0 14.5 100.0
Fishery 19.4 12.9 4.8 9.7 12.9 17.7 12.9 9.7 100.0
Water distribution
systems, amelioration 8.9 16.7 8.3 8.9 16.7 20.8 10.7 8.9 100.0
Transport 3.3 12.3 9.1 13.6 16.9 19.8 7.4 17.7 100.0
Housing, communal,
and social services 0.0 16.7 7.1 9.5 23.8 21.4 11.9 9.5 100.0
Medicine and health 13.2 14.3 9.3 9.0 11.1 14.0 10.6 18.5 100.0
Total 7.2 13.7 7.8 10.5 21.8 17.7 8.9 12.4 100.0
Source: CSRS, 1996a.
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the number of new institutions in almost all fields of S&T. Since 1985 the changes
have been mostly in the form of restructuring existing research institutes.
3.2 Changes in R&D Organization
3.2.1 Governmental organization
The transition to a market economy since 1991 has had a major impact on R&D.
As detailed in Chapter 2, the first development was a sharp decline in R&D expen-
ditures and in the number of personnel employed in the R&D sector. The decline
was pervasive but most marked in applied R&D.
The second development was a series of major organizational transformations,
beginning at the highest levels of state management and extending to individ-
ual R&D institutes. The changes at the top occurred as the Russian Federation
supplanted the Soviet Union. The State Committee on Science and Technology
was replaced by the Ministry on Science and Technological Policy (MSTP) and
Gosplan, by the Ministry of Economy. Many branch ministries were closed. Pri-
vatization of R&D institutes, the establishment of large financial industrial groups,
and the founding of technically oriented small businesses created new forms of
organization for S&T activity. Changes at the top reflected the search for public
policies to preserve the most valuable part of the R&D sector. In individual R&D
units, the changes reflected a search for ways to survive in the economic crisis that
has burdened Russia since 1991. Table 3.2 shows that the number of R&D units
decreased in all but three sectors (railways, geology, natural resources).
In September 1993, a new comprehensive system of federal bodies was es-
tablished. Decisions on the development of science and technology at the federal
level were assigned to the Interdepartmental Coordination Commission on Science
and Technology Policy. In February 1995, this commission was transformed into
the Governmental Commission on Science and Technology Policy, headed by the
prime minister of Russia. The Council for Science and Technology Policy was
also established, and is headed by the president of Russia. This council considers
the strategic problems of S&T and makes recommendations for S&T policy. The
committees on education, culture, and science of the State Duma and the Council
of Federation are responsible for the preparation of legislation related to S&T.
Regional interests are an increasingly important new influence on government
science and technology policy. The new Constitution of the Russian Federation
assigns S&T development to the joint competence of the federal and regional
authorities. Management bodies for regional S&T (departments, committees, and
others) have been created in 35 regions of Russia. Regional associations of scientists
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Table 3.2. Number of R&D institutions affiliated to civilian industrial ministries.
Ministry 1992 1993 1994
Petroleum 115 93 98
Machinery 409 404 360
Metallurgy 82 73 66
Fuel 73 62 62
Railways 34 38 36
Stone, clay, and glass products 47 36 29
Construction 74 70 67
Communications 27 21 22
Agriculture and food products 323 292 258
Fishery 42 32 33
Geology 52 52 55
Natural resources 38 37 38
Source: Authors’ estimate.
and regional coordination centers serve to unite representatives of various R&D
institutions with regional authorities.
To increase democratic activities since 1991 various public unions of scientists
have been founded. Between 1991 and 1995, more than 60 new public academies
were established to function as independent, nonprofit bodies; these new academies
complement the 160 existing S&T and engineering societies. Most of the new orga-
nizations have regional branches. The Russian Union of Scientific and Engineering
Society combines 30 S&T societies and 73 regional departments. The Union of
Scientific Societies, established in 1993, incorporates about 50 organizations such
as the Russian Physics Society, the International Union of Instrument-Makers,
the Academy of Engineering, and the Academy of Natural Sciences. Through
these institutions, scientists have the possibility of influencing government S&T
programs.
3.2.2 Reform directions
The changes needed to make Russian R&D efficient are extensive. The research
and technological organizations should be more flexible, more competitive, and
more responsive than they are today. Administrative barriers between branches
and disciplines must be removed, and science and industry must integrate into
new economic and legal organizations. Integrated activities could be accomplished
through state research centers, centers of contractual research, technoparks, and
financial and industrial groups. Establishments that currently make up the Academy
and higher education sectors should be included in any process of restructuring.
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R&D institutions should function independently within the science and tech-
nology market. State bodies should be responsible for a limited number of tasks,
especially the choice of state priorities in S&T, development and financing of gov-
ernment S&T programs, and the support for a market infrastructure for technology
transfer.
The most radical way of overcoming intersectoral barriers would be a complete
withdrawal of R&D institutions from the branch management bodies. Such a
radical change requires careful analysis of R&D institutions and their distribution
according to the sector of science, the branch of economy, and their stage in the
innovation cycle. On the basis of such an evaluation, the best structure for the new
market conditions could be determined.
One possible way of reorganizing the network of R&D institutions is a system
proposed by the MSTP in 1992. The proposal suggested changing the organization
of research institutes and their financing according to their role in the national
R&D effort. Large research institutes would be transformed into the centers of
contractual research. These would be dominant in a given field of study, reflecting
the economies of scale of staff, equipment, and facilities. They would become the
“incubators” of new knowledge and technologies. These centers would function
in accordance with the government S&T programs, using their capacities to fill
R&D orders from interested customers. They would also receive state financing
to perform both basic and applied research. Close cooperation of such centers
with higher education institutions would be required and would take various forms
including joint research projects, exchange of researchers, and grants from the
centers to universities for specific tasks.
Branch R&D institutions that perform R&D in a narrow field with a limited
number of customers would be supported by a consortium of industrial users.
R&D institutions that are even more specialized (for example, performing R&D
predominately for one enterprise) would be incorporated with its customer as a
joint research and production company. Finally, industry R&D institutions with a
high share of basic research, oriented to the acquisition of knowledge for general
use, would become part of the system of academic science.
The Russian Academy of Sciences and branch academies of sciences should
also be changed significantly, particularly with respect to applied R&D. The in-
dependence of the Academy research institutes should be increased, perhaps by
making them state R&D institutions. They should be financed by the government
R&D budget on a competitive basis, with a focus on solving the most important
S&T problems of the Russian Federation. The role of individual scientists and
research teams could be enhanced by a system of competitive grants. Finally, the
scientific councils of the Academy could act as boards of experts to advise the
government.
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This restructuring faces two difficulties. The sharp reduction of R&D financing
has forced R&D organizations to concentrate their energies on survival in a tough
market struggle with other institutes; the system is already burdened with strong
conflicts. The other difficulty is that the government’s priorities and strategic
purposes remain uncertain. Only since 1995 has the MSTP managed to execute
some of the measures needed for restructuring the R&D system.
An important component of the new science policy is the formation of a network
of state research centers (SRC). These institutes are to conduct world standard
research, employ highly qualified staffs, and use state-of-the-art equipment. In
1993, legislation was adopted supporting the concept of the SRC along with state
regulations on their activities and provisions for government financial support.
Measures in the SRC legislation include tax and customs privileges and decreased
utility and communications tariffs.
By 1996, the status of SRC had been assigned to 61 research institutes (Exhibit
A1.5). The MSTP, which manages this program, intends to pursue a rigorous
selection policy in granting SRC status; the main criteria are conformity to the
priorities of the state science and technology policy and the probable contribution
of the institute’s work to the Russian economy. The SRC status of each center is
to be reviewed every other year by the Governmental Commission on S&T Policy
(see Chapter 7).
The government is currently asking its agencies to inventory their R&D net-
work and to determine their organizational and legal forms, their main fields of
research, and their privatization plans. The Governmental Commission on S&T
Policy will consider the reports and will make decisions on revising the structure
of the R&D institutions.
The value of these reports is limited by the sectoral organization and reliance on
current officials to provide information. Early returns show that the reports contain
only general information, the views of decision makers in sectoral departments, and
requests for additional financing. None of the reports recognizes the fact that the
new situation requires the creation of incentives for enterprise financing of R&D
to lessen direct governmental support of R&D units.
Transformations also require changes in the attitudes of individual researchers.
A 1995 poll of researchers conducted by the Centre for Science Research and Statis-
tics (CSRS) found that most researchers think Russian science and technology is
falling far behind world standards and that professional qualifications of researchers
are declining. More than 80 percent consider the lack of financing the main rea-
son for the current crisis in R&D whereas only 36 percent list low demand for
R&D. The old system of direct government support persists in the thinking of
many researchers, despite the dramatic changes since 1991. Clearly the attitudes
of researchers must change if the R&D system is to be more market oriented.
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3.2.3 Privatization in the R&D sector
Privatization was expected to accelerate the adaptation of R&D institutions to
market conditions. A number of specific provisions have been established for the
privatization of R&D institutions. Some are to remain publicly owned and some
are to be subject to state control even after privatization.
Privatization in the R&D sector began in 1992. In that year 118 institutes
were privatized, together with 40 design and construction project and exploration
organizations and about 100 R&D divisions of industrial enterprises. In 1993, the
number of privatized R&D institutions more than tripled. The MSTP reports that, by
the end of 1994, 19 percent of the R&D institutions, employing 17 percent of R&D
workers, were privatized. This situation has led to a general shift in the pattern
of ownership of R&D institutions. By 1995, there were 796 R&D institutions
reestablished as joint-stock companies (with participation of the government) and
150 fully privately owned organizations – or 20 percent and 4 percent of the total,
respectively (Exhibit A1.3). Together they employed 20 percent of R&D personnel
(Exhibit A2.10).
Privatization has occurred in all kinds of organizations performing applied
R&D. About 100 of these are in the defense sector, including such large organi-
zations as the Sukhoy Design Bureau, the Tupolev Design Bureau, the Moscow
Helicopter Plant, and the Energy Research and Production Association which, de-
spite its name, is engaged in space-technology applications. The privatized part of
the R&D sector receives a considerably smaller share of government funding than
those that have remained state owned.
In July 1994, a governmental decree addressed the privatization of R&D insti-
tutions. According to this decree, the ministries and departments were to determine
if R&D institutions fit into one of the following categories:
 Firms that are forbidden to privatize.
 Firms that are to be transformed into institutionsfinanced by the federal budget.
 Firms that are liable to be transformed into joint-stock companies with 100
percent of the shares held by the state.
R&D institutionsnot classified into one of these categories could be completely
privatized under the general privatization legislation. In about 20 percent of the
privatized institutions, however, the government has retained full control over the
property; in some cases, it has retained a “golden share,” giving it the right to
approve key decisions such as a merger with another institution even though the
government is a minority owner. For other institutions, however, the government
has no role in management after privatization.
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By the fall of 1995, some 900 sectoral R&D institutions were either privatized
or in the process of privatization with the status of 1,100 organizations still to be
determined. In 1996, the government drew up a list of 616 R&D institutions that
cannot be privatized.
In 1995, the MSTP, jointly with federal ministries, carried out a survey that
found that the state still owned 61 percent of the 1,890 institutions surveyed. The
majority of the rest had some form of a joint-stock company. The most extensive
privatization had occurred in the civilian industrial sectors: by July 1995,60 percent
of these R&D institutions were partially or fully privatized. The other extreme is
agricultural R&D institutions; only 10 percent of these organizations had been
privatized.
Many governmental agencies consider it impossible to definitively assess the
effects of privatization. That is why officials and experts often argue that there
should be a cautious policy and that state control over the main research institutes
should be retained in priority fields.
3.2.4 Financial industrial groups
Privatization has prompted the development of financial industrial groups (FIGs)
in which independent organizations agree to work together. Such groups make
it possible to unite the R&D capacities of industrial research institutes, the pro-
duction capacities of industrial enterprises, and the capital available from financial
institutions.
Financial industrial groups are created in accordance with the president’s edict
of 5 December 1993 and with the 1994 Statute of Financial Industrial Groups and
the Order of Their Creation. In November 1995, the law on Financial Industrial
Groups was adopted. FIGs are defined as the commingling of enterprises of any
ownership form with banking and investment organizations, which may include
foreign companies. Financial industrial groups can be created by agreement among
organizations or by the exchange of shares (mutual selling of shares to group
members or transferring them to a trust management). FIGs are subject to some
antimonopoly limitations (International Encyclopaedia of Engineering, 1994). By
the beginning of 1996, there were 30 FIGs in Russia, and several other organizations
were in the process of registering. According to a forecast by the State Committee
for Industrial Policy, there could be as many as 150 FIGs by the end of 1997.
FIGs now include a total of 470 organizations with 2.5 million employees. Such
giant enterprises as Norilsk Nickel, Kuznetsk, Magnitogorsk, and Novolipetsk met-
allurgic plants, large automotive enterprises, and the Chelyabinsk tractor plant have
all become members of FIGs. Some FIGs have implemented huge projects with
foreign partners; for example, FIG Urals Plants have developed a modern commu-
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nication system jointly with Siemens, Ericson, and other Western companies. The
establishment of international FIGs in countries in the Commonwealth of Indepen-
dent States (CIS) began with the Interros group which was registered in September
1995.
The share of the state ownership in FIGs does not exceed 25 percent. Groups
differ both by number of participants (from 8 to 30) and by type of participating
enterprises. Most are based on the vertical integration of the technological cycle,
which combines suppliers of inputs with producers of final products. Such groups
often include R&D institutions developing new technologies, and these R&D in-
stitutions are financed by the production enterprises. For example, the Research
Institute of Vacuum Electronic Machine Building is included in the FIG Urals
Plants and the State Research Institute of Chemistry and Technology of Polymers
is part of the FIG RUSKHIM. Many FIGs declare that one of their goals is the
implementation of R&D in new products and processes. Under current conditions
of difficult financing and organizational problems, however, the groups have so far
tended to invest little in R&D projects with a long-run payoff.
In accordance with the Program to Promote the Creation of Financial Industrial
Groups in the Russian Federation approved by the government of Russia in 1995,
several FIGs will be established to bring R&D-intensive products such as aviation
and space technologies, petroleum chemistry, communications equipment, lasers,
and armaments to world markets. In the defense sector the FIG Russian Aviation
Consortium has been established, and includes large privatized R&D institutions
like the United Design Bureau of Sukhoy and units named after Ilyushin and
Yakovlev, famous aircraft designers.
Another related organization form is the large joint-stock company, which owns
and controls its units, in contrast to groups in which the enterprise members remain
independent organizations. Gazprom, in the fuel sector, is the most prominent
example of such a company. Some of the 20 research institutes owned by Gazprom
perform large-scale, long-term R&D; others provide more immediate technical
services. Some R&D units are fully owned subsidiaries of Gazprom working on
a contract basis, and others are considered integrated departments of the parent
company; however, all are mostly financed by Gazprom.
Although there are many obstacles to the creation of efficient financial in-
dustrial groups and large concerns such as Gazprom, these kinds of organizations
may be the best way of concentrating capital on R&D and innovation. Although
relatively small in number, the large and stable financial industrial groups and large
corporations in different sectors of the economy could be a significant factor in
Russia’s recovery. An important point is that these organizations decide which
sectors and projects are promising and invest accordingly.
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Table 3.3. Small enterprises in the Science and Scientific Services sector.
1991 1992 1993 1994
Number of small
enterprises 10,600 35,900 64,800 51,700
Source: CSRS, 1996b, p. 12.
3.2.5 Small businesses
The development of small business in the Soviet Union started in 1988 with the
adoption of the law on Cooperation in the USSR. In 1990, joint-stock companies
and private businesses were also legalized. In their registration new and existing
enterprises can declare S&T as the main sphere of their activities. In these cases
they are automatically listed in the so-called Science and Scientific Services sector.
If S&T constitute more than 70 percent of their total activities, the enterprises are
exempt from the profit tax during the first two years after registration. Small R&D
enterprises, as well as some other R&D institutions, have tax concessions with
respect to value-added tax (VAT), land tax, and customs duties.
By the end of 1994, there were 52,000 enterprises in the Science and Scientific
Services sector of which about 80 percent were private (Table 3.3). They employ
more than 200,000 workers and, together with those working under contract and
on a part-time basis, 1.2 million individuals were estimated to be involved in these
small businesses in 1994.
Small enterprises were often created as spin-offs from large research institutes.
The entrepreneurial individuals in these institutes established their own small en-
terprises to raise their incomes and to be free of bureaucratic supervision. In
many cases small enterprises were used as instruments to avoid taxes and over-
head expenses. Some of the small enterprises leased property and equipment from
the main institutes, and others used the facilities unofficially. Many individuals
involved in these small enterprises continued as employees of the large institute,
working only part-time in the new small enterprise. In 1994, more than 70 percent
of small enterprises in the Science and Scientific Services sector had fewer than
five full-time employees. According to some estimates only 3 percent of small
enterprises in the Science and Scientific Services sector performed R&D. Others
simply listed R&D as a major activity in their registration to obtain tax breaks.
In a recent CSRS survey, some 16 percent of R&D personnel did not know
whether there were small enterprises based on their institutes and less than 50
percent of those who knew of their existence assessed them positively. A common
view held by more than half of the respondents was that most small enterprises
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served the financial interests of the administration of the research institutes rather
than the researchers.
Many private small R&D enterprises could not have survived under the condi-
tions of low demand for R&D without help from the large research institutes with
which their founders were affiliated. In 1991 and 1992 many small firms specialized
in software, but intense competition and the lack of protection of intellectual prop-
erty rights forced them to switch to other activities, frequently computer hardware
retail. Most of those that continued with the software business either merged with
affiliates of foreign companies or mastered specific markets (banking, accounting,
etc.). The few small enterprises that were able to survive as S&T organizations
found niches in Western markets that they could serve profitably. Among them
there were several small companies developing software for telecommunications
systems (for an American company), software for municipal information systems
(for a Dutch city government), and biological preparations for race-horse testing
(for Portugal).
Another way small enterprises survived was to perform intersectoral R&D.
Without strict administrative control by an industrial ministry, small enterprises
could apply their R&D to many spheres of activity. An example of such an enter-
prise is the Intersectoral Research and Production Laboratory created by researchers
who were previously developing new metals for motor vehicles. By widening the
applications for their R&D, the researchers obtained contracts from the Ministry of
Railways and the Department of Chemical Industry. They developed a rail lubri-
cant that significantly increased the life of railway rails; several Russian railways
now use this lubricant. Small enterprises, however, cannot develop large-scale
intersectoral projects that need substantial financing. For such projects, it is nec-
essary to attract state investments or to find private capital, perhaps from financial
and industrial groups.
State support of small business in Russia is still in its infancy. The main
instrument has been tax exemptions to small enterprises for the first years of
existence. In 1993, the Foundation for Promotion of Small Enterprises in S&T was
established. It gives financial assistance on a competitive basis to research teams
for the most promising S&T projects proposed by small enterprises. The work of
the Foundation is discussed in Chapter 7.
3.3 An Example: Transformation of R&D
in the Metallurgy Sector
In this section we illustrate the changes that have occurred in the metallurgy sector.
Ferrous and nonferrous industries enjoyed a high priority in the USSR. Industrial
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enterprises were established particularly during the interwar “industrialization”
period and after World War II. The metallurgy sector, especially ferrous metallurgy,
developed extremely rapidly. By the beginning of the 1930s, a number of R&D
institutes dealing with metals were established.
During World War II, new R&D institutes were created to work on the de-
velopment of metals for military use. In 1944, the Central Research Institute for
Ferrous Metallurgy, the main R&D institute for the industry, was created. The
R&D institutes in nonferrous metallurgy were mainly devoted to the development
of individual metals: the Central Research Institute for Tin; the Urals Research
Institute for Aluminum; the Urals Research Institute for Copper; and the State
Research and Project Institute for Nickel.
In the postwar years (1945–1955) many metallurgical research institutes were
established in Moscow, Leningrad, and elsewhere. New R&D units, as well as
all other sectoral R&D institutes, design bureaus, and experimental plants, were
administratively directed by the science and technology departments of the Ministry
for Ferrous Metallurgy and the Ministry for Nonferrous Metallurgy.
By 1991, there were 104 institutions performing applied R&D in Russia under
the control of the two metallurgical ministries. Applied R&D related to metallurgy
was also performed by higher education institutes as well as in institutes of the
Academy of Sciences.
The structural transformation of the economy since 1991 has led to major
changes in the metallurgy sectors. The disintegration of the USSR resulted in Rus-
sia’s loss of some sources of manganese, chromium, titanium, silver, rare metals,
and uranium since the large ore deposits are located in other republics. Sharp de-
clines in industrial production in the major industries that were the main customers
for metals have led to an abrupt decrease in the demand for metals. Production
capacity of lead, copper, aluminum, and zinc is underutilized. Production of metals
has fallen for manufacturing of forges and presses, metal-cutting machine tools,
and excavators by 50 percent and for tractors and bulldozers by more than a factor
of three. Meanwhile, the exports of metals have sharply increased. According to
the Russian State Committee for Metallurgy most aluminum output and almost half
of refined copper output were exported in 1994.
Because of these conditions, the R&D institutions must face some complicated
problems. The number of sectoral R&D institutions declined from 104 in 1991 to 66
in 1994 (Table 3.4). The decline in the number of industrial enterprises performing
R&D shown in Table 3.4 is due to the fact that the managers of privatized enterprises
have chosen to forgo R&D.
With the lack of funding and the decline in demand for their services, R&D
institutes have been looking for ways to survive. Many small enterprises, estab-
lished by personnel from R&D institutes, have implemented the R&D results from
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Table 3.4. Number of R&D institutions of the State Committee for Metallurgy.
1991 1992 1993 1994
Research institutes 43 43 43 43
Design organizations 10 9 7 4
Construction and exploration
organizations 16 13 8 5
Experimental enterprises 1 1 1 1
Industrial enterprises 29 15 14 13
Others 5 1 0 0
Total 104 82 73 66
Source: Authors’ estimate.
previous years. Research institutes have begun producing consumer goods, using
their experimental equipment, and selling these goods through small enterprises.
Many institutes have leased their premises to commercial enterprises. The lack of
financing for R&D has led some institutions to keep their employees on the payroll
for only part of the year.
According to a sample survey by the MSTP, two-thirds of R&D institutions in
the metallurgy sector were privatized by July 1995. As with privatization generally,
it is difficult to estimate the impact of this privatization on R&D activity, but some
negative effects are apparent. For example, several large research institutes were
purchased by commercial enterprises interested only in their premises, not in their
research capabilities.
R&D institutes have also sought government financing, particularly as state
research centers described in Section 3.2.2. Three such centers are under the um-
brella of the Committee of Metallurgy (Table 3.5): the State Research Institute of
Nonferrous Metals (GNIITsvetMet), the State Research Institute of Rare Metals
(GIRedMet), and the Central Research Institute of Ferrous Metallurgy (TsNIICher-
Met). All are located in Moscow.
The new centers represent reorganization rather than simply a change in status.
The GNIITsvetMet is a good example. It has 420 employees specializing in the
study of heavy nonferrous metals and the purification of metallurgic gases. The
institute owns FOLGA, a research and production enterprise, which is developing
technologies to produce copper electrolytic foil, mainly for the radio electronics
industry. The TsNIICherMet unites 11 organizations among which there are 7
research, testing, certification, and computer centers. The state research centers are
financed primarily by the government R&D budget, so they are in a better financial
position than other R&D institutes.
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Table 3.5. State research centers (SRC) belonging to the State Committee for
Metallurgy in 1994.
No. of Applied R&D
organizations R&D in volume of
in SRC personnel budget financing
GNIITsvetMet 2 469 79%
GIRedMet 1 1,080 95%
TsNIICherMet 11 1,118 82%
Source: Authors’ estimate.
After the dramatic output decline in metals between 1991 and 1993, some
revival of demand occurred in 1994. In 1995, the decline in the demand for most
metals ceased, and in a few cases even grew, mainly because of increased exports.
Nevertheless, investment activity of the relevant enterprises is limited because of
financial difficulties; therefore, government support of R&D remains crucial.
The revival of demand, the improvements in overall economic conditions,
and the prospect of increased governmental support give some hope that Russia’s
metallurgical R&D will be able to overcome its current crisis and provide an
impetus for progress in developing new products and processes.
3.4 Science and Technology Legislation
3.4.1 The legal environment
The institutional structure of applied R&D is shaped by the legal environment
of a nation. There are three kinds of relevant laws: general laws relating to
property, enterprises, and contracts; science and technology policy laws; and laws
on intellectual property.
The Soviet system of central planning and state ownership did not require
the complex legal structure of a market economy. With centralized direction and
one owner – the state – there was no need for detailed legislation for market
contracts or to carefully define property rights. The transition to a market system
created a drastic and immediate need for a complex legal structure. The difficulties
were compounded by Russia’s new status as an independent state. The Russian
Constitution, adopted in December 1993, further complicated the adoption of new
laws for it identified two levels of legislation (federal and regional legislation). It
was noted earlier that regional authorities now have an important role in S&T and
other policies.
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3.4.2 General laws
The Civil Code, adopted in January 1995, regulates civil and property rights of indi-
viduals and organizations. The law sets out the general procedures for registration,
reorganization, and dissolution of all organizations including those in S&T. Simi-
larly, general privatization laws applies to the S&T sector unless the state chooses
to exempt an R&D institution under the procedures described earlier. The 1995
law on State Support to Small Enterprises also applies to small science-oriented
businesses but gives special support to commercial organizations in the Science
and Scientific Services sector.
The law on Conversion of Defense Industry states the legal basis for activities
of defense enterprises and R&D institutions and gives two general principles of
conversion of military facilities to civilian facilities:
 Utilization of high technologies, developed in the military sector, for produc-
tion of internationally competitive products.
 Utilization of production facilities for state programs to ensure socioeconomic
development.
This law applies to both production and R&D activities. The legislation has
some significant omissions for it leaves uncertain the status of international activi-
ties of former military sector enterprises, the provision for national security, the use
of classified technologies, and the legal mechanisms for transferring technologies
applicable to both military and civilian uses to the civilian sector.
General laws on standardization, certification, and tax legislation have had a
major impact on the R&D sector. These topics are discussed in Chapter 7.
3.4.3 Laws on science and technology policy
General laws are insufficient to encompass the special features of science and
technology. In July 1995 the State Duma passed the law on Science and State
Science and Technology Policy to deal with this insufficiency. The law was in
preparation for three years.
The law defines the strategy for developing state S&T policy; the place of S&T
activities in the state, society and economy; and the legal status of researchers and
R&D institutions. It also spells out sources of R&D financing; a system of tax,
credit, and customs incentives; and provisions for international S&T cooperation.
The law contains a number of completely new measures, including the following:
 Regulations for state certification of R&D institutions.
 Rules for undertaking state orders for R&D on the basis of agreements
(contracts).
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 Licensing provisions of individual S&T activities.
 Basic principles of state S&T policy.
 Responsibilities of different levels of state authorities for S&T activities.
 Budget and non-budget funds for promoting S&T in Russia.
 Priorities for basic research.
 Provisions for a fixed share of R&D expenditure in the government budget.
Unfortunately, the law has some shortcomings. For example, there is no
mechanism for certification of R&D institutions nor are certified institutions given
any special incentives. The principles for certification are to be developed, but it
seems likely that all existing R&D institutions will be certified thereby reducing
the significance of the procedure. The law does not address state support to small
business engaged in S&T. Nevertheless, the new law provides a basis for further
development of S&T policy as social and economic conditions change.
3.4.4 Legislation on intellectual property
Legislation for the protection of intellectual property was enacted in the Soviet
Union as early as 1931. At that time it was acknowledged that recognition must
be given to new inventions and “other technical improvements.” Inventors re-
ceived certificates and remuneration from organizations using their inventions.
This system of legal protections remained in place until 1992. During this 60-year
period, two systems of legal protection of inventions were in existence: the copy-
right certificate on invention and the system of patenting. The copyright certificate
was the most widely used device. Soviet citizens seeking to patent their invention
abroad were required to receive permission from the Committee on Inventions
established in 1931.
The new Patent Law of the Russian Federation was adopted in September
1992. This law protects a wider spectrum of intellectual property than the old
Soviet certificates and includes provisions for industrial design and utility models.
This law regulates certain relations between the inventor and his or her employer.
To protect the employer’s right to commercial secrecy the Patent Law allows the
employer to forgo submitting a patent application. If the patent is granted in the
inventor’s name (according to an agreement between inventor and employer), the
employer has the right to use the invention in his or her enterprise without a license
agreement but with payment of proper compensation to the inventor. A Russian
inventor may apply to foreign patent offices three months after an application has
been submitted to the Russian Patent Office.
In 1992 the law on Trademarks, Service Marks and Names of Place of Goods’
Origin was also adopted. This law provides trademark protection. After obtaining
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a certificate for a trademark, its owner has the exclusive right to its use for 10
years. Trademarks have become increasingly important in recent years. Between
1980 and 1988, 5,000 to 7,000 trademarks were applied for annually; the number
increased to 12,000 in 1989 and to 29,000 in 1992.
Along with laws on patents and trademarks, legislation regulating intellectual
property rights includes laws on Legal Protection of Software and Databases, Legal
Protection of Integrated Circuits Topology, and Copyright and Adjacent Rights.
Acts under preparation include laws on In-duty Inventions, Utility Models and
Industrial Prototypes, and the Patent Court.
The implementation of patent legislation is assigned to the Committee of the
Russian Federation for Patents and Trademarks (Rospatent). This federal executive
agency, established by a 1993 presidential decree, performs the duties of a state
patent office. It carries out state policy on industrial property protection, including
the protection of inventions, utility models, industrial designs, and trademarks and
identification of places of origin of goods, as well as legally protects computer
software, databases, and integrated circuit design.
In August 1993 a government resolution approved a list of organizations that
are to be supervised by Rospatent; these organizations perform individual patent
functions. Together they form the State Patent Service. The list includes the Russian
Research Institute for State Patent Expertise, the Board of Appeals, the Russian
State Patent Library, the Russian Institute of Industrial Property and Innovations,
the Administration of Industrial Property Rights, the Russian Research Institute for
Patent Information, the Center of Patent Information Services (Informpatent), the
Domodedovo Production Complex, and the Production Enterprise (Patent).
Even with these institutions in place, Russia still does not have an effective
patent system. The necessary legislation has not been approved. The Patent Court
has not yet been established, and the civil and arbitration courts do not have enough
experience or enough qualified specialists to deal with S&T issues or to make patent
legislation effective. Supervision by a patent procurator also does not exist.
An unresolved problem is the financing of patenting and licensing abroad. In
1990 the USSR Council of Ministers stopped the central financing of patenting and
licensing. Since then applications for patents in other countries have been obtained
at the expense of individual institutions. Budgetary allocations by ministries and
governmental committees to institutions to recover patent expenses incurred abroad
have either stopped or considerably decreased. The failure to pay renewal fees has
caused three-quarters of the patents filed abroad in 1990 to lapse (OECD, 1994a,
p. 64). There are few instances of Russians obtaining new foreign patents.
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3.4.5 Proposed legislation
The State Program on Protection of the S&T Output in Russia has had some impact
on intellectual property rights. This program aims at creating the conditions for
innovation by providing a clear definition of rights on S&T output being financed
by the federal budget; a control system for monitoring rights on S&T output; a
control system for transferring dual-use technologies to the civilian sector; and
support and control of international S&T cooperation.
The details of these provisions are to be resolved jointly by federal and local
authorities with the MSTP supervising the process. The program envisages the
development of laws to bridge the gaps in legislation on intellectual property
protection, the creation of a federal database on inventions, and the promotion of
technologies applicable to both defense and civilian industries.
Urgent issues in S&T are now being settled by presidential and governmental
decrees. Presidential decrees have been ratified on the following: Urgent Measures
for Preservation of the S&T Potential of the Russian Federation, State Research
Centers, Measures for Material Support of Russia’s Scientists, and the Board on
S&T Policy Attached to the President of the Russian Federation. The government
has enacted decrees on the establishment of the Russian Foundation for Basic
Research, the Russian Humanities Research Foundation, and the Foundation for
Promotion of Small Enterprises in S&T; on the procedure and use of sectoral and
intersectoral non-budget funds for R&D; on privatization of R&D institutions;
on the establishment of the Governmental Commission on S&T Policy; and on
governmental support of R&D. In addition, a number of governmental decisions
have been made concerning the Russian Academy of Sciences.
Even though numerous, the various laws are fragmentary, sometimes insuf-
ficiently coordinated with one another, and have major gaps. There is no law to
regulate the relations between the state, participants of S&T activities, and con-
sumers of their results; nor have many of the principles of the state’s S&T policy
been determined.
A doctrine on the development of Russian science was prepared by the MSTP
and approved by the president in June 1996. As a basis for policy-making, this
document is extremely important, not only for the country’s scientific community,
but also for the development of future governmental decisions and the prospects
for political and economic reforms. The document states general policies whose
realization at the federal level will secure a stable, goal-oriented transformation of
the R&D sector.
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Development of detailed legislation to regulate the status and activities of R&D
institutions and to determine the procedure of giving preferences and privileges to
some of them has started; the government is preparing a law on the status of the
Russian Academy of Sciences. Draft legislation is about to be proposed to develop
government support for innovation in enterprises. Legislative work continues on
the development of intellectual property protection; on a draft law on non-budget
funds in science, culture, and education; and on changes in the taxation and customs
codes to provide more incentive for R&D and innovation. A federal contract system
for financing R&D projects from government sources and a system of repayable
financing of applied R&D are also in preparation.
3.5 Conclusions
The policymakers in Russia have attempted to transform the R&D sector by adopt-
ing new legislation and introducing tax incentives. These attempts, however, are
being made within the old centralized system of S&T management with all its prin-
cipal components such as intersectoral barriers and centralized financing. Most
government R&D funds are still distributed through old industrial ministries or de-
partments which control specific programs. The share of government R&D funds
distributed on a competitive basis remains small. There is a long way to go to
create an efficient and internationally competitive S&T system. As time passes,
federal agencies will become less able to carry out a top-to-bottom transformation
of the S&T activity. Many R&D institutions are being privatized, so that highly
qualified research teams are no longer under governmental control. The share
of the government budget in the nation’s expenditure on R&D is declining. The
necessity of transition to a new S&T policy is becoming more widely recognized.
Direct management by the state should be replaced by indirect measures, and state
support should be limited to the most promising activities.
The strategic objective is to rearrange R&D institutions according to the types
of customers served. This approach would create a diversity in the R&D sector:
some organizations would be integrated into production enterprises, some would
be run by research consortia, some would be classified as government laboratories,
and others would be largely independent. Some would eventually be privately
financed; others would remain state financed. The diversity would be similar to
that found in other major industrial economies. The system of governance and
financing of the Russian Academy of Sciences must also be reviewed carefully.
Chapter 4
Sectoral Analysis of Russian R&D
Leonid Gokhberg
During the current transition to a market system, applied R&D must be ready to
respond to short-run changes in the economic conditions of the various industrial
sectors, as well as long-run changes in the economy. The interactive nature of
innovation is complex in a market economy with many feedbacks. Currently, the
macroeconomic disequilibrium dominates all other market developments; one con-
sequence of this situation is that innovations contribute little to economic growth.
It is hoped that macroeconomic conditions in Russia will improve so that some sec-
tors of the economy will be in a position to introduce new products and processes.
The conditions for and prospects of improvement vary by sector. Devising suitable
public policy requires an analysis of structural changes in the economy, as they
impact on the development of each industry. This chapter provides the sectoral
analysis required for formulating S&T policy.
Developments in each sector have been determined, in part, by the economic
recession that has hampered the country since 1990. The causes of the recession
are complex, but clearly low effective demand, chaotic supply conditions, sluggish
adjustment, and increased competition from higher-quality imported goods have
played a role. From 1991 to 1995 industrial output declined by half and all industrial
sectors suffered in varying degrees from the decline.
Since mid-1994 the output of some industries has stabilized, and in 1995 output
in some sectors even began to increase. The financial conditions of enterprises
remain difficult, though they are gradually adjusting to market conditions and to
foreign trade liberalization. Investors are more willing to place their savings in
safe profitable ventures abroad than to invest them in Russian production activities.
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Table 4.1. Contributions to the production of gross domestic product by sector (%).
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Production of goods 62.8 60.7 59.8 59.0 49.5 43.5
Industry 35.9 35.2 37.6 42.7 33.3 28.3
Agriculture 15.5 15.3 11.9 8.5 8.4 6.3
Construction 10.5 8.9 9.0 6.7 7.5 8.5
Other 0.9 1.3 1.3 1.1 0.3 0.4
Services 30.0 32.4 36.3 32.2 44.4 50.0
Value-added taxes 7.2 6.9 3.9 8.8 6.1 6.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Voprosy statistiki, 1995.
Given that industry demand for R&D is still weak, the level of applied R&D in the
next few years will depend on a combination of government policy and economic
conditions.
Currently, the production of goods is less important in the Russian economy
than it was in past decades. In 1989 the output of goods was 63 percent of gross
domestic product (GDP); in 1994 it was only 44 percent (Table 4.1). Sectors that
were neglected in the past but are now important in a market system – trade, real
estate, banking, insurance, and household and business services – have expanded
significantly. Most striking, banking services expanded 180 times from 1991 to
1994.
In the production of goods major shifts have been experienced across sectors.
Raw-materials industries maintained their output because of export opportunities
and a sufficient level of domestic demand, whereas sectors producing capital and
nonfood consumer goods suffered (Table 4.2). In manufacturing, output decline
from 1991 to 1995 ranged from 61 percent in machinery production to 80 percent in
textiles and clothing manufacturing; in contrast electricity generation experienced
only 19 percent decline.
The natural-resource orientation of Russia’s economy has increased signifi-
cantly, and is now significantly different from that of major countries in the Organ-
isation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The high shares of
the electricity-generation and fuel industries in total industrial output (29.5 percent
in Russia compared with 6.2 percent in the United States and between 12 and 14
percent in France, Germany, and Italy) and the large output of metallurgy (16.6
percent in Russia compared with 4.8 percent in the United States and 5.7 percent in
Germany) indicate the increased natural-resource bias. Industries that manufacture
complex products represent small and decreasing shares in total industrial output;
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Table 4.2. Industrial production by industry (%).
Annual growth rates Distribution of
(previous year = 100) industrial output
1992 1993 1994 1995a 1992 1993 1994 1995a
Electric-power
engineering 96.6 94.7 91.2 97.0 6.6 7.1 13.5 13.8
Fuel 87.5 85.7 89.9 98.0 19.8 19.5 16.0 17.6
Metallurgy 78.7 82.0 86.8 106.1 17.8 17.5 16.6 17.1
Chemicals 77.6 78.2 71.1 108.0 8.5 8.0 7.5 7.9
Machinery 85.1 84.4 60.6 90.0 20.4 20.2 19.1 17.0
Wood, furniture,
and paper 85.4 81.3 68.8 93.0 4.4 4.4 4.2 4.7
Stone, clay,
and glass 78.0 82.7 71.1 92.0 2.7 2.7 3.8 3.5
Textiles, clothing,
and leather 73.6 76.6 52.7 69.0 7.1 6.5 3.1 2.3
Food products 81.3 90.8 78.1 91.0 9.4 10.6 11.9 11.0
Totalb 81.2 83.8 77.2 95.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
aPreliminary estimate.
bDiscrepancies in totals are due to rounding.
Source: State Committee on Statistics, various years.
such branches include the chemical industry (7.5 percent compared with between
14 and 15 percent in the United Kingdom, the United States, Italy, and Germany)
and machinery (19 percent in Russia, 35 percent in France, 41 percent in the United
States, and 43 percent in Germany). (Data for Russia are given for 1994; for the
OECD countries data, see State Committee on Statistics, 1994, p. 84.)
Several factors could favor Russian industries in the long run. First, the size of
Russia’s territory and the transportation systems which are inadequate for foreign
suppliers will give many Russian enterprises a competitive advantage in the do-
mestic market when demand increases. The availability of a large, relatively cheap,
yet highly qualified labor force could help domestic enterprises become competi-
tive, even in foreign markets. Russia’s previous S&T achievements included many
technologies and complicated technical devices and armaments that were much
sought after in world markets. Restructuring and an improved financial situation
will allow some domestic and foreign enterprises to invest in the development of
new products and processes in Russia.
Russia has the finances available to develop its economy. Savings in Russia,
however, are being used for working capital and in realizing profits from financial
transactions. More than a half of the funds available for discretionary spending by
60 Leonid Gokhberg
Russian households (approximately R42–44 trillion in 1994) was used to purchase
convertible foreign currency, and much of the rest was used in financial speculation
(Ekonomist, 1995). In other words, investments in fixed assets would be forth-
coming to finance economic growth if manufacturing enterprises were to become
profitable.
Industries, of course, have many special characteristics. The analysis of in-
dustry trends can be based on various traditional classification schemes according
to such criteria as technology (R&D intensity) level, orientation, wages, and skills
(OECD, 1995b). Five types of industries, with respect to primary economic factors
affecting competitiveness, are appropriate for this study: (1) resource-intensive in-
dustries, (2) labor-intensive industries, (3) scale-intensive industries, (4) specialized
suppliers (differentiated products), and (5) science-based industries (OECD, 1987).
Each type of industry has a specific role in technology flows. Thus, resource- and
labor-intensive sectors can be considered net technology recipients, whereas the
science-based sectors can be considered exporters of technology to the rest of the
economy. The differences are roughly measures by variations in the ratio of R&D
expenditures to sales in which the science-based sectors have significantly higher
ratios (Table 4.3).
The current Russian Classification of Branches of the National Economy still
uses the obsolete administrative (ministerial) structure of economy in official statis-
tics, and does not distinguish sectors into economic activities. This system is not
compatible with the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), which
defines industrial activities that can be grouped into the five above-mentioned
groups in a straightforward way. Therefore, the data used in this chapter refer to
broad sectors of industry that are only loosely comparable with OECD categories.
In addition to classifying industries by technology characteristics and orienta-
tion, Russian industries can be classified by recent output trends and the financial
condition of their enterprises. These short-run trends strongly affect R&D activities
and through this have a long-run impact on the national economy. The R&D base
in the key industries that create technology for much of the rest of the economy
has recently eroded to such an extent as to raise the possibility of damage to future
growth in all sectors, including the prosperous natural-resource sectors. The classi-
fication based on recent output trends and financial conditions of enterprises groups
industries into four major groups (Institute of Economic Forecasting, 1995):
1. Growth pockets are distinguished by increases in output and improvements in
financial conditions of the enterprises. Examples include the chemical and
ferrous metals industries.
2. Stability pockets contain industries with improvements in the financial condi-
tions of enterprises, on the one hand, and output stagnation or decline, on the
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Table 4.3. Percentage distribution of R&D intensity by industry (value of
R&D/production).
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Electric-power engineering
and fuel 1.26 1.13 0.67 0.20 0.26 0.31
Metallurgy 0.80 0.81 0.38 0.14 0.11 0.11
Chemicals 2.46 2.42 1.32 0.48 0.58 0.60
Machinery 6.21 7.46 4.50 2.94 3.22 5.64
Heavy, power engineering,
and transport machinery 5.66 5.71 2.05 0.87 1.06 1.01
Instrument-making and
and electrical machinery 4.44 4.76 5.10 1.44 1.32 1.33
Chemical and petrol
machinery 0.96 1.1 2.53 0.98 1.10 1.29
Machine tools 4.00 3.53 2.79 1.41 1.34 1.16
Motor vehicles, tractors,
and agricultural machines 1.49 1.37 0.85 0.45 0.68 0.89
Machinery for construction
and communal services 0.57 0.56 1.00 0.38 0.34 0.32
Defense industry 9.13 12.34 7.05 6.95 7.46 13.48
Wood, furniture, and paper 0.64 0.52 0.29 0.16 0.08 0.06
Stone, clay, and glass 0.49 0.64 0.38 0.12 0.06 0.03
Textiles, clothing, and leather 0.15 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.05
Food products 0.21 0.28 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.12
Total industry 2.23 2.48 1.27 0.67 0.72 1.08
Source: Author’s calculations.
other. Examples include the resource-intensive nonferrous metals industry and
the wood and paper industries.
3. Stagnating sectors include industries with a stable or slightly decreasing level
of output and with enterprises in tolerable financial conditions. Examples
include both resource-intensive sectors (fuel, electric power, food) and spe-
cialized suppliers (such as machine-building).
4. Collapsing sectors include industries with declining output and with enterprises
in worsening financial conditions. Examples include labor-intensive light
industry (textiles, clothing, and leather) and construction-materials production
(stone, clay, and glass products).
In this chapter we provide a detailed review of the various major sectors and
also consider the implications of the prospects for each sector’s applied R&D.
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Table 4.4. Composition of machinery output in Russia and the United States (%).
Russia (1990) United States (1982)
Investment equipment 54 59
of which for services 6 24
Defense products 29 15
Durable consumer goods 17 26
Total 100 100
Source: Problems of Forecasting, 1993.
4.1 The Machine-building Sector
4.1.1 Overall output trends
The machine-building sector produces a wide array of products from machine tools
to automobiles and missiles. For decades, the industries in this sector played the
leading role in the Soviet economy as measured by both output and the number of
employees. Russia had about two-thirds of the Soviet machine-building capacity
in its territory, so it inherited this large industry with the Soviet breakup.
The machine-building industry manufactured many products demanded by
the military. Approximately 29% of the Russian machine-building sector was
devoted to producing defense products. This share was nearly double the US share
(15%) dedicated to defense products and more than the Russian combined share of
consumer goods and equipment for services (Table 4.4). Because of this military
orientation Russia’s machine-building sector was not ready for an economy that
emphasized the demand for civilian goods. The situation was further aggravated by
the fact that an overwhelming part of technologically sophisticated durable goods
(except for passenger cars) were produced by defense industry enterprises.
From 1990 to 1993, the decline in output was slower in the machine-building
sector than in industry as a whole. The momentum of the machine-building de-
velopment program introduced in the late 1980s continued into the 1990s, and was
aided by a powerful lobby that supported the machine-building sector after the
collapse of the USSR.
In late 1993, the decline in output drastically accelerated. This acceleration
was associated with a considerable rise in the prices of domestic machinery prod-
ucts, making them comparable to the prices of imported items of higher quality.
Simultaneously, demand by military and agricultural sectors decreased. Machinery
manufacturers were slow to respond to changes in demand, so their products often
did not meet the needs of consumers (for example, a surplus of heavy-duty trucks
and a shortage of light-weight vehicles).
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In addition, many low-quality Russian machinery products continued to be
unattractive in export markets. The share of machinery products exported was
19 percent of the total output in 1991 and 10 percent in 1993. Imports of these
items increased, and by 1994 the balance of trade in machinery was negative
with a deficit of US$7.5 billion, making the Russian economy strongly dependent
on imports for machinery. The quality of many domestic products which needed
advanced technology was considerably lower than imported products (e.g., personal
computers, consumer electronics, and pharmaceuticals).
Automobiles and Machine Tools
Some industries in this broad sector fared relatively well during the transition
because these enterprises were manufacturing products that were in demand. The
automobile industry is an example. From 1992 to 1994, the production of trucks
decreased by 65 percent, but the output of passenger cars and buses fell by only
17 percent and 3 percent, respectively. From January to August 1995, the output
of automotive parts was 2.7 percent above its 1994 level; this recovery was due
to the fact that prices of domestic products were lower than prices of comparable
imports. The production structure of the automobile industry is being changed to
increase competitiveness. Production of light-duty trucks has increased and new
engines have been introduced. Measures are being taken to add new passenger car
and bus models (Khoroshilov, 1995). In the majority of the other machine-building
sectors, however, output has continued to decline, mainly because of low levels
of investment in many industries. Limited demand particularly affected machine
tools because these products were intended to re-equip the machine-building sector
itself.
Under centralized planning some types of technologically advanced equipment
were produced and used in manufacturing even though they were more costly than
alternatives. The higher costs were not reflected in prices, so the equipment
was considered affordable. After the centralized system with its distorted prices
was abolished, output of advanced equipment sharply declined. Less drastically
affected were the output of universal machine tools and production of inexpensive
equipment that was not linked to specific production methods. Still the declines
were pronounced from 1991 to 1994: there were declines in output of metal-cutting
machine tools from 74,000 to 19,000 (by 74 percent), forge and press machines from
27,000 to 3,000 (88.6 percent), digital-programmed machine tools from 16,700 to
500 (by a factor of 33), and automated lines from 556 to 49 units (by a factor
of 11.3). The share of metal-cutting digital-programmed machine tools decreased
from 22.6 percent to 2.8 percent of the total machine tool output; for comparison,
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current output of these types of tools ranges between 50 and 75 percent in the
United States, Japan, and Germany (Centre for Economic Conjuncture, 1994).
Manufacturing of rotor and rotor-conveyor lines and industrial robots has virtually
stopped. Output of machine tools continued to decline in 1995 by 12 percent; this
decline is a major factor hindering modernization of Russian industry.
Electrical and Construction Machinery
Output of heavy engineering and construction machinery has also decreased. From
1990 to 1994, declines were evident in the production of turbines (by a factor of
two), excavators (by a factor of four), and bulldozers (by almost a factor of seven).
In 1995, as demand stabilized or grew in some sectors (metallurgy, oil extraction,
polymer, and paper production), the output of some enterprises in construction
machinery increased. Increases in demand for these recovering industry sectors, as
well as the projected rise of investments for modernization of agriculture, the food
industry, and industrial construction, may result in the revival of the production of
electrical machines, instruments, and automation equipment.
The Defense Sector
In this subsector, output decreased 2.6 times from 1992 to 1994. The decline in
output was particularly sharp for military machine products, but this was offset
by a rise in the share of civilian products in the total output of defense-industry
enterprises reaching 64 percent. During 1994, there was a sharp reduction in orders
and investments for the conversion of military enterprises to civilian industries. Of
R1,400 billion earmarked in the preliminary federal budget for conversion programs
in 1994, less than half were made available to enterprises (Volkov, 1995).
In spite of their difficult situation, defense-industry enterprises retained con-
siderable potential as demonstrated by their exports of high-quality military and
civilian products. A number of enterprises have mastered the manufacturing of new
types of industrial products, including articles that earlier were imported such as
equipment for the fuel industry and medical equipment (State Committee on Statis-
tics, 1995a). The sale of these products is the reason for the output stabilization of
civilian products from the defense industry in 1995.
All these changes led to greater specialization of defense-industry enterprises.
On the one hand, 13 percent of former military enterprises manufactured only
civilian products by 1996. On the other hand, the number of enterprises in which
military products were more than a half of their output increased by 17 percent
from 1993 to 1995 (Centre for Economic Conjuncture, 1995, p. 6).
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4.1.2 Trends in applied R&D
By 1990 R&D effort in the machine-building sector accounted for three-quarters
of total industry R&D, and since then it has gained even greater importance.
A report of the Centre for Economic Conjuncture of the Russian government
states that “domestic civil machine-building is to a considerable extent archaic and
inefficient, has sufficiently lagged behind world standards, and given openness of
the Russian economy : : : requires reproduction on a completely new technical and
technological basis” (Centre for Economic Conjuncture, 1994, p. 6). It is impossible
to accomplish this task without improving R&D and innovation activities. An
ambitious R&D policy is crucial since R&D spending in machine-building declined
by 80 percent in real terms from 1989 to 1994.
There are several reasons for the fall in R&D. The reduction in defense orders
and the limited funds for conversion of the defense industry led to a reduction in
R&D for military products. From 1990 to 1994, the number of R&D-performing
institutions in the military sector decreased from 1,468 to 704 and R&D personnel
declined by 32 percent. Even so, R&D in the defense-industry sector fared better
than R&D in the civilian sector. The military sector’s R&D units are the largest
of all the industry sectors. From 1990 to 1994 the decline in R&D personnel
in the defense sector was significantly smaller than that in the automobile sector
(45 percent), machine-tool sector (78 percent), and electrical machinery sector (75
percent). The result has been an increase in the gap in R&D intensity between the
military and civilian parts of the machine-building sector. Defense industry R&D
now constitutes more than two-thirds of total industry R&D (Tables 4.5 and 4.6).
The shifts in applied R&D to the defense industry were based on the assumption
that military R&D units must be reoriented to serve civilian branches rather than
reduced in size. The redirection of defense R&D is reflected in the rise in the
share of civilian R&D in former military R&D units from 46 percent in 1992 to
53 percent in 1994 (Table 4.7). The civilian orientation placed former military
enterprises in direct competition with weaker civilian R&D units for government
funding and for supplier contracts; as a result the latter units are gradually being
replaced on the market. Given its continued large size, it is not surprising that the
defense industry was one of the two sectors in machine-building in which the R&D
intensity did not decrease (see Table 4.3 above).
The decline in R&D expenditures in chemical machinery (by 77 percent)
was also smaller than the decline in expenditures in machinery on the whole
(82 percent) between 1989 and 1994. R&D institutes in this sector were split
into smaller specialized profit centers closely connected with specific enterprises.
Simultaneously, the share of development increased from 73 percent to 87 percent
in the sector’s R&D expenditure. Thus, the tactics of strengthening ties with
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Table 4.5. Percentage distribution of R&D personnel by industry.
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Electric-power engineering
and fuel 7.0 5.4 6.3 5.8 6.0 5.3
Metallurgy 4.0 3.6 3.5 2.7 2.0 1.7
Chemicals 7.8 6.7 7.3 6.0 5.3 4.7
Machinery 75.5 79.5 77.2 81.4 83.1 85.9
Heavy, power engineering,
and transport machinery 5.8 5.0 4.0 2.8 2.8 2.3
Instrument-making and
electrical machinery 8.4 7.6 12.7 6.2 4.9 3.8
Chemical and petrol
machinery 0.4 0.3 1.5 1.2 1.0 0.8
Machine tools 1.8 1.6 1.7 1.2 1.1 0.7
Motor vehicles, tractors,
and agricultural machines 4.6 4.1 4.9 4.3 4.9 4.6
Machinery for construction
and communal services 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.2
Defense industry 54.1 60.6 51.8 65.4 68.0 73.6
Wood, furniture, and paper 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.1 0.8 0.5
Stone, clay, and glass 1.0 1.2 1.3 0.8 0.5 0.3
Textiles, clothing, and leather 1.2 0.4 1.1 0.7 0.5 0.3
Food products 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8
Other sectors 0.9 0.8 1.0 0.8 1.1 0.4
Total industry 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: CSRS, various years.
enterprises and reorientation to their needs (even to the detriment of long-term
projects), combined with some institutionalchanges, enabled this sector to maintain
some of its R&D base.
4.1.3 Innovation activity and financing
The subsectors differed from one another in their innovation activity; this is another
manifestation of the direct dependence of S&T activities on the economic condition
of an industry. In machinery branches oriented to manufacturing equipment for
growing or stable sectors, innovation activity was high. For example, the share of
enterprises introducing one or more innovations was 55 percent in chemical and
petrol machinery and 62 percent in construction machinery. It should be noted
that innovation is defined as introducing a product or process that is new to the
enterprise, not necessarily new to the economy.
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Table 4.6. Percentage distribution of the value of R&D activities performed within
industry R&D institutions by industry.
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Electric-power engineering
and fuel 6.5 5.0 6.1 7.4 9.1 8.1
Metallurgy 4.1 3.4 3.4 3.6 2.5 1.5
Chemicals 8.4 7.1 7.5 6.0 5.8 4.1
Machinery 75.3 80.0 77.1 79.1 78.8 84.0
Heavy, power engineering,
and transport machinery 5.2 4.2 2.6 1.9 1.9 1.5
Instrument-making and
electrical machinery 8.6 7.9 13.0 5.3 4.2 2.5
Chemical and petrol
machinery 0.4 0.4 1.6 0.9 0.9 0.7
Machine tools 1.5 1.3 1.6 0.9 0.7 0.4
Motor vehicles, tractors,
and agricultural machines 3.2 3.0 3.6 4.1 6.0 4.3
Machinery for construction
and communal services 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.1
Defense industry 56.3 63.0 54.2 65.7 64.9 74.6
Wood, furniture, and paper 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.1 0.5 0.3
Stone, clay, and glass 0.8 0.9 1.2 0.6 0.3 0.1
Textiles, clothing, and leather 1.1 0.3 1.2 0.7 0.4 0.1
Food products 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.9 1.8 1.4
Other sectors of industry 1.1 1.0 1.2 0.6 0.9 0.3
Total industry 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: CSRS, various years.
Technological re-equipment of a number of machinery branches and the intro-
duction of new types of products, including those with the participation of foreign
organizations, helped to maintain high levels of innovation activity in heavy and
power engineering machinery and ship-building (50 percent of enterprises intro-
duced innovations) and in manufacturing of motor vehicles, aircrafts, and radio and
communications equipment (about 59 percent). However, in the stagnating com-
ponents of the machine-building sector the innovation rates were lower; examples
are machine-tools production (36 percent), agricultural machinery (33 percent),
equipment for textiles (26 percent), and the food industry (25 percent).
Russian electronics, considered part of the machine-building sector, is a high-
technology industry in serious trouble. Unable to compete with foreign companies,
domestic personal computer output declined by more than a factor of three from
1990 to 1994. Innovation activity in electronics is at a level that is too low for
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Table 4.7. Percentage distribution of R&D expenditure in R&D institutions of the
Russian defense industry by objective.
1992 1993 1994a
Defense R&D 54.3 47.6 46.6
Civilian R&D 45.7 52.4 53.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
aEstimates.
Source: State Committee on Statistics, 1995c.
a branch that, by definition, belongs to the high-tech sector. Only 38 percent of
enterprises introduced innovations in 1994, which is approximately equal to the
average for machine-building as a whole. Innovations have mostly occurred in
the production of household appliances, and many of these innovations are simple
models of products based on licenses held by foreign firms (video cassette recorders,
television sets, and audio recorders).
The links with applied R&D necessary for innovation are usually established
either by contracts with R&D institutions or through in-house R&D units. Gen-
erally the sectors performing the most in-house R&D, such as electric-power and
communications equipment, motor vehicles, and instruments, also had the most
R&D contracted with independent R&D institutions. The positive correlation be-
tween in-house and contract R&D suggests that the two kinds of activities are
complements to, rather than substitutes for, one another, a relationship that holds
in other industrialized countries. In-house R&D apparently is a proxy for an enter-
prise’s interest in innovation and leads to more contract R&D. There are, however,
exceptions. Machinery for chemical, aircraft, and construction industries support
a large amount of external R&D (between 24 and 29 percent of the enterprises
contracted for R&D) and a small amount of internal R&D (between 9 and 16 per-
cent). It should be noted that the terms large and small are relative to the average
in Russia. In international comparisons, the Russian average is low. In 1994 only
12 percent of enterprises in the machine-building sectors were engaged in contract
R&D and 13 percent in internal R&D.
Finally, the various parts of the machine-building sector differ in the relative
roles of state and enterprise financing of R&D (Table 4.8). Overall only one-quarter
of R&D financing for the sector is from government funds; the rest is largely from
enterprises. Again, defense industries are the exception because aircraft, com-
munications equipment, and electronics, all defense-oriented industries, obtained
two-thirds of their R&D financing in 1994 from government funds. Foreign fi-
nancing of machinery R&D is fairly insignificant for most subsectors, but it is
substantial in heavy and chemical machinery and aircraft industries.
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Table 4.8. Percentage distribution of R&D expenditure in machine-building by
subsector and source of funding in 1994.
Funds of
Funds from enterprises
enterprise Budget Non-budget and R&D Foreign
R&D units funds funds institutions funds Total
Heavy machinery 26.4 24.8 6.2 35.9 6.7 100.0
Chemical and petrol
machinery 34.3 5.6 4.4 50.0 5.7 100.0
Electrical
machinery 18.4 53.3 4.5 21.9 1.8 100.0
Instruments 14.4 18.5 3.0 63.7 0.4 100.0
Machine tools 33.9 23.3 0.6 42.2 0.1 100.0
Motor vehicles 84.0 5.6 1.3 8.5 0.6 100.0
Agricultural
machinery 45.6 15.6 10.1 27.8 0.9 100.0
Aircraft 6.0 64.4 10.8 12.6 6.1 100.0
Communications
equipment 4.9 70.8 1.7 21.7 0.9 100.0
Electronics 16.1 53.8 2.2 25.3 2.5 100.0
Source: Author’s estimates; discrepancies in totals are due to rounding.
Changes in the structure of R&D financing have entailed shifts in the type of
R&D activities carried out (basic research, applied research, development). Thus,
science-based and specialized machinery branches, which continue to receive a high
share of government support, had higher shares of basic research (defense industry,
instrument making and electrical machinery, and machine tools) than industries in
market-oriented sectors (such as construction and chemical machinery); in the latter
sectors basic research was reduced to zero (Table 4.9). In response to enterprise
pressure, the share of development in the overall R&D activity in the machine-
building sector increased from 68 percent in 1990 to 76 percent in 1994. Applied
research, which is notable for long-run returns, decreased over this period from 30
percent to 20 percent.
The increased emphasis on development supported from enterprise financing
has already resulted in some increase in machinery R&D output measured in terms
of the development of equipment prototypes (Table 4.10). As stated earlier, the
changes taking place favor new types of machinery intended for stable sectors
of industry (oil and gas, wood and paper industries), transportation (automobiles
and rolling stock), communications, health care, and households. The reduction af-
fected machinery development for declining sectors (textiles and food industries) as
well as manufacturing of such products that cannot compete against imported items
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Table 4.9. Percentage distribution of the value of R&D activities performed within
industry R&D institutions by type of activity in 1994.
Basic Applied
research research Development Total
Industry 3.6 24.5 71.9 100.0
Electric-power engineering
and fuel 1.6 50.2 48.2 100.0
Metallurgy 3.4 42.4 54.2 100.0
Chemicals 5.5 34.7 59.7 100.0
Machinery 3.4 20.3 76.3 100.0
Heavy, power engineering,
and transport machinery 1.3 16.4 82.4 100.0
Instrument-making and
electrical machinery 3.7 13.0 83.3 100.0
Chemical and petrol
machinery 0.3 13.1 86.6 100.0
Machine tools 4.3 30.1 65.6 100.0
Motor vehicles, tractors,
and agricultural machines 2.0 12.4 85.6 100.0
Machinery for construction
and communal services 0.0 34.2 65.8 100.0
Defense industry 3.6 21.1 75.3 100.0
Wood, furniture, and paper 17.5 33.2 49.3 100.0
Stone, clay, and glass 0.1 18.6 81.3 100.0
Textiles, clothing, and leather 3.5 38.5 58.0 100.0
Food products 13.6 75.0 11.4 100.0
Source: CSRS, various years.
(computers and equipment for trade). Demand decline from machine-building itself
was reflected in a reduced number of new types of machines for use in this sector
(machine tools, forge and press machines, automated lines, and industrial robots).
Government priorities shape the distribution of federal funds among various
parts of the machine-building sector. The priorities are reflected in 18 federal S&T,
innovation, and investment programs approved in 1994 for machine-building. All
are intended to reorient the sector from the inherited production to domestic and
export market demand. Major programs include development of the following:
 State-of-the-art equipment for the fuel and power-engineering complex.
 Internationally competitive machine tools.
 Power-saving equipment for electrical generators and transmissions.
 Improved railway locomotives and passenger cars.
 Better urban and suburban mass-transit vehicles.
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Table 4.10. Number of prototypes of machines, equipment, instruments, and
automation means by type.
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Machines and equipment 963 742 795 858 984
Power engineering equipment, diesel engines 25 30 15 20 27
Equipment for ferrous and nonferrous
metallurgy 9 9 4 5 9
Railway equipment and rolling stock 10 8 22 29 25
Electrical machines and equipment 146 100 79 107 112
Chemical, pumping, and compressor equipment 63 72 55 52 61
Equipment for oil and gas extracting and
processing 18 20 35 29 32
Metal-cutting machine tools 40 57 37 33 26
Forge and press machines 39 44 49 27 20
Wood-processing, pulp, and paper equipment 20 17 38 28 24
Automated lines, manipulators, industrial robots 16 13 7 3 6
Automobiles and engines 35 20 40 41 66
Agricultural machines for cattle-breeding,
poultry-farming, and fodder production 16 17 21 27 19
Earth-moving and road machines and
construction machines and equipment 31 23 23 23 23
Technological equipment for textiles,
clothing, and leather manufacture 68 39 17 26 17
Technological equipment for food manufacture 46 30 30 26 33
Trade and public-catering technological
equipment, regulators 32 5 11 13 11
Communications equipment 58 25 54 63 75
Electronics equipment 73 69 52 78 86
Medical equipment 40 31 41 45 71
Equipment for cultural and
social services 26 24 93 96 105
Others 187 109 112 87 136
Instruments and automation means 203 151 202 182 207
Technological process control
and regulation instruments 70 56 76 55 89
Electric-measuring instruments 14 10 12 16 16
Computers 39 26 30 21 10
Machines and instruments for
measuring mechanical values 23 18 20 24 19
Chronometers 5 8 25 4 8
Physical research instruments 19 7 1 11 16
Optical instruments and apparatuses 16 12 9 22 20
Others 17 14 29 29 29
Total 1,166 893 997 1,040 1,191
Source: CSRS, various years.
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 New machines and equipment for housing and road construction.
 New agricultural equipment and better food storage and handling systems.
 Standards and certification system for Russian machine-building products.
In addition, two large-scale programs are to be completed in the framework of
defense-industry conversion:
 Civilian aviation project to manufacture more than 10 types of multipurpose
civilian airplanes and helicopters.
 Development of electronics equipment, particularly devices that monitor
changes in the environment.
These two programs accounted for 10 percent of all budget appropriations for
civilian R&D in 1995.
State research centers provide an additional source of R&D financing in the
machine-building sector. The status of state research centers was granted to 25
of the most prominent research institutes carrying out machinery R&D, including
R&D on aviation, robotics, ship-building, optics, instruments, and electronics.
State support for R&D in machine-building is especially crucial since this sector
is the source of technological progress in the industries that use its products as
equipment. The proper selection and support of machine-building projects will
have an impact on Russia’s economic recovery far beyond its immediate impact on
the machine-building sector itself.
4.2 The Chemical Sector
4.2.1 Overall output trends
The chemical industry is a medium-technology sector (except for the pharmaceu-
ticals subsector) and ranks second after machine-building in R&D intensity (see
Table 4.3). However, the chemical industry in Russia is considerably less R&D
intensive than it is in industrialized OECD countries: 0.6 percent in Russia in 1994
compared with 3.3 percent on average in affluent OECD countries in 1992 (OECD,
1995b, p. 69).
Output declined by 57 percent in the chemical sector from 1991 to 1994. In
1995, growth in exports led to a rise in the output of basic chemical products
such as synthetic resins and plastics, synthetic rubbers, and chemical fibers and
threads. An increase in world prices made Russian products, whose prices had
increased at a slower rate, more competitive. Output of the above-mentioned
products grew by 8 percent, and production of synthetic ammonia, sulfuric acid,
and fertilizers increased in a range of 11–17 percent. Production of polyethylene and
Sectoral Analysis of Russian R&D 73
polypropylene increased the most in this sector (by 32 and 62 percent, respectively).
In the 1960s and 1970s there was an increase in the capacity to produce these new
chemical products enabling the industry to capitalize on the increase in world
demand for them. The economic prospects are good for a number of chemical
companies that produce these products now in demand.
4.2.2 R&D and innovation
For decades, chemical R&D was oriented to the needs of the defense, fuel, and
raw-materials industries. The sharp reduction in orders from the defense industry
and the decline in the output of civilian products from 1991 to 1993 led to a decrease
in R&D input, particularly in R&D employment, that had exceeded the industry
average (Table 4.5).
Despite this situation, the chemical sector remained distinguished as the indus-
try with the highest qualified researchers; 26 percent of them had advanced degrees
compared with 10 percent in total industry and 8 percent in the machine-building
sector.
Government and enterprise funding contributed to the revival of innovation
activity in this sector. In 1993, 122 new raw materials, substances, and manufactur-
ing materials were introduced into production, 93 of which were used for the first
time in Russia. According to a Centre for Science Research and Statistics (CSRS)
survey, 43 percent of chemical enterprises introduced new products or processes
in 1994 (this percentage was 22 percent in industry as a whole). The share of
enterprises that planned to develop or introduce innovations over the 1995–1997
period (37 percent) was also higher in the chemical industry than in the average
for total industry (19 percent). Likewise a high percentage of chemical enterprises
contracted out R&D: 24 percent of the enterprises in the sector compared with 5.7
percent for the total industry average. The chemical sector experienced a fall in
R&D intensity from 2.5 percent in 1989 to 0.5 percent in 1992; however, since
1993, some growth has been noticed in this indicator because of the sector’s efforts
to maintain a high level of innovation.
R&D establishments in the chemical industry continue to rely on budget fi-
nancing in the following priorities:
 Catalysts and their utilization.
 Membrane and other unconventional methods of separating, cleaning, and
concentrating materials for use and processing.
 Safe production of low-tonnage chemical products.
 New manufacturing processes to reduce resource consumption and increase
environmental safety.
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 Chemistry and technology for water purification.
Chemistry-oriented programs are a high priority in the federal budget. They
accounted for 16 percent of government S&T programs financing in 1994. This
high priority helps to maintain basic research, whose share in the sector’s R&D
effort (nearly 6 percent in 1994) is higher than the industry average (less than 4
percent). Ten leading chemistry institutes have been designated as state research
centers and consequently receive additional budgetary support.
The situation with non-budget sources of R&D financing in the chemical sector
seems to be more favorable than in most industries, and their contribution to R&D
expenditure is higher than the industry average. This makes the chemical industry
less dependent on budgetary financing.
This favorable record, if it continues, will provide the basis for restructuring
the sector’s R&D base. The restructuring should include the 30 Academy institutes
and 90 institutions of higher education that perform chemical R&D. Integration
of industrial R&D units with the Academy institutes and better use of university
facilities are important in improving R&D in this sector.
4.3 The Fuel and Electricity-Generation Sectors
4.3.1 Overall output trends
The fuel and electricity-generation industries provide essential inputs for every
industry and almost every household. For this reason and because of high demand
in export markets, the output decline in this sector has been smaller than elsewhere;
production of primary energy products decreased by only 13 percent from 1991 to
1994, and currently accounts for almost one-third of total industry output.
The level of energy production achieved between 1993 and 1994 filled the
domestic energy needs and allowed some increase in the export of oil and gas (State
Committee on Statistics, 1995a). Simultaneously, the structure of fuel production
changed: the share of natural gas increased from 45 percent in 1992 to 49 percent
in 1994 with a decrease in oil (from 35 percent to 32 percent) and coal (14 percent
to 12 percent).
Petroleum-refining output fell more sharply than the output of other energy
products (a 25 percent decline from 1992 to 1994). There was a shift in the mix of
exports to crude oil at the expense of more expensive refined products. In 1995 the
composition of output began to shift back toward more refined products.
Most enterprises in this sector are still in a difficult financial situation despite
relative stability in sales. Money receipts have lagged behind production, as
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enterprises in other sectors have failed to pay their fuel and electricity bills. As
a result, solvency in the fuel industry (especially in oil extraction) has fallen
drastically. Financial indicators in 1995 did not improve,showing that the sector has
remained stagnant (Institute for Economic Forecasting, 1995). Many enterprises
in the oil industry introduced limits on the extraction of crude oil in 1994 because
customers were unable to pay. Oil production in 1994 was only 80 percent of the
1992 level.
The level of oil extraction was affected by the fall in exploration and the
depletion of oil deposits. To address this problem, the oil industry needs more
efficient technologies for both the extraction and production of its product. It must
also renovate refining equipment. To increase the value of oil exports, as well as
domestic consumption, there must be improvements in the quality of petroleum
products and increases in the output of low-ethyl gasoline, low-sulfur diesel fuel,
and motor fuels all of which are in demand.
The natural-gas industry is the most prosperous sector of Russian industry.
Its exceptionally good natural-resource base has permitted stable levels of gas
extraction. Yet even here, financial limitations have postponed the introduction of
new extracting capacities and the construction of pipelines, compressor stations,
gas-processing plants, and other facilities. A serious problem has been the loss
of gas in transportation, a waste which is much greater in Russia than in the
United States. Government support and private investments will be required for
the creation of a system of sales, transportation, and processing of natural gas that
meets world standards. The development and reclamation of a new gas-extracting
region on the Yamal Peninsula will also require extensive investment (Vorontsov,
1995).
Coal output has declined by 20 percent from 1992 to 1994, reflecting a decrease
in demand from domestic electricity-generating stations, ferrous metal production,
and export markets. Rises in the price of transportation has forced up the price
of coal. Revival of demand by the ferrous metallurgy sector in 1995 increased
the demand for coal for coking, but this gain was largely offset by the decline
in the demand for coal in electricity generation. Many coal fields have become
unprofitable, yet coal extraction by strip mining, the cheapest source, is only about
half of coal output. The measures undertaken to reconstruct the coal industry began
in 1995, and involve the gradual reduction of deep mining in favor of strip mining
and the shutdown of unprofitable mines.
In electricity output, Russia ranks second in the world after the United States.
There was some reduction in electricity output (by 13 percent between 1992 and
1994 and an additional 2 percent from January to September 1995). The struc-
ture of the electricity-generation industry is changing. Electricity output from
hydroelectric-power stations increased by 6 percent from January to August 1995,
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Table 4.11. Percentage distribution of R&D expenditure in fuel and electricity-
generation sector by industry and source of funding in 1994.
Funds from Non- Private
enterprise Budget budget Enterprise nonprofit Foreign
R&D units funds funds funds funds funds Total
Electric power 7.7 37.5 27.0 27.6 0.1 0.1 100.0
Oil industry 7.8 17.2 22.5 51.4 – 1.2 100.0
Gas industry 6.4 1.1 28.1 63.9 – 0.5 100.0
Coal industry 4.4 38.4 40.9 16.1 0.3 – 100.0
Author’s calculations; discrepancies in totals are due to rounding.
while output by nuclear and thermonuclear power stations decreased by 1 percent
and 3 percent, respectively. Nuclear power stations in Russia provide 13 percent
of electricity output compared with 22 percent in the United States, 24 percent in
Japan, and 34 percent in Germany. A great deal of electricity in Russia is generated
by natural gas, which is the cheapest source of energy.
4.3.2 R&D and innovation
The fuel and electricity industry ranks third among major sectors in total industry
R&D, and its R&D intensity is higher than that of some branches of manufacturing.
The sector’s R&D personnel declined by 58 percent from 1990 to 1994.
Despite the personnel decline, powerful political and administrative support
has enabled this sector to keep most of its research institutes intact; the number
of R&D institutes declined from 188 in 1990 to 182 in 1994. The orientation of
research institutes to meet the needs of enterprises has strengthened. Approximately
35 percent of enterprises in the oil and gas industries contracted out R&D during
the 1992–1994 period; this was the highest level of this indicator in the Russian
industry. R&D in the fuel and electricity-generation sectors is more dependent
on enterprises’ financing and less dependent on government support than R&D in
other sectors. The share of financing from enterprises is very high in natural-gas
(64 percent) and oil (51 percent) industries, while budgetary contributions to these
enterprises are the lowest (Table 4.11).
The coal industry is the exception. Enterprises contributed only 16 percent of
the coal industry’s R&D funds, while the share of federal funds, both budgetary and
non-budgetary, totaled 79 percent. The coal industry is the lowest among Russian
industries in innovation activity, with only 12 percent of enterprises introducing
innovations in 1994.
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Enterprise financing increased the flexibility and productivity of research in-
stitutions, but also forced them to reduce their size. The average number of R&D
personnel per unit decreased from 408 in 1990 to 235 in 1994. The sector’s share
in industry R&D expenditure increased from 7 percent in 1989 to 8 percent in
1994, while its share of R&D personnel fell from 7 percent to 5 percent (Tables 4.5
and 4.6).
In the sector as a whole the share of applied research increased from 43 percent
in 1989 to 50 percent in 1994, a trend contrary to that in most other sectors. Applied
research was financed both by federal sources and by R&D-performing institutions.
The Ministry of Fuel and Energy finances a considerable part of its R&D
within the framework of the Fuel and Energy Program approved by the Russian
government in 1994. Due to budget constraints, the program’s R&D financing was
small in 1994. In 1995 it was assigned the following R&D tasks:
 To develop a Russian energy strategy.
 To increase energy savings.
 To improve gas-power engineering.
 To create high-capacity electricity transmission between Siberia and European
Russia.
Actual funds for the federal program on energy are much smaller than was
requested by the Ministry of Fuel and Energy, and not enough to obtain substantial
results. The Ministry on Science and Technology Policy (MSTP) also finances
two government S&T programs devoted to fuel and energy. The objectives of the
programs are to introduce ecologically clean power engineering and to promote
technologies for development of complex fuel and energy resources in Russia.
These two S&T programs are examples of joint public and private financing of
industry-oriented R&D. In addition to nearly R3.5 billion allocated to them by the
MSTP in 1994, associations of gas, coal, and oil industries and others spent R9.8
billion of their own funds. This pattern of public–private funding is an effective
form of investment in industrial R&D in the transition period, and should be used
in the future when the private sector becomes a significant source of financing for
R&D.
4.4 The Metallurgy Sector
4.4.1 Overall output trends
The drastic reduction in defense-industry demands and the severing of cooperative
ties with former Soviet republics caused a major decline in demand for ferrous
metals between 1991 and 1994. Output declined by a factor of two from 1991 to
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1994. In an effort to maintain trade, enterprises in this sector acted as net creditors
to the machine-building sector and did not apply rigid sanctions to customers in
arrears in their payments for shipments of metal. In some periods, arrears equaled
one-third of the total nonferrous metallurgy output (Budanov, 1995).
The sector has gradually reoriented itself toward exports, and by 1994 50
percent of production was exported. In late 1994, output of all main types of
ferrous metal products increased. In 1995, with some increase in domestic demand
from the automobile and construction industries, output grew 6 percent for steel and
9 percent for cast iron and finished rolled ferrous metals products. In recent years
metallurgical enterprises have displayed the best performance of most economic
indicators – investment, profitability, stock prices, and wages.
Before 1991, the Russian metallurgical industries produced 60 percent of the
former USSR total. These industries are still world leaders in production, except
for some metals for which the United States and Japan rank first.
To maintain its leadership role, the sector must remain competitive. This
will require reductions in energy and material consumption per unit of output.
Some gains have been achieved by modernizing or even closing obsolete facilities.
For example, the share of oxygen converter and electric steel in the steel output
grew from 50 percent in 1992 to 61 percent in 1995 and the share produced with
continuous casting technologies increased from 28 percent to 37 percent. The
sector’s leadership was also threatened by the considerable slump in output of
products for the domestic market, especially high-quality and expensive products,
such as alloy steel, rolled metals, and special steels for the defense industry.
Nonferrous metals experienced similar developments. The export market
is even more important for these metals; in 1994 70 percent of production was
exported. Production is almost totally dependent on developments in the world
market and on changes in exchange rates (Institute for Economic Forecasting,
1995). Developments of nonferrous metals have varied significantly within the
sector; the output of primary aluminum (including raw materials imported for
tolling), refined copper, zinc, and other nonferrous metals and their concentrates is
increasing, while the output of rolled bronze, brass, and titanium is declining.
The prospects for the metals industry depend, of course, on domestic demand,
especially investment activity, and on export trends. Factors unique to the metals
market may also be important. Competition from new high-technology metals will
also affect the prospects for these industries as will the increased use of recycled
materials and the development of metal-saving processes. Mini-mills may be built
to use local raw materials (including secondary ones) and the newest technologies.
The existing gigantic enterprises are likely to remain the main suppliers for the
automobile and construction industries, but these large mills must adjust to new
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conditions by providing new products, lowering costs, and instituting after-sales
services (Budanov, 1995, pp. 53–54).
4.4.2 R&D and innovation
The R&D intensity in Russian metallurgy was close to that in OECD countries until
1989. Since then, it has decreased drastically from 0.8 percent in 1989 to 0.1 percent
in 1994 (Table 4.3); this rate of decline is larger than the total industry average.
During the 1990–1994 period, R&D personnel decreased from 52,100 to 13,800,
or by 74 percent. The curtailment of R&D in this sector has been partly offset by
the fact that R&D projects targeted to metallurgy are carried out at approximately
160 institutes of the Academy and in other industry sectors that have received more
government support than research institutes in the metallurgical sector.
Metallurgy currently receives a relatively high proportion of R&D and inno-
vation financing from enterprises; this is probably a reflection of the good financial
standing of the manufacturing companies in the sector. The share of non-budget
and enterprise funds in R&D amounted to 12 percent and 32 percent in 1994, re-
spectively; both sources allocate more funds to metallurgy than they do to industry
as a whole. Enterprise initiative is especially intensive in nonferrous metallurgy:
the share of enterprises that contracted out R&D remained 37 percent between
1992 and 1994. The contribution from foreign sources is negligible, 3.4 percent
of R&D expenditure; in precious metals, however, foreign financing reached 22
percent in 1994.
Government support (24 percent of the government’s R&D expenditure on the
metallurgy sector in 1994) was oriented to R&D activity in the following priority
areas:
 Improvements in the technologies for extraction, concentration, and agglom-
eration of ores.
 Creation and introduction of low-waste and conservation technologies.
 Development of new materials (refractory metals; hard, super-hard, light, and
special alloys; ceramics) and technologies for their production.
 Creation of environmentally safe technologies, new methods of exhaust and
sewage purification, and new ways to use solid wastes.
Three large research institutes were granted the status of state research centers.
Federal support to metallurgy R&D institutions allowed them to increase the share
of basic research in R&D expenditure from 2 percent in 1989 to 3.4 percent in 1994.
Innovation activity in metallurgy is characterized by the creation and introduc-
tion of new materials. Thus, 42 types of metallurgy materials were developed and
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39 were introduced into production in 1993. Relatively favorable market condi-
tions stimulated enterprises to introduce more innovations than the total industry
average. Nearly 34 percent of ferrous metallurgy enterprises and 49 percent of non-
ferrous industries introduced at least one innovation in 1994. Given the favorable
economic situation, this trend is expected to continue, resulting in the revival of
R&D and innovation activity in the metallurgical sector.
4.5 The Food Industry
4.5.1 Overall output trends
Processed food output declined by 53 percent from 1991 to 1996; this decline
is smaller than the total industry average. The most significant decreases were
in the production of meat, milk products, butter, granulated sugar, flour, cereals,
bread, fish products, confectionery, and vegetable oil. Most of the decline for
these products reflected a shift in output to more expensive products demanded
by high-income households. Furthermore, in the past these products received a
very high subsidy from the federal government; when the subsidies were elimi-
nated, industries producing these food staples were more severely affected than
other industries. Price increases for agricultural raw materials lagged behind price
increases for processed products, enabling food-processing industries to increase
their profitability, particularly in 1995 (Institute for Economic Forecasting, 1995).
A rise of the population’s income is expected to stimulate production in the
food industry. To increase the quality of food products and the output per unit of raw
materials, new technologies must be installed in the meat-, milk-, poultry-, and fish-
processing industries. These technologies will increase the share of domestically
produced foods in the domestic market.
4.5.2 R&D and innovation
The number of R&D personnel declined by 64 percent from 1989 to 1994,exceeding
the average reduction in industry R&D employment, although the number of R&D
units decreased only slightly from 47 in 1990 to 45 in 1994. The food industry,
along with the fuel and electricity-generating industries, is the only sector that
experienced a relative increase in industry R&D expenditure and a reduction in
R&D personnel (Tables 4.5 and 4.6). In 1990 the food industry in Russia had
approximately the same R&D intensity (0.3 percent) as OECD countries; now the
Russian R&D intensity is about half that level, the result of relatively little interest
by either the government or enterprises in financing R&D in this sector.
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The low level of R&D in the food industry is matched by a low innovation
activity of the enterprises. Only 18 percent of them introduced innovations in 1994,
which is below the industry average (22 percent), and this percentage is expected
to decline further. Most innovations are based on patent licenses and know-how
agreements rather than on R&D obtained under contracts with R&D institutions or
performed within enterprises. Only 1.7 percent of the enterprises contracted out
R&D in 1994.
Currently, the government supplies most R&D financing in the food indus-
try. The government’s S&T program is primarily aimed at the creation of new
technologies and equipment for the manufacture of high-quality, ecologically pure
foodstuffs. The program comprises 36 projects working to develop environmen-
tally safe and resource-saving technologies. The work is carried out by R&D units
in the food sector and by the Russian Academy of Agricultural Sciences and en-
gineering colleges. The program’s principal projects are study of food albumen,
improvements in dried foodstuffs, introduction of resource-saving technologies for
baking bread, introduction of resource-saving technologies for processing meat,
and development of technologies for obtaining fermentation and food antibiotics
on the basis of membranous, biotechnological, and other progressive methods.
This R&D program received R2.1 billion in 1994; this amount places it high on the
government’s list of S&T programs.
4.6 The Wood, Furniture, and Paper Products Sector
4.6.1 Overall output trends
Output in this sector fell by 56 percent from 1991 to 1994. In 1995, however, both
domestic and export demand for paper increased sharply, leading to a recovery of
23 percent in paper output and 33 percent in commercial pulp. These increases
led to a situation in which paper and pulp enterprises achieved higher profitability
than any other industry sector. In contrast, the enterprises in the lumbering and
woodworking branches fared poorly. They were unable to recover their higher
costs for energy and transportation nor could they avoid raising export prices given
the considerable rise in real exchange rates. Similar difficulties were experienced in
the furniture-manufacturing industry, which also faced intense import competition.
One of the sector’s most serious economic problems is how to increase output
of finished products per physical unit of raw materials. In plywood, cardboard,
paper, and pulp the same amount of timber yields four to seven times more finished
products in the United States than in Russia. The lower output per raw-materials
input is caused by the low quality of the equipment and the waste of timber and
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paper in production. It is also due to a low use of scrap materials. The manufacture
of 1 ton of paper and cardboard consumes more than 250 kg of scrap paper in
the United States and more the 450 kg in Japan and Germany. In Russia, such
secondary raw materials are used on a considerably smaller scale (Centre for
Economic Conjuncture, 1994).
4.6.2 R&D and innovation
Wood, furniture, and paper industries have a modest R&D intensity in all nations.
In Russia, the level was low to begin with, and it has declined significantly in the
transition period. R&D personnel fell from 19,700 in 1994 to 3,900 in 1994, and
the sector’s contributions to industry R&D totals are around 0.5 percent (Tables
4.5 and 4.6). A further decline in R&D personnel may completely destroy the
industry’s R&D base which would be detrimental to Russia given its exceptionally
rich stock of raw materials.
One favorable development is the application of R&D results from other sectors
to the wood industries, especially R&D in the university sector such as that at the
St. Petersburg Academy of Forestry and the Moscow State Forestry University.
Approximately two-thirds of budget funds available for R&D in this sector are
channeled to universities and Academy research institutes. These institutions give
priority to basic and high-level applied R&D related to wood. However, the share
of basic research in R&D expenditure in this sector – 17.5 percent – as reported by
respondents, seems to be overestimated (Table 4.9).
A major part of R&D expenditure in the industry in 1994 was from federal
non-budget funds, including the Fund for Financial Regulation in the Timber In-
dustry (31 percent), and from business enterprises (28 percent). In the number of
enterprises contracting R&D (3 percent), wood and paper industries are at a level
lower than the industry average (nearly 6 percent in 1994) and rank last among the
seven sectors examined here. Innovation activity of its enterprises is also below
average: 18 percent of enterprises introduced innovation in 1994, and only 17
percent intended to do so in the future.
4.7 Collapsing Branches
This category of industries is marked by declines in both output and financial results
and includes textiles, clothing, and leather and construction-materials industries
(stone, clay, and glass in the tables). These industries also have the smallest scales
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of R&D performance and the lowest R&D intensity among all the main sectors
(Tables 4.3, 4.5, and 4.6).
4.7.1 Overall output trends
In the textiles, clothing, and leather sector, which in Russia has traditionally been
called light industry, output declined by 80 percent from 1991 to 1995. The lower
output was due to a decline in demand which, in turn, was due to a fall in real
income per capita and competition from imported products. The output decline
was the largest among industrial sectors.
In the cotton industry, the output decline in 1992 and 1993 was also caused by
interruptions in supplies of raw materials from the Central Asian republics of the
former USSR. Some plants were idle for several months because they were without
raw materials. In 1994 the state offered loans to enterprises for purchases of raw
materials, but cotton-manufacturing output still fell by 25 percent in 1995.
Despite the output decline in this sector, some enterprises successfully ex-
panded production of goods that were in demand, such as outdoor clothing. Al-
though the sector primarily serves the domestic market, some textile and clothing
enterprises managed to export their products. The real appreciation of the ruble in
1995, however, hit the export end of the clothing industry hard.
Demand for construction materials (stone, clay, and glass) is determined by
construction investments rather than, as in textiles and clothing, by current house-
hold consumption. Construction output began to decline in 1989 and, as expected
in grave depressions, fell more rapidly than the industry as a whole. Rises in the
relative prices for construction materials forced construction firms to undertake
measures to reduce materials consumption in the construction process.
The one flourishing part of the construction sector is in small-scale individual
housing in the countryside. As a result of this growth output increases were evident
from 1994 to 1995 in asbestos and asbestos cement pipes (by between 11 percent
and 17 percent), polished glass (by 8 percent), and so forth. In contrast, output of
materials for large-scale construction, especially for industrial building, decreased
by a factor of two to three from 1990 to 1995.
Due to a gradual revival in general investment activity in the Russian economy,
the possibilities are good for obtaining external financing for the purchase of high-
quality construction materials for housing and industrial construction (Vorontsov,
1995). There are also good prospects for manufacturing state-of-the-art components
for construction of one- and two-story homes and farmhouses, as well as effective
wall materials, and increasing the use of articles made from local raw materials
(clay, sand, lime, and so on).
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4.7.2 R&D and innovation
Innovation activity in light industries has been comparable to that in the food
industry. Although 18 percent of the enterprises introduced innovations in 1994,
only 13 percent of the enterprises plan to introduce innovations between 1995
and 1997, placing light industry, together with the coal and construction-materials
industries, at the bottom of the list of industry sectors.
The small amount of innovation activity of light-industry enterprises and the
reductions of budgetary appropriations caused a decline of 85 percent in the number
of R&D personnel from 1989 to 1994. By the beginning of 1995, there were only
2,700 R&D personnel left in the light industry sector. Only 2 percent of light-
industry enterprises contracted for R&D in 1994. There were, however, some new
industry structures in which innovation was twice that of the sector average. For
example, 22 percent of the enterprises of the Roslegprom joint-stock company and
30 percent of enterprises in the Rostekstil textile group introduced innovations. In
R&D institutions attached to the governmental Department of Textile and Light
Industry, the share of federal financing was 65 percent of R&D expenditure in 1994,
but in industrial companies it was only 7 percent.
Government R&D financing in this sector has lacked specific goals, and most
of the funds available have been used to finance the remaining R&D institutions
rather than to carry out a coordinated program with clear objectives. The exceptions
are small-scale projects financed by the MSTP directed at the creation of new tech-
nologies for new textile and cotton materials, including those with unconventional
fibers.
The bleak financial outlook of the construction-materials sector negatively
affects the innovation activity of its enterprises. On average, only 12 percent of
enterprises introduced product or process innovations in 1994, the lowest among
the main industry sectors. The share of enterprises that contracted out R&D was
only 3 percent in 1994. The exception was the glass industry, where the share of
innovative activity (21 percent of enterprise) approached the industry average.
Having neither sufficient enterprise demand nor serious budgetary support,
the R&D effort of the construction-materials sector decreased markedly. R&D
personnel declined sixfold from 1990 to 1994.
Budget funding of R&D is low for the construction-materials industry. The
Federal Economic Program on Dwellings allocated little to R&D projects in this
sector in 1995. Again, there was an exception for Rosstrom, an industrial associa-
tion serving the construction-materials industry. In 1994 only 9 percent of the R&D
carried out by the association was financed by the federal budget. The association
received 49 percent of its financing from non-budget funds and 40 percent from
enterprise contributions.
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The analysis of budget-supported R&D projects in the construction-materials
industry shows that the majority of the projects are oriented to the needs of housing
construction, primarily individual houses (cellular concrete for low-level dwelling,
fiberglass-reinforced plastic items based on thermoplastics, sanitary equipment of
high reliability and duration, technology for manufacturing cement-fiber tiles, and
so on). However, a number of projects are also aimed at the creation of technolo-
gies for manufacturing materials for large-scale industrial and public constructions
(vulcanized roofing polymer film, prefabricated buildings made of thin monolithic
concrete shells, and aggregates for light concrete).
The current policy considers housing construction one of the key sectors nec-
essary to fill the future housing needs of the Russian population, and therefore
could become a “money pump for the economy.” R&D institutions in related fields
should be more active in offering their services to enterprises in the sector.
4.8 Conclusions
The prospects of R&D in industry sectors vary from sector to sector and strongly
depend on economic conditions. In principle, market research should be able to
identify those segments of the market in which Russian products could be compet-
itive. The federal government should then provide R&D funding to enterprises in
these segments. The rationale for increased activity of the government is that cur-
rently even the most prospective industries are operating under difficult economic
conditions and the enterprises are barely able to support R&D. Government support
would enable R&D institutions to survive and maintain their research capabilities
for the economic recovery and renewal of growth of the Russian economy.
Chapter 5
Innovation Activity of
Russian Industrial Enterprises
Serguei Glaziev, Il’dar Karimov, and Irina Kuznetsova
Applied R&D is only the early stage in the process that leads to a new product or
new production process. A crucial later stage is that of innovation – the introduction
of new products and processes into the economy. Such commercialization is the
way R&D raises living standards and benefits the population.
This chapter focuses on innovation, particularly the role of the enterprises
in the Russian setting. The chapter consists of three parts. The first provides a
brief history of attempts to reform the Soviet innovation system since the early
1960s. The second part examines the empirical evidence of recent general trends in
industrial innovation. The third part describes feasible policy initiatives that would
promote enterprise innovation.
5.1 Innovation Activities in the USSR:
Adjustment without Reform
5.1.1 Changes in the organizational structures of innovation:
From the 1960s to the 1980s
Soviet policymakers spent several decades searching for efficient innovation poli-
cies. In the 1960s, it was widely recognized that bureaucratic costs outweighed
the possible advantages of direct, top-down management, although the concept of
socialist planning was not questioned. The command economy had already lost
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much of its steam and needed to progress technologically. The contrast between a
powerful R&D potential and its insignificant utilization by industry was apparent.
It was recognized that innovation in nondefense fields was important, so civilian
R&D was given a higher priority than earlier in terms of financing, wages, equip-
ment, buildings, and pilot and experimental facilities. Administrative command
mechanisms were unable to combine the activities of separate research institutes,
design bureaus, experimental pilot plants, and industrial enterprises to create new
products and processes and introduce them into the economy. Such a separation of
R&D institutions from industries was considered a source of inefficiency, as was
the slow transfer of knowledge from the Academy and higher education institutions
to enterprises; the limited application of mighty military R&D potential to civilian
industries; the gap between the metropolises and provinces in the S&T level; and,
finally, the almost complete autarky of the USSR with respect to innovation.
With the recognition of these problems, efforts were made to transform the
organizational structures of innovation. Most important was the establishment of
research and production associations and, later, intersectoral science and technol-
ogy complexes (ISTCs) to strengthen ties between research and production and to
achieve high efficiency in technology transfers (see also Chapter 3). These organi-
zations were created within the framework of the centralized state management and
had integrated plans and a high level of budget financing. Hopes were high that
ISTCs would provide “realization of penetrative achievement of S&T progress,
development of massive competitive products, transition to a new technological
structure, modernization for the whole economy, and advancement in the world
market with high-technology products.”
However, the organizational changes were not backed by incentives for achiev-
ing such ambitious objectives. The ISTCs were shielded from market forces by
lavish subsidies. Enterprises within ISTCs continued to follow the legislation and
informal rules valid for organizations subordinate to industrial ministries. Although
legal entities, ISTCs did not have their own finances and the leading organizations
in an ISTC could influence its satellite members only during the formation of plans.
The freedom and incentives necessary for the development of ISTCs were missing.
As a result, goals were not accomplished and industrial ministries remained closed
systems with minimum interactions with external organizations.
Important organizational changes were also made to help disseminate infor-
mation about innovations. A state S&T information system (GSNTI) was created.
GSNTI had a hierarchical structure (USSR, branch, territorial, and local levels).
By 1990, GSNTI comprised 10,500 units and had a staff of 136,000 employees
(CSRS, 1992, pp. 86–87). GSNTI disseminated information on S&T achievements
and advanced production techniques, as well as the collection, systematization, and
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analysis of efficient methods for the introduction of innovations. It also organized
domestic and international exhibitions of advanced machinery and technology.
In spite of the changes in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, by the early 1990s the
organizational structure for innovation had several inefficiencies. The innovation
system did not have enough versatility and, as shown in previous chapters, had
acquired an extremely inflexible structure. Organizational changes implemented
within the framework of the administrative command system had not created an
efficient way to bring technological ideas to commercial realization quickly. The
military sector was the exception, for here the innovation process was well or-
ganized. The arms race and international competition demanded innovations and
pushed the central authorities to establish a special mechanism for defense inno-
vations and to allocate resources generously to the military sector. Incentives for
the efficient integration of R&D and production were lacking in all other sectors.
Innovation was stifled by the centrally planned economy despite the illusion of
significant organizational change.
5.1.2 Changes in the central planning system
The central planning system for innovation survived with its major features intact
until 1991 when the Soviet Union was replaced by the independent republics. Until
this time major decisions in the USSR were made by the supreme party leadership
and the central government. Drafts of decisions of national importance were pre-
pared for party leaders by such central bodies as the State Planning Committee, the
Ministry of Finance, and the USSR State Committee of Science and Technology. At
the republic level, an analogous structure of decision-making prevailed. Regional
and local authorities, however, had few chances to influence the development of
innovation activity located within their boundaries for these decisions were made
at the national level.
Resources needed for R&D innovations were estimated by the State Commit-
tee for Material and Technical Supplies. The point of departure for the estimations
was the previous year’s output, which secured stability of the economic structure.
The State Planning Committee followed a similar approach, which also resulted
in the reproduction of existing production patterns. The centralized distribution of
financial resources through the state budget excluded the possibility of forming an
innovation strategy that depended on the economic results of enterprises. Instead
support for R&D was available to all industries roughly in proportion to their ex-
isting size. The pricing and distribution system guaranteed the sale of any increase
in output. Financing for inefficient industries was available without provisions for
the repayment of loans.
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The development of S&T in the Soviet period was regulated by five- and one-
year plans, which officially assigned tasks and priorities. Under this system of
management, important intersectoral S&T problems were ignored because they did
not match the departmental system of management.
Criticism of the performance of the R&D system focused on the actual man-
agement of S&T processes; however, only a few major attempts were made at
improving the underlying system of management. Under pressure by prominent
scientists and R&D administrators within the general paradigm of the administra-
tive command system, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central
Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers adopted a new system of S&T man-
agement in July 1979. The measure was entitled On Improvement of Planning and
Reinforcement of the Impact of Economic Mechanism on Increase in the Efficiency
of Production and Quality of Works and envisaged changes in both planning and
incentives for R&D and innovation.
This document had the following provisions for S&T planning:
 The S&T program would be established for a twenty-year period with subdi-
visions into five-year stages. The S&T goals would be based on the socioeco-
nomic objective defined by the Communist Party. After each five-year period,
the program was to be supplemented by more precise objectives for the next
five-year period.
 S&T programs would identify which areas to focus on and provide time tables
for the completion of various stages, from research to the introduction of new
technology into the economy.
 The five-year plans would guide the allocation of resources for S&T.
The leading role in developing S&T programs was assigned to the USSR
Academy of Sciences and the USSR State Committee on Science and Technol-
ogy. These two organizations reported to the USSR Council of Ministers and State
Planning Committee. S&T programs were to be worked out both for the national
economy as a whole and for separate branches and regions of the country. The
responsibility for preparation of branch programs was placed on the corresponding
ministries and departments, and regional programs were to be developed by repub-
lican governments. All this activity occurred under the guidance of the USSR State
Planning Committee.
Another reform concerned economic incentives for R&D and innovation ac-
tivities. In the late 1970s, there was an attempt to decentralize management of
innovation to ministries and departments within ministries. In each branch, a fund
for S&T development was established which was derived from payments by enter-
prises according to standards fixed by each ministry. The funds could be carried
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over from one period to another but could not be diverted to other purposes. Major
uses of the fund were to finance R&D and to introduce new machinery. A portion
of the ministry funds was at the disposal of the USSR State Committee on Science
and Technology and was used for additional financing of projects carried out in
accordance with national S&T programs. A further portion of the funds was re-
tained by individual enterprises to give them an incentive to speed up innovations
and raise their economic efficiency. The funds could be used at the discretion of
the enterprise to design new processes or products or to buy new machinery to
implement innovations.
Finally, the reform measures attempted to strengthen incentives for R&D and
innovation. Previously, incomes of participants in the innovation process were
strictly controlled by direct regulations. A Fund of Economic Incentives was
established in each enterprise to pay bonuses to managers, researchers, and other
personnel. Contribution to these funds was based on profits from the innovations.
Even with all these changes, the bureaucratic grip on R&D institutions and
enterprises remained tight. The system of state procurement orders limited the
possibility of accomplishing work on a contract basis. A ceiling on achievable profit
rates neutralized the influence of demand on innovation. Even though the system
envisaged the recovery of all costs, intangible investments were not included as an
enterprise cost. Limits on the increase in personal income did not give incentives to
innovators and researchers. Attempts to increase incentives by establishing sectoral
funds, providing bonuses for successful innovation, granting special governmental
and departmental awards, or introducing ranks for researchers had limited impact
because the dominant bureaucratic structures kept the system from reflecting the
wide variance in returns inherent in innovation.
5.1.3 Decentralization to enterprise
The 1987 law on state-owned enterprises was an important step in decentralizing
decisions to enterprises. It was intended to give enterprises some economic in-
dependence and the responsibility for the results of their activities. It was hoped
that, among other goals, new economic methods would accelerate S&T progress,
secure maximum receptivity to innovation, and increase incentives to use the latest
S&T achievements. Innovations to produce new and higher-quality products at
low costs were recognized to be the most important way of increasing the income
of an enterprise and providing for its self-financing.
The enterprise had to support its activities from the revenue realized from the
sale of its output. The law granted enterprises the right to arrange their economic
activity according to one of two economic models. The first was based on a system
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of profit distribution and input charges. After settlement with ministries for taxes,
the repayment of credits, and payments to a wage fund determined by a fixed share
of the value-added or some other measure of production, the enterprise could apply
its net profit to any of the three funds: development of production, bonus payments
for personnel, or social activities (health, training, recreation, or housing). The
workers collective and the managers of the enterprise determined the distribution
of income among these funds.
The second model of economic self-support was based on detailed regulations
for distribution of income after payment for material inputs. Income was used first
for the settlement of taxes and repayment of credits. The remaining income was
then distributed among the funds mentioned above and then used for wages.
In both systems, enterprises could create a financial reserve and a fund of hard
currency. The fund for development of production could be used by an enterprise
to finance R&D and innovation and to purchase fixed assets. An enterprise was
also granted the right to use the funds from amortization of fixed assets for the
development of production or similar uses.
Through these reforms enterprises obtained freedom in financing innovations,
but enterprises limited their use of this new freedom. This was because the law
on state-owned enterprises created a conflict between the legal status and actual
status of property in a state enterprise. Most managers of state-owned enterprises
had little interest in the development and modernization of production that would
increase profits in the long run. At the same time, having practically uncontrolled
command of their enterprises’ property, managers had an interest in increasing the
revenue of enterprises in the short run by raising prices and using cheap credit.
They used the resulting profits to reward themselves in direct and indirect ways
and to maintain the real wages of employees whose support they needed.
R&D institutions were also subject to the law on state-owned enterprises. The
transition of the industrial sector to a more decentralized system led R&D institu-
tions to search for ways to be self-supporting. One way was to increase efficiency,
and this did occur at the level of research teams. Arbitrary rule by managers became
less common, and managers took more responsibility for their organizations’ re-
sults. However, the effort to make R&D institutions self-supporting oriented them
to short-term objectives that increased current revenue. The change also made
R&D institutions more dependent on clients who were not yet always sufficiently
competent in expressing their requests directly to the R&D institutions.
The intended goal of the new law was to retain the system of top-down control
while enlisting the initiative and enthusiasm of managers, researchers, and workers.
However, the reforms of the 1980s failed to achieve these goals.
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5.1.4 Voluntary organizations to promote technical progress
Another development in the 1980s was the foundation of voluntary S&T associ-
ations. S&T societies (STSs) were voluntary public organizations that supported
S&T to solve specific industrial problems. STSs operated under the guidance of
trade unions and comprised voluntary research laboratories and schools involved
in advanced studies. Also included were so-called technology houses and people’s
universities of technological progress (a kind of open university), where more than
1 million people studied annually.
The All-Union of Inventors and Rationalizers (VOIR) was also founded un-
der the guidance of trade unions as a voluntary organization aimed at involving
employees in innovation and organizing production in a more rational way. To
improve the development of innovations and to solve the task of speeding up the
country’s socioeconomic development, VOIR, together with the All-Union Council
of S&T Societies, carried out an experiment of combining efforts of scientists and
enterprise managers. Contracts from enterprises financed the effort. The main goal
of this endeavor was to accelerate implementation of S&T tasks in the five-year
plan. As part of this effort an interdepartmental committee on the introduction of
especially important inventions was established.
Still another initiative was the establishment of an S&T creative work program
for young people in 1986. In early 1987, the responsibility for development of this
program was placed with the respective All-Union Coordination Council headed
by the Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and the Chairman of
the USSR State Committee on Science and Technology. A regional system was
also established. By the end of 1988, 500 centers existed with an average of more
than 600 people (mostly employed on a part-time basis) at each center. Such cen-
ters arranged interaction between clients and temporary working groups including
employees of public R&D institutions. This form of R&D organization proved
to be efficient since it could complete contracts more quickly with smaller num-
bers of participants and at a lower expense than the established R&D institutions.
Moreover, with their own financial resources, the centers were able to carry out
self-initiated research, create and develop data banks, and help in the introduction
of S&T achievements into enterprises.
The voluntary organizations were probably cost-effective ways of providing
some flexibility in a rigid R&D–innovation system. However, small, innovation-
oriented organizations could not compete for resources with the mighty ministries,
giant branch research institutes, and industrial enterprises. In an environment
where political importance and size were major factors in obtaining resources,
young enthusiasts had little chance of gaining significant support.
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5.2 Recent Trends in Innovation Activity
5.2.1 Transition difficulties
Partial reforms within the central planning system ended with the collapse of the
USSR and Russia’s sudden shift to a radical liberalization policy in 1991. This
switch in policy was designed as a revolution against the central planning system.
The idea was to remove the state from economic activity and to rely on private
initiative and the market to tackle economic problems. In the rush to establish a
market system, little attention was paid to legislation to regulate market activity, to
encourage innovation, and to promote competition.
As the economy moved to a market system in 1991, innovation activity dras-
tically decreased for a number of reasons:
 An unstable macroeconomic environment tremendously damaged innovation.
Short-term and survival goals dominated enterprise behavior. High interest
rates and unstable and unpredictable domestic demand made innovation eco-
nomically unprofitable. Another obstacle to innovation was a shortage of work-
ing capital for enterprises, accompanied by decreased centralized financing.
 Russia’s lag behind the West was finally and unconditionally acknowledged.
Political pressures on the R&D sector to catch up now vanished along with most
of the subsidies for R&D. Indeed, during the first years of post-Soviet reforms
government policy was limited to maintaining R&D institutions, while support
for industrial innovation declined sharply. Enterprises now were exposed to
market pressures, and many recognized that in the long run they must innovate
to survive. Still, market signals during the transitional period were misleading,
and could not substitute for government guidance. A new national innovation
system has not yet emerged.
 Large-scale privatization of state enterprises broke established partnerships
between production enterprises and research institutes. Industrial ministries
no longer coordinated the work of research and production units, which had to
learn how to operate in a market environment.
 Brain-drain from the R&D sector had a strong negative effect on R&D and
innovation activities. In the past both employers and employees were distressed
by staff reductions. Restricted in their efforts to dismiss employees, troubled
R&D institutions and enterprises adjusted to the decline in their funding by
across-the-board cuts in real wages. Young, mobile, and talented employees
had economic incentives to move to other sectors such as banking, trade,
and other services, as well as to work abroad, leaving R&D institutions and
enterprises with senior employees much less disposed to innovation than the
younger ones who left.
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The decline in innovation can be documented by several indicators of economic
activity. A simple but comprehensive indicator is the level of innovation activity
measured by the share of enterprises carrying out the introduction of innovations
(for the survey methodology developed by the Centre for Science Research and
Statistics see section A1 in Annex and also Gokhberg and Kuznetsova, 1996;
the first survey results were published in CSRS, 1996c). According to CSRS
(1996c), this measure fell from between 60 percent and 70 percent in the 1980s to
the average of 22 percent for the 1992–1994 period (Table 5.1). The percentage
of innovating enterprises varied by industry. The highest shares of enterprises
implementing activities to introduce at least one innovation are found in the oil-
and gas-extracting industry (48 percent), nonferrous metallurgy (49 percent), the
medical industry including both instruments and pharmaceuticals (48 percent), and
the chemical and petrochemical industry (43 percent). For the oil and gas industry
and nonferrous metals industry, innovation activity was economically justified since
the demand for these products was relatively stable in both domestic and foreign
markets in comparison with other major industry sectors (State Committee on
Statistics, 1994b, p. 13). All the sectors connected with extraction and processing
raw materials and intermediate products had a smaller decline in output than the
manufacturing sectors during the 1992–1994 period. By 1995 some of these
raw-materials sectors had achieved an increase in output from the previous year
(nonferrous and ferrous metallurgy and chemical and petrochemical industries).
Surprisingly, some industries suffering from a steep decline in output demon-
strated relatively significant innovation activity. Examples include machinery and
metal-working (38 percent of enterprises introduced innovations) and ferrous met-
allurgy (34 percent). These developments reflect the fact that the drastic decline
in demand in their traditional products forced companies to make innovations in
related fields in an effort to survive. Major innovation requires investment. There-
fore, a revival of innovation activity, even in depressed sectors, has been demon-
strated by the competition of enterprises for tenders for centralized investment.
The Commission on Investment Tenders at the Ministry of Economy received an
unexpectedly large number of proposals from the machine-building (17 percent of
the total) and metallurgy (13 percent) sectors (Profile of Change, 1995).
The level of innovation activity has been low in industry sectors oriented to
domestic-market needs such as light industry (18 percent of enterprises introduced
innovations), the food industry (18 percent), and the construction-materials industry
(12 percent). This reflects, in part, low overall demand for the products of these
sectors and, in part, the fact that domestic consumer goods are not competitive
with imports. Realistic forecasts of innovation activity in these industries, based
on enterprise estimates, predict that in the 1995–1997 period there will be even less
innovation activity than during 1992–1994 (13 percent in light industry; 16 percent
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Table 5.1. Innovation activity of industrial enterprises during the 1992–1994
period.
Level of
Enterprises Innovating innovation
surveyed enterprises activity
A B (B/A), in %
Oil extracting and refining,
gas extracting 135 65 48.1
Coal, slate, and peat 317 39 12.3
Ferrous metallurgy 240 82 34.2
Nonferrous metallurgy 76 37 48.7
Other metallurgy, n.e.c. 183 48 26.2
Chemicals (excluding pharmaceuticals) 515 219 42.5
Machinery and metal-working
(excluding medical equipment) 3,348 1,259 37.6
Wood, pulp, and paper 1,374 251 18.3
Stone and clay products 2,142 270 12.6
Glass, porcelain, and faience products
(excluding medical articles) 153 32 20.9
Textiles, clothing, and leather 2,162 380 17.6
Food products 4,957 877 17.7
Microbiological industry 42 17 40.5
Medical equipment and pharmaceuticals 119 57 47.9
Other sectors 1,216 170 14.0
Total 16,979 3,803 22.4
n.e.c. = not elsewhere classified.
Souce: CSRS, 1996c.
in the food industry; 10 percent in construction-materials industry). In spite of an
obvious improvement in the economic situation (reductions in the rate of decline
in output and the rate of inflation), a decrease in innovation activity is expected in
the 1995–1997 period, not only in these industries but in practically all industrial
sectors, including the most economically well-to-do branches such as the oil and
gas and nonferrous metals industries.
Enterprise managers estimate that over the next three years the level of inno-
vation activity will be only 19 percent on average. A division of enterprises into
two categories with respect to innovations is apparent: more than 70 percent of the
already innovating enterprises plan to continue innovation activities; those that did
not support innovation in the past are not expected to introduce innovations in the
future.
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Table 5.2. Innovating industrial enterprises by type of activity during the 1992–
1994 period, survey results.
Introduced
Introduced new new or improved
or improved technological Performed
products processes R&D
Oil extracting and refining,
gas extracting 24 48 18
Coal, slate, and peat 13 22 1
Ferrous metallurgy 57 64 37
Nonferrous metallurgy 23 26 15
Other metallurgy, n.e.c. 31 33 24
Chemicals (excluding pharmaceuticals) 189 158 104
Machinery and metal-working
(excluding medical equipment) 1,122 829 456
Wood, pulp, and paper 208 170 47
Stone and clay products 177 145 38
Glass, porcelain, and faience products
(excluding medical articles) 23 22 5
Textiles, clothing, and leather 307 249 43
Food products 724 466 101
Microbiological industry 12 12 3
Medical equipment and pharmaceuticals 50 35 18
Other sectors 101 115 12
Total 3,061 2,394 922
n.e.c. = not elsewhere classified.
Source: CSRS, 1996c.
5.2.2 Types of innovation activity
Innovation activity encompasses a wide range of diverse activities such as R&D,
design, testing, and, finally, the introduction of new or improved products and
processes into production (Table 5.2). In the period from 1992 to 1994, innova-
tions were made by fewer than 4,000 of the almost 17,000 enterprises surveyed;
however, some of the enterprises were simultaneously engaged in different types
of innovation activity. More than 80 percent of the 4,000 enterprises active in
innovation were engaged in product introduction. This indicates that innovation
activity was biased toward product innovation. A major factor in the innovation
activity was the struggle by enterprises for shares in new and traditional markets.
The most common tactic was for an enterprise to improve its products and to change
its product lines, adding new ones and dropping obsolete ones.
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Product innovations are very important at the trough of an economic cycle for
they can lead to new markets and opportunities for growth. The indisputable leaders
in product innovations were those connected with manufacturing equipment for
light industry (95 percent of innovating enterprises carried out product innovation).
In part, these innovations targeted import substitution. For example, imports of
textile machinery from the West totaled $200 million annually in the early 1990s
with additional imports from former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(CMEA) member countries. These imports included 200 items of equipment
which were also manufactured in Russia (Khimushkin, 1995). Innovations in this
field were supported by the budget, although demand for equipment by textile
manufacturers was bleak.
A high level of product innovations was also a characteristic of the medical
industry (88 percent of innovating enterprises introduced product innovations) and
the chemical and petrochemical industry (86 percent). Consumer goods industries
had only an average rate of introduction of new products even though producing
better products is one of the conditions for the survival of enterprises in this sector.
The other significant type of innovation activity is the introduction of new
or improved production processes, primarily to reduce the costs and to improve
product quality. In transition economies, such as Russia, enterprises are more
concerned with immediate survival than with long-term profitability. Product
innovations better serve the first goal since they can bring in more revenue, whereas
process innovations have a long-term payoff.
Process innovations were introduced by 63 percent of innovating enterprises
between 1992 and 1994. Under the special circumstances in Russia, labor-saving
process innovations were of little value because managers were attempting to main-
tain employment levels. Managers, hence, were not interested in innovations that
could reduce costs by reducing the size of their staff. In contrast, product innova-
tions could raise the revenues of an enterprise while maintaining the employment
level. Process innovations are most widespread in the raw-materials sectors, such
as mining, chemical, and petrochemical industries because their export orienta-
tion makes lowering costs a significant factor. In these industries, sales are of
standardized commodities in which product innovation is less significant. For the
1992–1994 period, the share of enterprises engaged in process innovations among
the innovating enterprises was 74 percent in the fuel industry, 72 percent in the
ferrous metallurgy, 70 percent in nonferrous metallurgy, and 72 percent in the
chemical and petrochemical industries.
Process innovations focused on cost reductions in the energy, fuel, and materi-
als sectors. These innovations were forced on Russian enterprises partly by the in-
crease of relative prices of energy and materials and partly by the fierce competition
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in the domestic and foreign markets; this competition made enterprises realize that
reductions in their relative costs were crucial for survival.
Improvements in product quality have been a priority with one-quarter of
enterprises engaged in process innovations. Better product quality is the main
factor in the recent increase in competitiveness of domestic products relative to
imports in the Russian market.
There have been some innovations aimed at protecting the environment such
as the reduction of dangerous wastes; these innovations were pursued primarily by
enterprises with a high potential for damaging the environment. Improvements in
working conditions ranked lowest in the objectives of innovation activities.
The pattern of innovation activity shows that R&D performance by enterprises
is insignificant, as could be expected with economic conditions that discourage
expenditures with a long-run payoff. Indeed, in the three years under examination
(1992–1994), only 5 percent of the total number of enterprises or 24 percent of
those active in innovation, performed in-house R&D. In G-7 countries, enterprise-
financed R&D occurs in more than 90 percent of the large industrial enterprises.
The reasons for such low levels of R&D in the Russian enterprise sector lie in
the Soviet past. As discussed earlier, industrial R&D was carried out by research
institutes and design bureaus that were separate from the production enterprises.
The privatization program did not help this situation; it broke even the weak
links existing between industrial R&D and production units. Industrial enterprises,
privatized separately from R&D institutions, do not significantly support R&D
because it has only a long-term payoff, and they lack sufficient investment funds
to introduce radical innovations.
5.2.3 Qualitative characteristics of innovation
Many of the innovations counted in the data cited above represent insignificant
improvements of products and technologies already in use by other domestic or
foreign enterprises. In the survey cited above industrial enterprises indicated that
most of their innovations are the introduction of products that are new only to their
enterprise. One might better classify such activity as the diffusion of innovation
rather than innovation itself.
In practically all sectors of industry, the output of new products decreased at
a greater rate than the output of all products. For example, the share of newly
introduced products in the output of machine-building decreased from 6.5 percent
in 1990 to 2.6 percent in 1994, and that of radically new products from 3.0 percent
to 0.9 percent, respectively.
Another important aspect of innovation is its source. The technology for
innovation has diverse origins. It can be the result of an enterprise’s in-house
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or contractual R&D, or it may come from patent licenses or from reliance on
unpatented technology. As mentioned in earlier chapters, technological progress
in Russian enterprises depends almost completely on R&D performed outside the
enterprise sector. Technology transfer thus has a major role in the innovation
process as a link between R&D and production. In their innovation activity during
the 1992–1994 period, enterprises relied mainly on new technologies and other
S&T achievements acquired by technology transfer (Table 5.3).
The weakness of enterprise R&D is partly compensated by the use of R&D
results obtained from other sectors: the industrial R&D institutions, academy orga-
nizations, and higher education. It should be noted, however, that enterprises with
in-house R&D are also the most active in seeking R&D results elsewhere. These
enterprises are in chemical and petrochemical industry (66 percent of innovating
enterprises obtained contractual R&D), ferrous metallurgy (57 percent), nonferrous
metallurgy (78 percent), the fuel industry (77 percent), and the medical industry (51
percent). This reconfirms the importance of enterprise R&D as a link to external
S&T.
Transfer of technology occurs most often by contractual R&D (33 percent
of innovating enterprises) and borrowing or imitation without patents (18 percent
relied on know-how agreements and 23 percent on engineering and consulting
services). These are the most accessible and the least costly sources. In contrast,
acquiring patent licenses and rights for patents holds only a modest share in overall
technology transfer. These two forms of transfer were used during the 1992–1994
period by no more than 16 percent of enterprises active in innovation. In the three
years since the beginning of economic reforms, only 125 industrial enterprises
of the 17,000 surveyed have bought patent licenses for the use of inventions.
These enterprises were largely in the machinery and metal-working industry (45
enterprises) and the chemical and petrochemical industry (28 enterprises). Even the
most economically successful sectors, such as nonferrous metallurgy (16 percent
of innovating enterprises bought licenses for inventions) and the fuel industry (15
percent) are not using patents as a major source of innovation.
The weakness of the patent and license market reflects the decrease in the
general innovation activity in Russia. The decrease is also apparent in the fact
that only 7 percent of the R&D institutions produced patentable inventions. The
high expenses of patenting intellectual property and the weak guarantees against
imitation discourage patenting even those few inventions that are patentable. This
is especially so for enterprises suffering from financial difficulties.
Thus, estimates of qualitative content of innovation indicate that most inno-
vation activity in Russia involves modest technological progress or only imitation
of innovations that have been introduced elsewhere. Innovations are characterized
by little use of the most advanced S&T achievements. The innovation activities
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Table 5.3. Technology exchange during the 1992–1994 period (number of industrial enterprises acquiring technology),
survey results.
Acquisition of patent
Acquisition licenses (of which Acquisition
of patent licenses on the use of unpatented R&D Know-
rights of inventions) licenses results how Othera
Oil extracting and refining,
gas extracting 10 12 (10) 56 50 27 30
Coal, slate, and peat 1 4 (2) 19 15 6 8
Ferrous metallurgy 16 10 (8) 59 47 16 27
Nonferrous metallurgy 7 6 (6) 32 29 11 19
Other metallurgy, n.e.c. 6 8 (3) 43 36 16 21
Chemicals (excluding pharmaceuticals) 19 31 (28) 168 144 84 108
Machinery and metal-working
(excluding medical equipment) 98 114 (45) 701 519 262 364
Wood, pulp, and paper 7 12 (1) 91 55 27 42
Stone and clay products 6 61 (3) 125 77 33 49
Glass, porcelain, and faience products
(excluding medical articles) 2 1 – 15 9 8 8
Textiles, clothing, and leather 8 16 (6) 138 87 39 60
Food products 31 85 (9) 233 107 102 75
Microbiological industry – 1 – 13 12 5 8
Medical equipment and
pharmaceuticals 8 6 (4) 39 29 16 18
Other sectors 2 25 – 56 21 20 28
Total 221 392 (125) 1,788 1,237 672 865
aEngineering, consulting, and other technology-related services.
n.e.c. = not elsewhere classified.
Source: CSRS, various years.
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recorded in enterprise surveys include mainly insignificant improvements in ex-
isting products and technologies or diversification of product lines to offset the
limited demand for the enterprises’ other products.
5.2.4 Investment and innovation
Innovations are closely connected with investment activity. Fluctuations in inno-
vation activity and volume of investment are positively correlated; the introduction
of innovations often requires investments and investments are often in response to
the profit opportunities created by innovations.
Investment declined threefold from 1990 to 1994. The investment share in
GDP was 17 percent in 1994 compared with 22 percent in 1990 (State Committee
on Statistics, 1995, p. 13). The only reason the share remained as relatively
high as it did is that GDP itself declined. The most significant decrease (by a
factor of between three and four) in capital investments from 1991 to 1994 was
in the chemical, wood, construction-materials, and light industries. The decline
in investments was most limited in the fuel and power-generation sectors where
demand for products changed little (State Committee on Statistics, 1994a).
Another view of the pattern of investment is provided by data that divide in-
vestment into that directed at restructuring of functioning enterprises and that for
technological advancement (Table 5.4). The objective of investment in techno-
logical advancement is to raise the technological level of specific enterprises and
workshops by introducing advanced machines and substituting new, more produc-
tive methods for outdated ones. The leaders in this form of capital investments are
enterprises in the ferrous and nonferrous metallurgical industries, which are more
active in innovation than enterprises in most other industry sectors.
The methodology of official Russian statistics limits innovation-related capital
investment to that mainly connected with the acquisition of fixed assets such as
the cost of machines, equipment, and other capital expenses used in introducing
new or improved products or processes. This is, of course, only a small part of
the expense of introducing an innovation. More significant is the R&D expense
connected with innovation; given the data available, R&D expenditure is perhaps
the best indicator of innovation costs. Another part of innovation costs related
to technology transfer is represented in Russian statistics by exports and imports
of S&T services (for data, see Chapter 6). Innovation requires, however, more
than R&D efforts and investment in new equipment. It also needs marketing and
personnel training. All these expenditures must be made prior to the realization of
returns on the innovation, although they are, as a rule, charged by enterprises to
accounts that include both routine and innovation activities; so they are difficult to
measure.
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Table 5.4. Structure of capital investment in 1994 (%).
Share of investment Distribution of the total
outlays for reconstruc- investment for reconstruction
tion and technological and technological re-equipment
re-equipment in Recon- Technological
capital investment structiona re-equipmentb
Industry 54 32 68
Electric-power
engineering 27 45 55
Fuel 47 19 81
Ferrous metallurgy 74 40 60
Nonferrous metallurgy 71 38 62
Stone, clay, and glass
products 38 41 59
Food products 59 30 70
Agriculture 40 33 67
Transportation 51 46 54
Construction 48 44 56
Total for Russia 51 36 64
aReconstruction is defined as a comprehensive re-equipment of the enterprise aimed at increasing
output and product quality.
bTechnological re-equipment is considered less comprehensive and refers to particular production
units only.
Source: State Committee on Statistics, 1995e.
Russian enterprises have not been active in creating marketing units sufficient to
research and influence market demand. Therefore, most enterprises are ill-informed
about prices, costs, and their market – a major disadvantage in introducing new
products. The exceptions are enterprises active in innovation. A Centre for Science
Research and Statistics (CSRS) survey of machinery-building enterprises shows a
close connection between marketing and innovation activities. All the enterprises
engaged in innovations had their own sales and marketing services.
Despite the limited data, we have attempted to estimate the overall innova-
tion expenditures in Russia in 1994. The estimation is based on data on R&D
expenditures, capital investment in machines and equipment, as well as exports
and imports of technologies. The calculations suggest a value of all innovation
expenses at R10 trillion or 1.6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). These
are very low numbers. Using the same methods of calculating general innovation
expenditures, the percentage of innovation activities in GDP in Russia was 4.9
percent in 1990 or three times higher than the estimates given for 1994. The share
of innovation expenditure in GDP then is not only low but have decreased during
the transition to a market economy.
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Table 5.5. Capital investment by source of funding (%).
1993 1994
Individual funds 2.6 4.1
Enterprises’ own funds 59.8 64.5
Centralized non-budget investment funds 3.3 5.9
Privileged state investment credits 1.7 1.4
Local budgets 15.1 10.5
Federal budget 17.5 13.6
Total 100.0 100.0
Source: State Committee on Statistics, 1994a.
5.2.5 Factors hindering innovation activity
Several surveys conducted in 1993 and 1994 asked enterprise managers to indicate
the principal factors limiting innovation. They ranked the high level of inflation
first (mentioned by more than 40 percent of enterprise managers) and the accom-
panying high interest rates on loans second. Inflation changes the price of inputs
and products in an unsystematic way, making the profitability of an innovation
difficult to calculate. The resulting uncertainty dampens the long-term investment
in innovation. Most loans are available for only two to three months, which is
a vastly insufficient duration for innovation to occur. Banks are ready to arrange
loans mostly to enterprises in export-oriented natural-resources sectors that can pay
back debts quicker than manufacturing enterprises.
Insufficient budget financing as a factor hindering innovations was ranked
third; approximately 20 percent of enterprise managers listed this factor. Only 3
percent of enterprises received state financing for the acquisitions of fixed assets.
Thus, enterprises have had to rely largely on self-financing for their investments in
plants and equipment and the share of their funds in the capital investment total is
growing (Table 5.5). This pattern is also reflected in the financing of innovations
(not contained in Table 5.5: 46 percent of enterprises surveyed used mainly their
own resources to finance innovations, whereas loans were used by only 18 percent
of them.
Other hindrances to innovation were difficulties obtaining materials, fuel, and
electricity. These difficulties were reported most by enterprises in the light- and
food-industry sectors, but also affected the chemical and petrochemical and nonfer-
rous metals industries. Some of the shortages were created by the disruption of ties
between consumers and manufacturers in other countries in the CIS and Russia.
Increases in prices of electricity, raw and other materials, and rail transport created
additional difficulties. An insignificant share of enterprises reported a shortage of
qualified specialists for innovation activity as a problem. The importance of this
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factor may increase in the future, given the movement of professionals away from
R&D.
Besides the factors within the enterprise, innovation activity is noticeably
influenced by factors of demand: more than 40 percent of enterprises reported
insolvent customers as a problem and about 20 percent listed a sharp drop in
demand. Clearly least important to limiting innovation is the lack of need for
technological innovations; only 1 percent of surveyed enterprises mentioned it.
5.3 Innovation Policies for Economic Growth
Technological change is considered the primary source of growth in almost all
studies in the literature of economic growth. Analyses have shown that technolog-
ical progress contributes between 70 and 90 percent to GDP growth per capita in
industrialized countries. The process of technological progress in turn consists of
the introduction and diffusion of innovations.
Recovery of innovation activity and economic growth in Russia requires a more
comprehensive stabilization policy than the one currently in force. A switch to a
reliable and growth-oriented macroeconomic policy is necessary but not a sufficient
condition for promoting innovation activity. With a decline in investments and
R&D expenditures by a factor of four, with the collapse of production of consumer
durables that embody advanced technology, and with the brain drain from R&D-
intensive industries, special measures are required for innovation. The government
must use well-known instruments of industrial and S&T policy that include the
following:
 Increased government financing of R&D.
 State procurement of innovative products.
 Restructuring programs supported by a mix of private and public financing.
 Formation of development institutions providing long-term credits for invest-
ment projects.
 Tariff and nontariff regulations on foreign trade, particularly for domestic
innovations.
 Elimination of the tax on profits used for investment and R&D expenditures.
 Promotion of cooperation among production enterprises, financial organiza-
tions, and R&D institutions.
 Legal protection for intellectual property.
 Creation of an efficient information infrastructure including a network of con-
sulting companies.
In its efforts to promote R&D the state should not substitute for the market but
rather help enterprises to adjust to market competition. For instance, state purchases
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of new products is most important at the earliest phases of their introduction to
bring down unit costs. This policy is actively used in virtually all industrialized
countries. The objective of state programs is to support the initial phases in the
life cycle of new products to create favorable conditions for the restructuring of
production facilities. Private funding should be involved in financing innovations,
for experience in other nations has shown the efficiency of mixed financing and
risk sharing by the state and private organizations. Government guarantees for
financing high-risk projects may also promote innovation.
Public policy is needed to improve the infrastructure and financial conditions
so that small enterprises can focus on developing innovation. In spite of the role
of large firms, companies owned by individuals risking their own capital remain an
important force in a market economy. Small firms have been the source of many
radical innovations.
Also important in financing basic research and promoting applied R&D are
state subsidies and tax breaks, as well as other services whose usefulness is char-
acterized by important externalities (for example, communications, transportation,
information, engineering, and other business services). Any taxation scheme must
recognize that the possibility of high profits provides incentives to innovate. It is
necessary to gradually shift to a new taxation system that transfers a major taxation
burden from current revenues to accumulated wealth. Along with the existing in-
vestment tax credit it would be worthwhile to introduce a tax credit for R&D. The
undeveloped market relations and the necessity to overcome the structural dispro-
portions in Russia make it necessary to have special tax exemptions differentiated
by industries during the transition period. As the economic situation stabilizes and
the government budget condition improves, the use of tax concessions can become
more limited.
An information infrastructure is also needed to provide the country’s research
centers and enterprises with state-of-the-art means of telecommunications and data
banks incorporated into the global information networks. This program can be
developed using domestic satellite communications in the way that other global
networks of commercial and scientific and technical information have been created.
Under conditions of galloping inflation and a deep slump in investment activ-
ity, the formation of long-term lending institutions becomes important. Provision
of special credit lines by the government through commercial banks or through
the creation of special financial institutions is important in promoting innovation.
Reliance on commercial banks, however, requires complicated controls to be effec-
tive. Financing from commercial banks is very inflationary in the Russian context.
The use of special institutions is more in accord with world practice. Examples
include the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, the Japanese Bank of Development, and Brazil’s Bank of Reconstruction and
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Development. Significant experience with project financing has been accumulated
which can guide new Russian institutions.
World experience suggests various methods for the mobilization of domestic
savings to support investment activity. In Russia, household savings have decreased
in real value because of hyperinflation. This problem could be solved with a special
program of personal savings that includes indexation of personal savings in savings
banks.
The objective of state promotion of innovation and investment activity is to
stimulate but not substitute for private activity. It is widely accepted that pri-
vate activity largely depends on industrial organization and the industrial-financial
structure of the economy. Large corporations closely connected with banks form
an important base for industrial organization under conditions of a modern mar-
ket economy. Controlling a major part of industrial production, such financial
and industrial groups ensure stable industrial growth and are the foundation of
the economic power in industrialized market economies. Financial and industrial
groups can play a significant role in securing economic growth under the turbu-
lent conditions in the Russian economy. Relying on their own sources of capital
accumulation, these groups of interdependent industrial enterprise, banking, and
trade organizations can finance innovation in key industries. The concentration
of resources in financial and industrial groups ensured the rapid economic growth
in the postwar Japan and West Germany and from the mid-1960s in Korea and
other countries where the conditions of transition to the market were similar to
those now present in Russia. This is the reason why one of the key objectives of
the national industrial policy should be to promote the formation of independent
financial and industrial organizations. This is particularly a necessary precondition
for successful restructuring and conversion of the defense industry.
For the first time in decades enterprises are once again interested in promoting
and implementing innovation activities. They now know that their products’ com-
petitiveness is linked to the technological level of production. Therefore, the stage
is set for an innovation-promotion policy that will lead to growth in productivity.
Chapter 6
The Integration of Russian R&D
into the International Economy
Levan Mindeli
The Soviet Union’s isolation from the international R&D system was largely its
own doing. Russia, however, from the very beginning of its independence, adopted
an economic policy of openness and established the objective of joining in world
S&T activities. This chapter explores the initial consequences of that policy. It
begins with a description of the general internationalization of S&T and continues
with a discussion of Russia’s strategies for international participation in ways that
protect its national interests. The chapter then reports on Russia’s international
transactions in the early years of the transition (1991–1995) and provides examples
of the diversity of international activities that have occurred. It concludes with a
discussion of current policy related to international activity.
6.1 The Internationalization of S&T
The international economic system has expanded dramatically since the end of
World War II and in the process it has become more technological in two ways.
First, the goods that are traded embody more R&D in their production. Second,
there is increasing exchange of technological knowledge in the form of licenses,
know-how, and research alliances of firms across national boundaries.
Both developments reflect the impact of several factors. Some new products
and processes require large expenditures which, in turn, require the worldwide
application of a technological advance to be profitable. At the same time, the costs
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of global integration of innovation activity have decreased. Dramatic improvements
in transportation have reduced costs for trade in goods while new international
communication networks permit the inexpensive and fast exchange of information.
Further, the spread of global financial institutions and the greater convertibility of
currencies have facilitated the raising of capital on a multilateral scale. Finally,
the relaxation of many international tensions and the disappearance of military
confrontations between two competing social systems has increased cooperation.
Even though national S&T policies remain significant, their role has been
reduced by the increasing importance of multinational corporations. These orga-
nizations operate across national borders with production, distribution, and R&D
carried out in different nations. Technology-intensive products frequently cannot
be identified with any one country of origin. For the multinational corporation,
technology is often the most significant dimension of corporate rivalry and R&D
policy becomes a key corporate decision. In addition, there are small companies
that operate internationally in highly specialized niches of a broader product market.
The government was also active setting up new institutions: they have established
new international research centers that are internationally oriented in their projects.
Increasing internationalization of S&T provides the following important
lessons for Russia:
1. The economic potential and political influence of a country are determined
in part by the level of its technological development. New nations have
quickly emerged in international competition and dramatically increased their
standards of living.
2. Some nations are increasingly concerned with environmental issues.
3. Assistance to developing countries includes technological aid.
4. S&T activities have become increasingly important to international organiza-
tions, and there is more coordination of national S&T efforts.
5. Organizational structures have become considerably more flexible with inter-
national R&D carried out by temporary teams of researchers from different
countries.
The USSR had little experience with systematic international cooperation in
S&T activities. The exception was the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(CMEA), involving the centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe.
In the last decade of its existence from 1980 to 1991, the CMEA attempted to
combine the innovation efforts of its member states to enhance economic growth.
It was assumed that such cooperation would symbolize a qualitatively new stage of
cooperation and exchange of S&T results, leading to the integration of national S&T
potentials. One of the most important ways of cooperation was the development
of specialization among the member nations.
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CMEA policies had a number of positive results: national S&T programs were
coordinated within the framework of the so-called CMEA Complex Program of
S&T Progress, direct international links between research institutes and industrial
enterprises were created, and the exchange of researchers among CMEA countries
was promoted. These were clearly progressive steps. Even so, the CMEA S&T
programs were largely failures. They were highly politicized and centrally con-
trolled. Participating organizations could not obtain sufficient financing for joint
activities from their national governments. The isolation from world S&T activity
reduced the efficiency of various projects. There was little involvement of Soviet
military R&D – the largest and most advanced part of the USSR R&D activity.
Formalism was excessive in the drawing up of research plans, the production of
elaborate reports, the maintenance of a large bureaucracy, and the distribution of
resources to activities on insignificant topics. Most joint projects failed to produce
world-level research results or innovative products and processes. The question of
competitiveness in the world market was seldom considered.
Perhaps the fundamental problem, however, was departmental barriers. The
chain of science–technology–production diffusion within national industrial min-
istries interfered with potential international links. To sum up, the CMEA ex-
perience was another demonstration of the incompatibility of innovation with an
administrative command system.
6.2 Russia’s Strategy for International S&T Cooperation
A dominant part of economic growth depends on technological advances. These
advances come from many countries, so by participating in international R&D
activities, a country gains from inventions achieved in other parts of the world. If
it pursues a policy of isolation, its economic growth is limited to the technological
advances achieved only with its own resources. Russian R&D resources are now
in disarray. Therefore, the transition to a market economy and democratic society
requires international participation. Increased participation in world activities
may reduce the lag in technology that Russia has in many fields. A level of
technology equal to that in industrialized countries is essential for the success
of Russia’s manufacturing industries and to enable Russia to shift away from its
current natural-resource orientation.
Imports of advanced production equipment and know-how are also an essential
element of international activity. Experience in other parts of the world, partic-
ularly in Japan, shows that the effective use of such imports requires substantial
domestic R&D to adapt imported technology. This is especially true for Russia,
given the variety of its climate and environmental conditions, labor skills, and
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population’s educational level. New products must also be modified to conform
to local consumer preferences. International activity also allows Russian defense
R&D to be the basis of exports of both military and civilian goods.
As pointed out in earlier chapters, the Russian R&D sector is large in abso-
lute size. Earnings from abroad help support the sector and its large staff and
improvements in equipment. Increased international S&T links may help institu-
tional transformations, in particular allowing financial and industrial groups and
corporations currently emerging in Russia to become international organizations.
Likewise, it can contribute to the rise of small and medium-sized enterprises. Fi-
nally, technology can increase productivity, raising wages without inflation and
creating more highly skilled jobs.
Even though it is unclear which model of market economy will prevail in
Russia, it is possible to identify nine basic principles that should guide Russian
policies in international S&T cooperation:
 Balance. Involvement in international R&D on a reciprocal basis requires
a certain amount of domestic S&T activity so that there is interest abroad
in domestic results that can be used in technology exchanges. It is naive to
rely on another nation’s altruism; rather the country should be able to offer
technology in exchange for S&T results. Russia’s influence in international
affairs depends on its own S&T activity. The right approach is to secure tech-
nological independence while taking advantage of the international division of
intellectual labor.
 Advancement. Raising Russian R&D to international standards means adjust-
ment to future trends,not to the current level of S&T activity. This advancement
will help to form a new model of the Russian R&D establishment. Without a
new model Russia risks finding itself in a state of always trying to catch up. A
particular valuable tactic is to establish positions in certain niches in the world
market and to export science-intensive products from these niches.
 Efficiency. International cooperation must be cost-efficient. A general method
for determining efficiency consists of comparing expenses of domestic ac-
tivities with the value of the R&D received from international efforts. For
international R&D, however, this method of evaluation is limited because
many aspects of both costs and results cannot be measured. Furthermore, na-
tional efficiency is not limited to immediate economic results, but also includes
the effects of the intangible and long-run gains to a nation from S&T cooper-
ation. A more comprehensive accounting of the impact of international S&T
transactions should also recognize the gains from increasing the stock of knowl-
edge available to a nation and from diffusion of R&D results to neighboring
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industries, since externalities are pervasive in R&D. Social, environmental,
and other impacts must also be taken into account.
 Flexibility. One-sided approaches to complicated problems must be avoided.
Thus, while in the most developed fields in Russia (e.g., nuclear physics and
space exploration) a policy of national independence is possible, in others, with
smaller domestic potential (chemistry and electricity generation), the emphasis
should be on the consolidation of research efforts in frameworks of joint studies
and projects. In still others (such as agriculture) it is important to stimulate
technology imports.
 Differentiation by country. Relations with specific countries, international
organizations, and individual companies must be maintained. It is important
to remove long-ingrained stereotypes of a uniform world capitalist system.
Every participant has strategic and tactical interests which influence his or her
behavior in S&T transactions.
 Coordination. It is desirable to avoid uncoordinated actions of different Rus-
sian participants in international R&D activity. In so doing, efforts should be
made to prevent restrictive features of the previous regime from reappearing,
and avoid infringement on the rights and interests of independent organiza-
tions trying to maintain international connections. Coordination should take
into account both domestic and foreign interests.
 Improvement. International R&D activity should not be a short-term cam-
paign as it was, for example, with the establishment of joint ventures during
the perestroika period. Long-term relationships and a stable public policy are
necessary. There should be provisions, however, for dismantling organiza-
tional structures that have completed their tasks and for discontinuing public
policies that are no longer desirable.
 Protection of national interests. Reasonable participation should be combined
with protection of national security interests, including restrictions on the
transfer of strategic technologies and products.
 Participation in international scientific and research organizations. These
organizations are increasingly important in S&T activity. By joining these
groups, Russia can obtain access to information and the ability to influence
activities and protect its particular interests.
These principles should be followed in many aspects of S&T policy such as
financing, legislation, product standardization, intellectual property rights, and the
development of information and other infrastructures. These elements are discussed
in other chapters, but their international dimensions must be emphasized.
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6.3 International Cooperation in Russian
Applied R&D in the 1990s
6.3.1 Limitations on international cooperation
The collapse of the USSR eliminated the rigid state control over international R&D
contracts. Russia’s introduction to the world scene of applied R&D has been
difficult for several reasons:
 Industrial R&D lost much of its budget appropriations, the main sources of its
financing. Governmental appropriations for defense R&D were also sharply
reduced.
 The demand by enterprises for the results of applied R&D fell and the innova-
tion activity of the institutions formerly active in innovations decreased.
 As mentioned in Chapter 5, in the unstable macroeconomic environment the
new financial institutions were interested only in short-term gains. They were
not ready to provide long-term financing for R&D and innovation.
 With the disintegration of the USSR, many scientific, technological, and pro-
duction links between republic boundaries were broken.
 In contrast to basic research, which had developed international contacts during
the Soviet period, international ties in applied R&D were weak, especially with
industrialized countries.
 The sharp reduction in Russian technical aid to former socialist countries and
developing nations curtailed the demand for applied R&D in aid programs.
 Governments of leading Western countries were selective in distributing aid
and limited its amount even though, according to available estimates, approx-
imately 15 and 20 percent of Russian R&D institutions are internationally
competitive in their research (Kuznetsova and Dagaev, 1995, p. 20).
 Emigration of scientists and engineers abroad and the flight of specialists to
other domestic activities damaged Russia’s own S&T potential.
Despite these difficulties, Russia has been able to partially integrate into the
world’s international R&D system. These positive results provide reasons for
increasing the scale of international activity. The establishment in Russia of offices
and research centers by foreign companies and organizations is encouraging, as
is the involvement of such giants as IBM, Siemens, General Electric, and Boeing
in R&D activity with Russian enterprises. Foreign government offices are also
involved in cooperative activities with Russia.
In some cases, however, Russian participants have benefited only to a limited
extent because they have signed agreements that are disadvantageous to them.
Russian managers have lacked the appropriate expertise in negotiating contracts
with intellectual property clauses. Obviously the limited expertise in the world
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market for patents and licenses results from the paucity of such transactions during
the Soviet era. In the past the Soviet Union bought about 100 licenses annually
whereas Japan purchased between 3,000 and 5,000 and the United States between
2,000 and 3,000 yearly. Recently, licenses have often been bought for low level
technology that violates environmental regulations. Under financial distress many
R&D institutions and enterprises have eliminated their patenting, marketing, and
foreign economic services to reduce expenses, but the absence of such expertise
makes bargaining with foreign partners one-sided. For example, one condition
for obtaining a foreign contract often calls for full transfer of intellectual property
rights which deprives the Russian side of royalties. Patent rights are often lost to
foreign companies, and the commercial use of products invented independently in
Russia is sometimes blocked even after the contract has expired. A further problem
is that Russian participants sometimes fail to obtain rights for improvement on
patents. Dumping (sale of Russian technologies at below market prices and low
reimbursement to Russian specialists) has occurred, spoiling the general reputation
of Russian technology experts. Private firms and individuals often sell results
obtained by state-owned organizations at the expense of government financing. In
most cases no provision is made for repayment to the state. For example, a Canadian
company bought a technology for the creation and exploitation for self-contained
environmental systems from the Institute of Biophysics (Krasnoyarsk) for next to
nothing (Kuznetsova and Dagaev, 1995, p. 20). There also are cases of outright
deception. For example, the German company Pearl Agency illegally disseminated
an operational system developed by the Russian company Phystech-soft (Isvestiya,
20 September 1995).
To improve the practice in international S&T contracts for Russian organiza-
tions, the Ministry on Science and Technological Policy (MSTP), together with
other interested departments, has worked out recommendations for R&D institu-
tions. The recommendations cover all aspects of intellectual property rights which
must be taken into account before signing an agreement with a foreign partner. It is
expected that this document, together with increased legal knowledge of executives
and employees of R&D institutions about intellectual property rights, will provide
the basis for mutually profitable transactions with foreign partners.
International involvement also occurs through foreign direct investment in
Russian S&T activities. This activity, however, has been strongly limited by polit-
ical and economic instability as well as by social and ethnic conflicts. Investment
has been hurt by the lack of clear tax rules and laws protecting foreign property and
profits of joint ventures. The assignment of powers and responsibilities is unclear
within the government, and the level of bureaucracy is still high. For example,
many potential foreign investors are scared off by the requirement for approval by
a large number of authorities.
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The difficulties may decrease in the long run, allowing Russia’s advantages in
the international setting to become apparent. In various fields Russia is likely to
be competitive in the world market. Laser technologies, pharmaceuticals, medical
devices, and computer software are some of the promising sectors. The Russian
defense industry, aerospace and shipbuilding sectors, and a number of others are
also promising fields for S&T cooperation. Moreover, the demand for Russian S&T
may increase as marketing services for technology are developed and packaging
and advertisement of consumer products achieve world standards.
The prospect of greater international involvement has led to a public debate on
whether such participation will best serve Russia’s interests. It is difficult to find any
serious report calling for complete autarky in S&T. Still there are different opinions
concerning the scale, form, and direction of such international involvement. Two
main concepts of international relations have been discussed: the neoliberal and
the neorealist (Sandholtz, 1992, pp. 11–12). The first is based on a high estimate of
the Russian S&T potential and the favorable experiences of newly industrialized
states (Kochetov, 1994). The second, more pessimistic view, is connected with
doubts about the possibilities of Russian R&D and its high-technology products to
succeed in international competition and to overcome the barriers of protectionism
(Kuzin, 1993). There are also differences of opinion on the role of international
activity in particular industries and fields. Several authors emphasize cooperation in
high-technology sectors (Bubennikov and Mamrykin, 1995; Firsov, 1993). Some
think that it is also important to involve foreign partners in the basic branches
of the Russian economy (Khalevinskaya, 1995, p. 15). There is considerable
discussion about the international involvement of defense R&D; the discussions
include statements on the possibilities of the role of defense industry in international
R&D activity (Gavrilov, 1993), certain doubts about it (Tolkachev, 1995), and
apprehensions concerning foreign secret service activities in international contacts
(Arkhipov et al., 1994).
The current government policy favors liberalization of foreign economic con-
tacts, including those in S&T (Program of the Russian Federation, 1995, p. 127).
Perhaps as a consequence, questions of safeguarding national security have fre-
quently been raised lately (Obolensky, 1995; Porokhovsky, 1995). Most attention
has been given to technology export controls (Presnyakov and Sokolov, 1994).
6.3.2 The size of international S&T transactions
Currently measures that capture Russia’s participation in international R&D do not
exist. The primary data are dispersed over hundreds of organizations participating in
international technological activity. Statistics of international S&T transactions are
often missing even at the level of ministries and departments, and regional data are
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Table 6.1. Exports and imports of machines and chemicals in Russia.
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Bil- % of Bil- % of Bil- % of Bil- % of Bil- % of
lion $ total lion $ total lion $ total lion $ total lion $ total
Exports
Machines &
equipment 12.5 17.6 5.2 10.2 3.8 8.9 2.9 6.5 2.5 5.0
Chemicals 3.3 4.6 3.4 6.6 2.6 6.1 2.6 6.0 3.9 7.7
Imports
Machines &
equipment 36.3 44.3 15.8 35.6 13.9 37.7 9.1 33.8 10.0 35.8
Chemicals 8.9 10.9 5.5 12.4 2.5 9.3 1.7 6.2 3.0 10.6
Source: State Committee on Statistics, 1994d, p. 435.
even scarcer. As a rule institutions and specialists involved in international activities
prefer not to make such information public to avoid attention from competitors, tax
authorities, and even the mafia.
Some indirect measures are available for the scale and orientation of Russia’s
international activity in applied R&D. One of the most useful indicators is the level
of export and import of technology-intensive products as shown in Table 6.1. The
table shows a steady decline in the export and import of machinery. In exports of
chemicals volumes have changed little although imports show a sharp decline. The
shares of exports of machinery listed in Table 6.1 are remarkably small for a major
industrial country.
The low or decreasing shares in Table 6.1 date back to the Soviet period. In
1980 the share of machines and equipment was 16 percent of total exports and 35
percent of total imports, and that of chemical products was 3 percent and 6 percent,
respectively (National Economy of the USSR in 1990, 1991, pp. 659–661).
Another measure of international links is provided by data on the export and
import of technology that is not embodied in products. (I am grateful to Irina
Kuznetsova for material in this section.) For exports, the measure includes receipts
for engineering services, patent licenses, and know-how (unpatented technological
knowledge) sold abroad by Russian organizations. Imports here include payment
for these same items by domestic organizations to foreign ones.
In 1994, Russia was a net exporter of technology (S&T services), valued at
$295 million, but this net amount was reflected mainly in sales of engineering
services, which were 91 percent of all the technology exports (Table 6.2). Sales of
R&D services were 8 percent of technology exports in 1994 and sales of licenses
and know-how were each less than 1 percent. Besides tough foreign competi-
tion, Russian science must deal with a lack of funds to maintain patents abroad.
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Table 6.2. Structure of exports and imports of S&T services, in percent.
Export Import
1993 1994 1993 1994
R&D services 5.0 7.7 2.0 5.7
Engineering services 94.5 91.0 46.0 18.0
Licenses 0.02 0.3 26.0 57.0
Know-how 0.4 0.9 26.0 19.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: CSRS, 1996c, p. 23.
Nevertheless, in comparison with 1993, the value of licenses sold increased signif-
icantly in 1994.
In 1994, imports of S&T services were a modest $46 million, which was 12
percent lower than in 1993. Patent licenses made up 57 percent of S&T service
imports.
The volume of imports and exports of technology items was very low for an
economy of Russia’s size. Among the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) countries only the small economies of Finland and Norway
have a comparable volume of these trade items. This comparison suggests that
Russia is still not completely integrated into the international market for intangible
S&T transactions. Decreases in technology imports further isolate Russia from
the countries with the most advanced world innovations and continue to aggravate
technological backwardness of some of its industrial sectors.
The largest volumes in S&T services trade were with the United States and
Germany. Their shares in exports of Russian R&D services made up 24 and 40
percent, respectively; in Russian imports of such services their shares were 63
percent and 11 percent. In Russian imports of engineering services and intellectual
and industrial property (patents, licenses, and expertise), the shares of the United
States and Germany are also considerable, but substantial shares in this category
also belong to the United Kingdom and Italy. Export of Russian engineering
services are also high to China and developing countries – Iran, Pakistan, and
Egypt.
Some 545 international S&T projects were implemented in 1994, many with
MSTP support. Americans were involved in 120 projects and Germans participated
in 111 projects. Table 6.3 presents the main fields of R&D where projects were
implemented.
Prospects for trade in technology should improve. Registration and purchases
of patents and patent licenses by Russian organizations should be helped by the re-
cent provision of government funds for obtaining patents abroad and for promoting
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Table 6.3. International R&D projects by field of research in 1994 with MSTP
support, by S&T field.
S&T field Number of projects
Future information technologies 42
Modern bioengineering methods 38
Technologies, machinery, and production for the future 33
Complex exploration of oceans and seas, the Arctic and Antarctic 24
Global environmental and climate changes 24
Future processes of agricultural production 23
New materials 22
Controlled thermonuclear fusion and plasma processes 21
High-temperature superconductivity 18
National priorities in medicine and health services 15
High-energy physics 11
Telecommunications 9
Human genome 9
Optics, laser physics 8
Environmentally safe power engineering 8
Source: MSTP.
their registration (Government of the Russian Federation, 1995). Over time, par-
ticipation in international transactions should make Russian managers more aware
than they are today of the profits that can be realized from patents and patent
licenses. They should begin to learn that buying technology is an effective way
to improve products and processes, valuable even with extensive R&D of one’s
own. Thus the United States, with the largest domestic R&D activity in the world
still imported $5 billion worth of technology items, almost 100 times the amount
purchased by Russia. Of course, the low level of technology imports corresponds
to the current low level of innovation. When innovation picks up, so should the
import of technology.
6.4 The Spectrum of International S&T Cooperation
6.4.1 Classification of international S&T links in Russia
and diversity of partner countries
Several elements distinguish R&D partnerships with commercial objectives from
those with noncommercial goals. The commercial category includes S&T com-
ponents of direct foreign investments; the execution by Russian organizations of
applied R&D for foreign customers; investments in R&D by foreign companies;
export and import of R&D-intensive products; foreign sales and purchases of S&T
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intangibles rendering S&T services such as patents, licenses, and know-how; and
the leasing of R&D installations and equipment. The common factor in these di-
verse transactions is the search for profits by both domestic and foreign participants.
The noncommercial category includes joint nonprofit research projects; the
exchange of S&T information at international exhibitions, fairs, conferences, con-
gresses, symposia, seminars, and courses; exchange of specialists and students;
publication of S&T results in books and periodicals; and S&T assistance in aid pro-
grams. Profit is not the objective in these activities. Most activities are supported
by national governments, international organizations, or philanthropic foundations,
and seek to provide good will, to achieve prestige, or to serve the public interest.
Another distinction is between activities aimed at the commercialization of
completed developments and those directed at obtaining new S&T results. There
is also a distinction between activities to create new products or processes em-
bodying the results of R&D and activities to achieve intangible knowledge, be it
R&D services or patents. R&D contacts may be implemented through direct links
between partner institutions or in the framework of intergovernmental agreements,
both bilateral or multilateral. Such classifications are certainly not exhaustive, but
nevertheless help to systematize the variety of current international R&D links in
Russia.
Another way of classifying international S&T activity is by the country in-
volved. There are several distinct groups:
 G-7 and smaller industrialized countries with highly developed technologies.
 Countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) whose S&T
activity since the collapse of the USSR has been artificially isolated from
Russia.
 Countries from the former CMEA with technological bases similar to Rus-
sia’s (Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and the Slovak Republic); these
countries are influenced by their past interactions with Russia.
 Newly industrialized countries of Asia that are approaching the economic level
of the most developed countries.
 Large developing economies including China, India, and Brazil, which have
had success in some R&D high-technology sectors, but which are confronted
with difficult problems of commercialization.
 Some states in Latin America, Asia, and Africa (Argentina, Mexico, South
Africa, Egypt, Turkey, and others) that have created an R&D base focused on
technologies for mining and processing natural resources; in this respect they
are similar to Russia.
 Oil-exporting countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and so on) that use receipts
from natural-resources exports to introduce new technologies.
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S&T transactions with particular countries are influenced by past bilateral
relations and geographic proximity. Transactions with G-7 countries and with
highly developed smaller European nations are catalysts in the transition to a more
innovative economy. These nations are the technological leaders, and by joining
the train of the countries with extensive international R&D links, Russia can more
quickly move toward increasing the competitiveness of its economy. Nevertheless,
given Russia’s long isolation from the world community and the considerable
technological lag in the majority of civilian sectors, attaining competitiveness vis-
a`-vis these countries will be a lengthy process.
Russia’s role in the S&T activities of the CIS merits special attention. Chances
are good that in the coming years Russia will be a major source of technology
for CIS member countries. To facilitate relations with CIS countries the financial
and legal details of the transfer of S&T results must be worked out. Other aspects
of Russia’s S&T policy with CIS countries include maintenance or restoration
of relations between research institutes, exchange of S&T information, mutual
certification of diplomas and certificates, coordination of patenting and licensing
activities, and guarantees of access to scientific installations in other states.
Russia may have some competitive advantages in former CMEA countries
owing to collaborations prior to 1990. Researchers and managers in these countries
know their Russian counterparts, and this may secure business and research ties.
Consumers and businesses in these countries are familiar with Russian products,
and in the past there were common standards that should facilitate future sales of
some products.
Some R&D cooperation has already been restored with East European partners.
For example, the Kaluga Road Repair and Mechanical Plant, in cooperation with
the “Roads Mechanization, Prague” joint-stock company, manufactures state-of-
the-art machinery for Russian railroads, based on Czech developments and know-
how. These machines are 2.5–3 times lower in price than comparable Austrian
products (Ekonomika i Zhizn, 1995). In the field of biotechnology, the Inbio
joint venture, based on cooperation between the Russian Institute for Albumen
Synthesis and the University of Sofia (Bulgaria), has developed a procedure for
processing microorganisms to obtain biologically active compounds for medicine
and foodstuff.
Cooperation is developing with both new and traditional Asian partners. The
Center for Physical Instrument-building of the Institute of General Physics is de-
veloping an industrial laser with the financing, equipment, and materials provided
by the Korean Institute of Science and Technology. In the Republic of Korea, a
company specializing in imports of Russian technologies has been established with
state funding and private capital. On the basis of the Bach Institute of Biochemistry
and the Vietnam Institute of Tropical Medicine, a laboratory has been established
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to develop fermentation technologies for Vietnam’s food industry as well as soil
microorganisms and regulators of plant growth. The Skochinsky Institute of Min-
ing and the Central Research Coal Institute of China are cooperating in a project
to provide the Chinese market with Russian developments in cleaning and drifting
combines, cutting tools, hydrotransport, and underground coal gasification. An
important condition for increasing S&T cooperation with the Asian countries is
exchange of information. The Russian House for International S&T Cooperation
has joined the computer networks of the UN Asian-Pacific Center on Technology
Transfer to facilitate information exchange with Asian countries.
Russia has attempted to achieve more contacts with countries and regions that
are second in line in the world S&T arena. Business in these countries, as a rule,
is riskier than business with industrialized countries, yet Russia may confront less
competition in these areas than in industrialized countries.
6.4.2 R&D projects with foreign partners
Despite its currently limited scale, the participation of foreign partners in Rus-
sia’s applied R&D organizations is very important. There are several prominent
examples of its importance.
A large-scale partnership exists between the American firm Pratt and Whit-
ney and the Russian Ilyushin Aviation Complex and Perm Engines Joint-Stock
Company (JSC) to develop aircraft engines. Another example of an applied R&D
project is the cooperation between Rosneftegazstroj JSC and Turboizoljatsija Pro-
duction Association and the French CIF-IZOPIPE company to create technology
and equipment for manufacturing polyethylene gas pipelines from Russian raw
materials. The new pipelines last two to three times longer than steel pipes, weigh
a third less, and do not require electrochemical protection.
Some joint projects are active in import substitution. The Research Institute
for Aviation Technology and Production Management (NIAT) is working with
companies from Italy and Canada to develop equipment for electrochemical and
ultrasonic punching and pressing molds. This equipment will reduce imports
of expensive equipment from Switzerland and Japan, saving up to $90 million
annually.
International projects also help solve acute social and environmental problems.
The joint project of the Russian Lota company with several American companies
(ADM Protein Specialties, Protein Technology International, and the American
Soya Association), and the companies from Italy (Bertuzzi) and France (Magra),
will develop medicine and food supplements for children. The Chernobyl Nuclear
Power Station project, implemented by the Russian Research and Construction
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Project Institute for Nuclear and Power Machine-building and the Oxford Polytech-
nic company (United Kingdom), is attempting to make all objects of the Chernobyl
nuclear power plant into an environmentally safe zone. The Russian scientific cen-
ter MEI-VEI, together with Masuda Research of Japan, is implementing a project
on development of an ozone-absorption installation to ensure safe drinking water.
6.4.3 Foreign orders for R&D
In recent years the Russian S&T sector has benefited from contracts to perform
R&D for foreign enterprises. Some projects are technically advanced. An exam-
ple is the Research and Production Association for Machine-building Technology
(TSNIITMASH) which has contracts from German, Italian, and French compa-
nies to determine the possibilities of using various materials and equipment in the
construction of electric power stations.
For a number of Russian research institutes, foreign R&D contracts provide
an opportunity for improving their technical facilities. For example, the Institute
of Biochemical Chemistry of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences obtained
the equipment and reagents necessary for research in connection with a contract
with the American Proctor and Gamble Company. In some cases foreign orders
have served to maintain research capacities of Russian institutes. Managers at the
Research Institute for High-Frequency Currents in St. Petersburg speculate that the
institute has survived only because of shipments to foreign customers of prototypes
of high-frequency current and ultrasound technologies.
Foreign enterprises have been particularly attracted by the S&T capabilities of
the Russian defense industry where an overwhelming part of the Soviet Union’s
applied R&D effort had been performed (see Chapter 4). By late 1994, the Russian
defense complex was developing more than 1,200 projects with partners in 18 coun-
tries (Inzhenernaya Gazeta, 1994, No. 131). Examples of the unique developments
of Russian defense enterprises include a rotary-drawing method of punching, an
electron-beam welding process, technologies to manufacture pure materials on the
basis of centrifugal refinement, and sorption-extraction and fluoride technologies.
The Izhevsky Zavod JSC cooperates with several large American and German
enterprises in the production of satellite communication, medical equipment, and
consumer products.
6.4.4 Higher education institutions
Cooperation between Russian higher education institutions and foreign firms is a
promising route for international S&T links. The introduction of Russian R&D-
intensive products to world markets could take place simultaneously with the
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provision of educational services. The Russian State Committee for Higher Educa-
tion supports special programs to involve Russian universities in international S&T
cooperation. Between 1993 and 1995, 350 international S&T projects involving
the participation of more than 80 universities and higher education institutes were
selected to receive government support; most of these projects were for applied
research. Foreign partners contributed a total of $33 million to the projects (Higher
Education R&D, 1995, p. 5).
Several projects have already demonstrated success. The Altai State Technical
University, together with IBM, has created the Barnaul-based Center for Integrated
Computer Technologies. IBM provided the computer and information technologies
at a considerable discount. This university has also launched efforts to promote
Russian technologies in the Chinese market. The Moscow Automobile Mechanical
Institute together with the Boolan Industries Company has organized the production
of punched pistons for automobile engines based on the isothermal-punching tech-
nology developed by the institute. The Siberian Physico-Technical Institute at the
Tomsk Sate University established an engineering commercial center specializing
in marketing, advertising, patenting products, and personnel exchanges to support
international S&T cooperation.
6.4.5 Technology transfer through patents, licenses, and expertise
Another form of collaboration is the transfer of existing technology by a com-
pany to a joint activity. For example, in establishing Mechatron, a joint venture
for manufacturing electric drives, the Italian partners Poletta & Osti and Izoflux
(the world leaders in general-purpose industrial and robo-technical electric drives)
contributed their know-how in engines production. In the creation of the Mecha-
tronica Research and Production Group, a joint venture with the South Korean
company DARIM, the Russian partners contributed the know-how. However, the
most promising contacts are those encouraging mutual exchange of know-how. An
illustration is the Isopress inter-metallurgy project of the Russian institute VNII-
metallurgija and the Israeli company El-plazma. The Russian partner is providing
its Israeli partner with hydro-pressing, hydrostatic, and gas-static processing tech-
nologies and receiving in exchange know-how about metal purification and other
technological processes.
In some cases, enterprises in Russia have successfully licensed their technolo-
gies. The Russian joint-stock company Central Research Institute for the Sewing
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Industry concluded five license agreements with companies from Germany, Swe-
den, and Italy.
Technology-based partnerships may speed up the introduction of innovations.
The average duration of development of new types of machines and equipment was
estimated at 2.2 years in Russia in 1993 (CSRS, 1995a, p. 168); this period of time
is much longer than in G-7 countries.
There are promising examples of successful S&T links in different areas and
regions. At the machine-building plant in Tosno (in the Leningrad region) a joint
venture, Rekon, has been established for manufacturing Russian-made carriages
on the basis of Spanish technology. The Urals Electrical Engineering Plant in
Yekaterinburg has started manufacturing new current transfers with a technology
developed by ABB. The Japanese firm Yamaguchi has helped to set up production of
a special gastrointestinal drug called dinol at Belvitamin a Belgorod pharmaceutical
enterprise. Such contacts are not one-way streets. For instance, specialists of the
Zelenograd Doka JSC have established a plant in Canada for production of potato
mini-tubers using its unique hydroponic technology (Izvestiya, 1996, 7 March).
6.4.6 Joint ventures and small businesses
By 1995, the Russian Science and Scientific Services sector was involved in 510
joint ventures employing about 8,900 persons. Exports of their products and
services totaled $94 million in 1993, and domestic sales were $23 million (CSRS,
1995a, p. 185; 1996, p. 12). Some 70 percent of the foreign joint ventures are
located in Moscow or St. Petersburg.
Some joint ventures successfully combine Western capital and technologies
with Russian intellectual resources. In these partnerships foreign companies sup-
ply high-tech products and technologies, while their Russian counterparts provide
adaptation, software, and after-sale and other services. However, the scale of these
activities is very modest if we take into account the size of the Russian economy.
Many small firms have made distinctive contributions to international S&T
activity. These firms require financial support and expert advice to offset the
disadvantages of their small size. The St. Petersburg city government, with financ-
ing from the European Union and the Russian–German investment fund, Invest
Consulting Company, has tried to deal with these disadvantages by providing con-
sulting services to small businesses. Yet, according to a survey, small enterprises
in innovative areas such as information technologies and engineering services are
more interested in direct investment and partnership with firms from the West than
in advice (Izvestiya, 1995, 6 October).
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6.4.7 Foreign direct investment in Russian R&D
Foreign direct investment may be the catalyst to speed up Russia’s S&T devel-
opments. In 1994, the value of foreign investments in the Science and Scientific
Services sector was $26 million or 2.5 percent of the total value of foreign direct
investments Russia (State Committee on Statistics, 1995, p. 301). This is a modest
amount but great hopes have been raised by the participation of foreign capital
in the establishment of Russian technoparks, such as that in St. Petersburg and
the biotechnological center in Pushchino near Moscow. The research and pro-
duction capability of a huge military plant in Kursk with unique technologies for
synthetic and quartz article production has been successfully preserved because
the US Computerland corporation bought almost 50 percent of the shares of the
enterprise (Delovye Liudi, 1993, p. 38).
Foreign direct investment is also promoted by the expanding practice of tenders
for state procurement in which foreign companies can compete.
6.4.8 Development of infrastructure for international transactions
An ever-growing number of Russian R&D institutions are switching to such infor-
mation systems as Internet, RELCOM, PEER REVIEW, and STN International.
Information interaction is also developing in specific areas. In particular, the
Russian Center for Pharmaceutical and Medico-Technical Information, with finan-
cial support from the IMS (United States), created a dialogue system of infor-
mation retrieval and exchange on domestic and foreign pharmaceuticals named
METAPHARM. The Russian Institute for Economic Problems of Nature Manage-
ment, with the assistance of Frisenius-Consult (Germany) and partial financing
from the Hessen regional government, has established the Federal Data Bank on
Nature Protection Technologies of EU countries and the United States.
An important contribution to the dissemination of information on options for
R&D cooperation will be provided by the Russian Dealers and Distributors Net-
work, which has more than 300 regional offices and a center of international
commercial information implementing the program Interpartner. The search for
partners in applied R&D will also be facilitated by joint publications, such as Busi-
ness Russia magazine founded in Chicago by the Ekonomika i Zhizn weekly, and the
Russian Chamber for Trade and Industry. The Russian S&T Information Centers
of the MSTP and Academy of Sciences and Optistora company (Netherlands) have
jointly developed an English-language database on results of R&D in Russia.
Participation of Russian R&D institutions and specialists in international ex-
hibitions and trade fairs is expanding. For example, many Russian and other
CIS researchers participate in the Leipzig Innovation Fair and the annual world
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inventions salon Brussels-EUREKA; both provide valuable information. In 1993
and 1994 the MSTP supported 10 exhibitions of new Russian technologies, 4
S&T seminars, and 2 presentations of Russian research centers. In the course of
these events 47 contracts were signed, totaling about $10 million. Russian exposi-
tions were organized at international exhibitions and fairs where 36 contracts were
signed, amounting to approximately $3.5 million.
Mediatorial services have become increasingly important as they help to link
potential S&T partners. The company Informtechnology Service was established
in 1991 for this purpose. The American firm Dworkovic & Associates provides
a selection of licensees and licenses, calculates the costs of licenses, concludes
licensing agreements, and assists in obtaining credits for investments. Through
this company more than 2,000 sellers and buyers have found each other. The
company’s data bank contains 35,000 clients from 60 countries. At present, the
company is attempting to standardize the technology databases available in Russia
(Nikitina, 1995, pp. 17–18).
6.4.9 Noncommercial international activities
While much of the international activity for applied R&D has been on a commercial
basis, noncommercial activities are also relevant to applied R&D. Participants
in these activities recognizes that Russian R&D is valuable to the entire world.
Numerous international organizations, national governments, private companies,
and foundations have rallied to preserve the core of Russian R&D. In 1993, the
European Union established the International Association for the Promotion of
Cooperation with Scientists of the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union
(INTAS), a nongovernmental organization uniting science representatives from the
West with their CIS counterparts. Another example of help from Western colleagues
is the activities of the Technological Center of the German Guild of Engineers.
The center examined Russian projects in laser technologies and, as a result of
this examination, 15 projects received financing from the Federal Ministry of
Education, Science, Research, and Technology of Germany (Inzhenernaya Gazeta,
1995, No. 65).
Two European Union research programs are particularly important for Russian
R&D: EUREKA and COPERNICUS. At present, Russian R&D institutions and
enterprises are participating in 19 projects of these two EU programs. At the MSTP
four working groups have been established to improve cooperation with EUREKA’s
umbrella projects: FAMOS, EUROENVIRON, EUROLASER, and EUROSURF.
Several Russian R&D institutions with a long history together have participated in
these projects. For example, the Russian Polus Research Institute, together with
partners from Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and Spain, has developed a safe
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technology for surgical treatment by high-temperature laser radiation under the
auspices of the EUREKA project. In the COPERNICUS program, the Institute of
Radio Engineering and Electronics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, together
with the Polytechnic Institute of Bari (Italy) is creating systems of mobile commu-
nication based on solid-state electronics elements that perform better than existing
cellular systems.
Personnel exchanges have become increasingly popular; more and more Rus-
sian scientists are actively participating in research and training programs abroad.
One illustration is the recently established International Institute of Industrial Coop-
eration in southern California; the objective of this institute is to establish permanent
collaboration between American oil and gas experts and their colleagues from CIS
countries. In Moscow, at the Academy of National Economy, an international in-
cubator of technologies has been established with a grant of the American Agency
for International Development and Cooperation to help qualified specialists bring
their projects from R&D to commercialization.
6.5 Government Support to International S&T Links
As the political and economic situations stabilize in Russia, the attention given to
S&T issues will increase. In all probability, the state will have the main burden
of organizing, maintaining, and regulating Russia’s international S&T activities.
Governmental policy for international cooperation must capitalize on the decades
of experience of other nations. However, simple imitation must be avoided, and
foreign schemes must be adjusted to Russian conditions.
In addition to the political, economic, and socio-cultural features of Russia,
public policy must take into account the differences in the technological level of
particular sectors and fields of S&T. A policy of cooperation in vanguard fields
(such as aerospace and defense branches) must be established; this policy can be
based on the experience of the most advanced countries. Many high-technology
and basic sectors should also study the policies pursued by newly industrialized
nations. Finally, in some cases (particularly mining branches, light industries, and
food sectors) public policy should study the approaches that have been successful
in developing countries.
Russia’s technology policy has several features in common with international
S&T policy of market economies. First, national security concerns have led to
the control of technology exports. There has been a change from unilateral to
multilateral control, from the control of immediate products and technologies to
control over their national destination and from centralization to decentralization
(creation of intercompany units). In view of these developments the Russian system
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of regulation must implement a clear system for controlling technology exports that
are oriented to strategic national interests. Better controls will allow Russia to join
international control systems which, in turn, will provide opportunities for more
exchanges of applied R&D results.
Second, applied R&D is better promoted by government efforts to create a fa-
vorable climate for international cooperation than by direct government subsidies
for international projects. The government should work on ensuring large-scale
orders for Russian products and services. Such activity is particularly important
in government procurement, large construction projects, and commercial aviation.
Financing of exports at below-market interest rates is also important, particularly
for large orders for products produced by sectors that have received government
assistance. Russia has not yet developed a system of export regulation and pro-
motion. Export control activities are dispersed among the Ministry on Science
and Technological Policy, the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Foreign Eco-
nomic Relations, the State Committee for Industrial Policy, the Ministry of Defense
Industry, as well as other agencies.
Two important areas requiring government support are infrastructure improve-
ments and information dissemination. Abundant data enabling business circles to
watch world trends in technology development, to search for partners, and to ex-
amine the competition should be collected in data banks on advanced technologies.
These data banks should be established, maintained, and accessible to interested
companies. Many nations also have S&T attache´s in diplomatic missions to monitor
foreign S&T progress; Russia should do the same.
Tasks have been assigned to the Russian government through international
agreements in the field of science and technology as well as by bilateral and
multilateral intergovernmental bodies on the issues of R&D cooperation. These
arrangements provide a legal framework for international contacts at different
levels. Russia urgently needs to establish international agreements on protection
of investments and double taxation and to join international efforts against piracy
of intellectual property rights. Russia must also undertake the task of setting
up a legal framework for foreign direct investments in S&T. The model law on
foreign investments, currently under development by the OECD with experts from
CIS nations, may provide a significant contribution. Coordination of efforts to
attract foreign investments has been assigned to the Russian Center for Assistance
to Foreign Investments, recently founded at the Russian Federation Ministry of
Economy. At the same Ministry, an Information Center for Foreign Investments
has been organized to create data banks on specific investment projects for potential
foreign partners.
Another task is to increase the budget financing of large intersectoral and
sectoral international applied R&D projects. A prototype of such a structure may
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be found in the activities of the Russian House of International R&D Cooperation
established by the MSTP with the aim of investing in international applied R&D
projects.
Considerable value has been attributed to indirect methods of governmental
control of international S&T transactions. A system of taxation and customs
regulations must be established for both Russian R&D institutions and their foreign
partners. The status and privileges of free economic zones are yet to be formulated;
such zones could disseminate information on advanced foreign technologies.
The state is also responsible for providing standards for certification of products
and procedures. These standards must be rigorous yet favorable to international
transactions. The government must also develop the human resources of S&T
including training researchers in international transactions. Management training
for S&T international transactions should be introduced.
Russia must establish membership in the most important international eco-
nomic, science, and technology organizations. Membership in these organizations
will not only provide benefits to researchers but also protect Russia’s national
interests.
The prospects for greater Russian participation in international R&D activities
are favorable. The world is about to take a qualitative technological leap, and cur-
rently much effort is devoted to ensure sustainable development. In the transitional
periods, favorable conditions are being created for involvement of new participants
in international R&D activities of which Russia will be the largest. The Russian
government should actively promote S&T cooperation with foreign partners using
a variety of policy tools.
Chapter 7
Government Policy for Applied R&D
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From 1992 to 1994 Russia faced the possibility of total disintegration of its R&D
sector. By 1995 the crises had passed, but problems remained such as insufficient
financing, unsatisfactory research facilities, and the outflow of young promising
researchers from the R&D sector. The current problem is how to create an integrated
strategy for S&T development to avoid the need for emergency measures. To solve
this problem Russian R&D policy must recognize the value of institutions inherited
from the Soviet Union and redesign them to serve the market economy. This chapter
describes the policy emerging and proposes additional measures.
7.1 Strategic Goals and Factors of S&T Policy
The R&D sector has passed through two stages in the evolution of market reforms:
liberalization of the economy occurred in the first stage (1992–1993); financial
stabilization took place in the second stage (1993–1995). By 1996 the principal
tasks had become stimulating investment, improving production efficiency, and
restructuring industry. The main problem has been to determine ways of reforming
Russian society that would lead to social progress and economic development on
the basis of democratic principles. Achievement of this objective would enable
Russia to become one of the world’s most prosperous countries, but it requires
a comprehensive approach that includes many changes in business, government
policy, education, and S&T resources (Fonotov, 1993).
129
130 Andrey Fonotov and Lioudmila Pipiia
The prospects are good for realizing Russia’s goal of economic growth. In the
period from 1996 to 2000, the most internationally competitive industries will be in
the natural-resource sectors. These sectors are also crucial in the Russian economic
policy as their revenues can be used to finance structural changes that promote the
development of technology-intensive industries. Over the long run technology
holds the greatest promise for a prosperous Russia. Some forecasts project that by
between 2001 and 2005 Russia will already be able to produce competitive high-
tech products that will ensure the diversification of Russian exports and supplant
natural-resource sectors as the leading sectors of the national economy.
Russia already possesses a number of high-technology sectors capable of pro-
ducing internationally competitive products, and the government intends to pursue
a policy to support these sectors, such as aerospace, nuclear-power industries, and
power machine-engineering. To implement this economic strategy, S&T policy
should pursue three long-term goals:
1. Steadily increase support of R&D from public and private sources.
2. Create a stable demand for S&T results.
3. Provide support for innovations.
These principal directions require concrete measures from the state. The process
of implementation must also recognize the socioeconomic reality and take into
account the different and often conflicting factors and interests of many groups in
Russia that influence S&T policy. These factors include demands from the scientific
community, the economic interests of the public and private sectors of the economy,
social policy requirements, and the consequences of restructuring state institutions.
Under these conditions, every S&T measure is a compromise among interested
parties. It is important to recognize that the R&D sector is competing with other
groups for governmental support, tax concessions, and preferential regulations.
Increasing government expenditures for R&D may reduce the budgets for health,
education, and social security. Similarly, subsidies for state-owned enterprises may
reduce budget funds for R&D and social services. Tax concessions in one field
increase the pressure to grant tax concessions in other fields.
S&T policy is also the result of legislative compromises often reached after
intense struggles. At the beginning of market reforms, it became clear that the
S&T system inherited from the Soviet Union would not be able to function with
the changes occurring in the economy. The shift from central planning to a mar-
ket system made it necessary to quickly adopt a myriad of laws to support the
reforms, including legislation on intellectual property that would promote R&D
and innovation (see Chapter 3). Some matters were regulated by decrees from the
president and the government and others by legislation passed by the Duma. Often
the laws from one branch contradicted those of another. Under these conditions,
Government Policy for Applied R&D 131
lobbying groups representing different sectors of society had considerable influence
on legislation. In the 1992–1993 Parliament, the strongest lobbies represented the
military-industrial complex, the managers of collective farms, and the directors of
state-owned enterprises. In the competition between lobbies, the interests of the
R&D sector without a strong political base were given little attention.
The sociopolitical conditions in Russia in early 1992 did not permit reformers
to develop and implement a coordinated program of market reforms. Governmental
policy was influenced by political pressures, the sharp deterioration of the macro-
economic situation, and the subsequent reduction in the state budget. Subsidies
were given to state-owned enterprises for fear that the collapse of these enterprises
would destabilize the country. There was no governmental concept of a strategy
of socioeconomic development, and the contribution of R&D to economic growth
was ignored. A host of new problems emerged as Russia entered international S&T
markets (see Chapter 6).
S&T policy between 1992 and 1993 was formulated under conditions of un-
precedented reductions of governmental expenditures for R&D. Inadequate fi-
nancing of R&D severely harmed the operations of government-supported R&D
institutes and created tension in the scientific community.
Simultaneously with these developments the government has stated that R&D
is to be a priority activity. For instance, in 1993 a government decree On the
Selective Structural Policy of the State (No. 306, 12 April 1993) was enacted. It
identified five priorities in national restructuring:
1. The fuel and power complex including oil processing and petrochemistry.
2. Support for low-income households.
3. Stabilization of transportation and communications systems.
4. The conversion of military industry to civilian uses.
5. R&D participation in the transformation of industry.
It is obvious that the last two objectives have not yet been realized. In practice
R&D does not have a higher priority than many other activities. Government
appropriations for R&D have been grossly inadequate.
Many different governmental departments have policies that affect S&T – for
example, the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry on Science and Technological
Policy, the State Committee on Industrial Policy, the Ministry of Finance, and the
Ministry of Defense Industry. Coordination between ministries has been limited,
but a governmental commission on S&T policy, chaired by the prime minister, was
established in 1995 to improve coordination of S&T policies among the ministries.
To deal with the coordination problem and other S&T issues, a 1995 draft law
was prepared, On Science and the State Science and Technology Policy. This draft
law is one of the most important documents on R&D policy; it defines the role of
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R&D in the national economy and is intended to ensure that S&T decisions are
consistent at different levels. The draft law defines the procedure for elaborating
government S&T policy, addresses the legal status of researchers, identifies the
sources of financing for R&D, sets out taxation, credit, and customs concessions
for R&D, and prescribes rules for international R&D collaboration. The draft law
also contains a number of radically new concepts such as state certification of R&D
institutions and a federal contract system for state orders. The adoption of this law
will be a major step in addressing the main problems of S&T regulation.
7.2 Government Financing of R&D
7.2.1 Current financing problems
The most important indicator of a state’s actual S&T policy, as opposed to its
rhetoric, is the budget allocations to R&D. The policy for governmental support
for basic and applied research has been much disputed. Two extreme positions are
often expressed. One has been taken by a number of experts who have insisted on
eliminating governmental financing of applied R&D and concentrating budgetary
support solely on basic research. Their argument is that under market conditions
applied R&D should be carried out and financed by enterprises. Thus the scale of
financing would reflect the demand by enterprises for applied R&D. The current
industrial R&D sector should be transformed into company R&D (Lakhtin, 1990).
Such rose-colored expectations reflected the pre-reform period when people in the
country were contemplating a market without really knowing what it was.
The other extreme view is applied R&D should be completely supported by
funds from the state budget, because in the coming years enterprises in Russia
will not be capable of financing an adequate level of applied research. This
viewpoint was frequently held in 1994 and 1995 (see, for example, Varshavsky and
Varshavsky, 1995).
The actual adjustment of R&D to new conditions shows that the experience
has been somewhere between these two positions. Enterprises have invested little
in R&D and innovation, but this reluctance reflects the macroeconomic instability
of the economy in the first years of reform. The extremely unfavorable investment
climate hindered innovation activity and made financing of R&D unattractive to
private capital.
To prevent a major disintegration of the country’s S&T potential, the govern-
ment has shouldered the main role of financing applied R&D along with supporting
basic research. This is a transitional solution. In the long run, private capital
must be involved in financing applied R&D and innovation. Whether this can
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be achieved depends on the macroeconomic situation and the S&T development
strategy.
Under the new conditions, it is also necessary to adjust applied R&D to the
requirements of Russian industry, as well as to develop capabilities to market intel-
lectual products of R&D for both domestic and foreign markets. Research institutes
are becoming increasingly interested in drawing attention to their achievements and
are making efforts to search for customers among domestic industrial enterprises,
foreign companies, banks, and others ready to invest in R&D.
To sum up, in the first years of the transition government support served to
preserve the R&D base; this role dominated the restructuring of the R&D sector.
In 1995, however, the government adopted the position that “the main task of
today is to stabilize the situation, to put the level of governmental support of
R&D in correspondence with the needs of its reorganization without destructive
consequences” (MSTP, 1996). Officials and researchers now recognize that the
state cannot maintain all the research institutes at the pre-reform level.
7.2.2 Selectivity and competition in R&D programs
The new policy clearly requires the state to be selective in its support of R&D.
It also states that government funds for R&D should be distributed as much as
possible on the basis of competition. Simultaneously, efforts must be made to
develop a system for objectively evaluating R&D proposals.
These principles have been implemented by shifting to tender-based R&D
financing. In this method individual scientists or groups submit competitive pro-
posals for specified research tasks. This contrasts with the previous system in
which R&D institutes were given funds on the basis of their budget requirements.
Tender-based financing allows budget funds to be channeled to creative groups and
individuals and ensures that applied R&D focuses on topics important to the na-
tional economy. Competition for financing among researchers also increases their
interest in achieving results that are up to world standards. It may lessen the brain
drain from the R&D sector since the best researchers can be better supported in a
competitive system. In the long run, the efficiency of budget funds will increase in
a competitive environment.
The first steps in this direction have already been made. Several budgetary and
extra-budgetary funds allocate support through competition. Some of these foun-
dations are listed in Table 7.1. The funds for these foundations were established
by the government to strengthen the selectivity of financing S&T projects, to in-
crease financing of R&D, to stimulate initiative by researchers, and to involve
industry-supported applied R&D. Non-budgetary funds draw support from indus-
trial enterprises through a procedure established by the state. These funds are
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Table 7.1. Foundations promoting R&D in Russia.
Budgetary foundations Non-budgetary foundations
Russian Foundation for Russian Foundation for
Basic Research Technology Development
Russian Foundation for Russian Foundation for
Research in Humanities Conversion
Russian Foundation for Promo-
tion of S&T in Small Enterprises
Russian Foundation for
Support to Young Scientists
Federal Foundation for
Industrial Innovations
Source: MSTP, various years.
considered a transitional form in the process of moving from government to private
funding of R&D.
Among the foundations listed in Table 7.1, the activities of the Russian Foun-
dation for Technology Development (RFTD) and the Russian Foundation for Pro-
motion of Small Enterprise in S&T (FPSE) are directly associated with applied
R&D. The RFTD, established in May 1992, is a centralized non-budget foundation
which, along with 71 sectoral non-budget funds attached to sectoral ministries or in-
dustrial associations, is financed by contributions of 1.5 percent of sales of revenue
of industrial enterprises. The contributions are divided as follows: three-quarters
of the amount collected support sectoral non-budget funds and the remaining one-
quarter goes to the RFTD. Initially it was assumed that these funds would be used
to maintain existing industrial R&D institutions. Over time, however, the emphasis
has shifted to projects that introduce innovations. Table 7.2 contains data on the
number and field of projects approved for financing by the RFTD in 1994.
In 1995, spending from sectoral non-budget funds was equal to about 9 percent
of the government budget for civil R&D planned for 1995. The funds are growing
rapidly, increasing nearly tenfold in the last six months of 1995.
Unfortunately, the government’s current S&T policy in Russia cannot be called
consistent. For instance, on 19 January 1996, the president’s decree On Measures
for Securing Timely Payment of Wages, at the Expense of Budget at all Levels,
Pensions, and Other Social Payments questioned the need for the RFTD. The
decree directed that all previously established non-budgetary foundations must
be liquidated within two weeks and their funds must be used to pay wages in
budget organizations. The decree indiscriminately lumped together the activities
of all non-budgetary foundations, ignoring individual achievements in long-term
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Table 7.2. R&D projects approved for financing by the RFTD in 1994, by R&D
objective.a
Objective of R&D Number of projects
Informatics, instrument-making, and conversion of defense R&D 23
Fuel and power generation 3
Chemistry and new materials 21
Machine-building and transport 30
Agroindustrial complex 5
Biotechnology and forestry industrial complex 5
Mining, metallurgy, and construction 5
Social sphere 11
Economics and law 1
Total 104
aThe objectives of R&D are presented in correspondence with the names of sectoral departments at
the Ministry on Science and Technological Policy of the Russian Federation.
Source: MSTP, 1995.
development and stressing only the single short-term goal of obtaining additional
money for the budget. After the publication of this decree, the government was
forced to reconsider its decision to abolish some of the non-budgetary foundations
including the RFTD. It decided to retain the RFTD and restored most of the
accumulated amounts to the foundations.
7.2.3 Repayable financing and the contract system
In February 1994, the Foundation for Promotion of Small Enterprise in S&T (FPSE)
was established to support innovative projects of small businesses. The foundation
is financed by allocations from the MSTP. In 1996 the allocation was 1 percent of the
federal budget for civilian R&D. The FPSE also receives voluntary contributions
from domestic and foreign enterprises, organizations, and individuals. The FPSE
not only examines research and production projects proposed by enterprises but
also allocates grants for development of the innovation infrastructure – training
specialists, patenting inventions, certifying products, arranging conferences and
meetings, and producing publications.
At present, FPSE experts find that the most profitable lines of innovations are
in medical technologies, civilian and industrial ecological activities, environmental
monitoring, personal safety, computer technologies, shipping, office equipment,
and energy-saving devices. The foundation examines approximately 150 applica-
tions every three months and chooses about 30 projects to receive between R200
and 250 million on privileged terms (interest rates of 25–30 percent, much less than
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the 90–100 percent annual interest rates charged by commercial banks). Projects
are examined for their future usefulness to enterprises. Nearly 1,000 experts are
involved in the review process, and the final decisions are made by a 12-member
foundation commission (Poisk, 1995).
The FPSE embodies an important concept for R&D policy – repayment by
the enterprises of financing from the budget and non-budgetary funds once an
innovation is realizing revenue. The requirement of repayment financing should
force enterprises to carefully select R&D projects, paying close attention to the
projects’ economic viability. It also makes the foundation partially self-financing
as revenue from old projects finance new ones. Financing repayment should
also provide additional resources to supplement budget funds. After some time
repayable financing should provide a steady source of funds to support RFTD and
FPSE activities and to offset interruptions in budget financing. The MSTP also
plans to apply the principles of repayable financing to R&D projects performed by
federal S&T programs, international S&T projects, regional programs, and other
activities supported directly by the budget. It is hoped that repayable financing will
eventually be applied for most of the applied R&D financed by the federal budget.
Draft regulations envisage that half of the funds that will be repaid by the
contractor will be deposited in a special account of the MSTP. These funds will be
used to fund new projects and for arranging exhibitions, seminars, and conferences
and publishing information materials. According to the draft, intellectual products
obtained from research performed on the repayable basis would be the property of
the MSTP until the funds advanced to the project have been completely repaid.
The new methods of research financing reflect the necessity of creating a
mechanism of government support for R&D that conforms to the principles of a
market economy. In our opinion, one important additional measure would be the
introduction of a federal contract system for R&D. The contract system would
regulate relations between organizations carrying out R&D projects and recognize
the need to respect intellectual property rights. These changes would lower barriers
to industrial use of S&T results obtained from federal projects.
Contracts protecting intellectual property rights should be broken down into
three levels: between the employee and the research institute; between the research
institute and the industrial enterprise; and between the research institute and the
state. Legal documents securing relations at the first and second levels have already
been completed. Documents regulating the relationship between the state and the
research institution are under development.
In the autumn of 1995, the MSTP submitted to the government a draft decree
on the introduction of the federal contract system for financing R&D projects from
both budgetary sources and non-budgetary funds. Its adoption has been delayed by
the unresolved issue of ownership of R&D results obtained under contract. Despite
Government Policy for Applied R&D 137
this delay, the government plans to use the contract system in the framework
of current legislation to gain experience with the contract system. This sort of
financing is to be introduced in stages. It is expected that expansion of such a
system will increase the flexibility for financing R&D projects and improve the
investment and innovation climate.
7.2.4 S&T priorities
The new forms of government financing reflect S&T priorities. At present, the
list of priorities is long. It consists of 14 subjects and encompasses almost all
fields of science and technology. Its contents are almost identical to the priorities
of the world’s most developed countries, and does not always acknowledge the
special conditions in Russia (Table 7.3, left column). During the first four years of
reforms the priorities were widely criticized. The limited size of the government
budget ruled out financing all R&D inherited from the Soviet system. The task
was to carefully select R&D projects that should receive support. Experts from the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) pointed out
that the process of setting priorities at a more detailed level, as well as the criteria
used in the selection process, was unclear. OECD experts further noted: “There
was, unquestionably, an inclination to distribute small amounts of money to a large
number of teams, and there is still a tendency to select frontier technology programs
without giving sufficient attention to their applicability” (OECD, 1994a, p. 36).
In 1994, at the behest of the MSTP, the Republican Research and Consulting
Expertise Center prepared proposals on the priorities of S&T development and a
list of critical technologies. The proposals were based on a two-stage expert poll
using the Delphi method. In the first phase 107 representatives were polled from the
Academy, higher education, and the industrial R&D sectors, as well as industrial
management. In the next stage the results were reviewed by MSTP specialists who
relied on consultations with scientists, particularly members of the scientific boards
for federal S&T programs.
In August 1995, the list of priorities for S&T development and the list of
critical technologies prepared by the MSTP were sent to ministries and departments
responsible for a considerable share of the government’s allocations to R&D (the
Russian Academy of Sciences; academies of medical and agricultural sciences; the
state committees on industrial policy, higher education, and the defense industry;
the ministries of the economy, atomic energy, transport, fuel and energy, health and
medical industry, agriculture, and environmental protection, among others). On
the basis of comments and proposals made by ministries and committees, a list of
priorities for S&T development was prepared (see Table 7.3, right column).
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Table 7.3. Actual and proposed S&T priorities in Russia.a
Actual priorities Proposed priorities
1. New production technologies 1. Information technologies and electronics
2. Informatics and communications 2. Industrial technologies
3. New materials 3. New materials and chemicals
4. Chemical products and technologies 4. Technologies of living systems
5. Fuel and power engineering 5. Transportation
6. Transportation 6. Fuel and power engineering
7. Forestry 7. Ecology and environmental
8. Food production and processing management
9. Life sciences and biotechnology 8. Priority directions of basic research
10. Ecology and environmental
management
11. Space
12. Technologies for
medical research and social services
13. Fundamental properties
of matter research
14. Fundamental problems of Russia’s
social and cultural development
aThe table presents a complete list of priorities, comprising both applied R&D and basic research.
Source: MSTP, various years.
In spite of the great amount of work and the sophisticated methods, there are
limitations to setting priorities this way. First, the priorities proposed in Table
7.3 are merely an enlarged list of previous priorities, although the categories are
more precisely defined. Second, the Delphi method is oriented toward a search
for a consensus among a number of possible choices; it does not provide an
effective search for S&T policy based on the goals set out. Third, economic
agents – industrialists, bankers, owners of small business – were not sufficiently
represented; implementation of innovations depends on the participation of these
agents. Representatives of industry took part only in the initial stages. A more
active involvement of business circles was difficult because under present-day
conditions managers are primarily interested in short-term investments with a quick
return of capital. They react negatively to activities that yield only long-run returns.
Thus, only one phase of the choice of priorities for S&T development has been
completed. The results have clarified and harmonized the position of the ministries
and departments influencing the country’s S&T development, yet the interests of
the government are quite different from those of businessmen. Informal discus-
sions with politicians and representatives of business circles should be valuable
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in overcoming the limitations of this survey, particularly in recognizing economic
criteria for applied R&D support.
In the process of developing priorities, a list of 76 critical technologies was also
compiled. Critical technologies were defined as “technologies that have an inter-
branch nature, provide the prerequisites for the development of many technological
fields or directions of R&D and solutions to key problems of : : : S&T priorities”
(MSTP, 1995a). The problems in developing a list of priorities for S&T activities
apply equally to creating a list of national critical technologies. Despite the absence
of a clearly formulated overall state strategy for long-term economic development,
the inclusion of the economic factor in the definition of critical technologies would
make the concept more useful.
7.2.5 The future of government financing of S&T programs
In 1994, government financing was organized into 41 government S&T programs,
16 federal goal-oriented programs with an R&D element, and 4 interdepartmental
programs. The list of government programs includes practically all fields of science
and technology. Under conditions of limited financing, this means the funds are
dispersed over several projects in each program. A serious issue in S&T policy is
to increase selectivity and to shorten the list of government S&T programs.
Another important problem is the formation and implementation of federal
goal-oriented programs (for data, see Exhibit A3.13). Often the government de-
cides to finance programs and for this it addresses specific items in the federal
budget. Examples are the Federal Space Program and the Program of Civil Avia-
tion Development. Financing of other programs is decided on the basis of proposals
from ministries and departments. The approval procedures are rudimentary. Funds
allocated to programs largely support the general upkeep of institutions rather than
R&D activity essential to a program’s objectives.
To increase the effectiveness of federal R&D expenditures, the government
must clarify the procedure for forming and implementing federal goal-oriented
programs. According to MSTP data, 55 percent of the 1995 federal budget appro-
priated to civilian R&D was allocated to these goal-oriented programs.
Another method of government support for R&D is provided by state research
centers (SRCs). At present, the status of SRC has been granted to 61 R&D insti-
tutions which perform R&D in such advanced fields as nuclear physics and power
engineering, chemistry and new materials, aircraft development, ship-building,
navigation and hydrophysics, medicine and biology, biotechnology, computer sci-
ence and instrument making, engineering, optoelectronics, laser systems, and robot
engineering (see Exhibit A1.6). SRC status was given to the largest institutes
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in the industrial R&D sector, and 17 SRCs are institutes associated with defense
industries. SRCs are concentrated in regions that were active in R&D during the
Soviet era. Thirty-three centers are in Moscow, and another six are in the region sur-
rounding Moscow, eleven are in St. Petersburg; and the regions of Novosibirsk and
Tomsk have four each. Some of the centers are located in the former closed science
cities. Research institutes with SRC status are given priority in budget financing
for approved activities. Between 40 and 70 percent of the total funds obtained by
state research centers are provided by government programs (MSTP, 1996).
An evaluation of the two-year experience with SRCs shows that the key ques-
tion is whether the centers are worth their costs. Would a selection procedure for
financing based on competition produce better results at cheaper costs than one
based on SRC status? Could this selection process be biased toward supporting
large institutes inherited from the centralized planning system?
To answer these questions we must take into account the conditions of the
economy in transition and the urgency of preservation of the country’s R&D po-
tential. The program of SRC development started in 1992, and its large-scale
implementation began in 1993, when the amounts of governmental R&D financ-
ing were dramatically reduced and survival of R&D institutions was the dominant
consideration for policymakers. Therefore, the program was intended to minimize
the destruction of the largest and best-known research institutes possessing state-
of-the-art equipment rather than to introduce market principles into applied R&D.
In the first two years the program supporting SRCs was not backed with
sufficient financing. Government funds allocated to them were hardly enough
to pay salaries and maintain the facilities; little was available for renovation and
improvement of equipment.
The meager financing notwithstanding, an SRC exhibition in Moscow in
November 1995 demonstrated a high standard of S&T achievements; institutes
which had earlier been working solely for military needs managed to reorient their
operations to civilian purposes. For example, the Obninsk branch of the Karpov
Physico-Chemical Research Institute developed and introduced into production
various pharmaceuticals. The Research Institute for Organic Semiproducts and
Dyes introduced into use radically new pharmaceuticals for cancer diagnosis and
therapy. The Applied Chemistry Institute worked out a technology for industrial
production of ozone-safe freons. The Bochvar Research Institute for Inorganic
Materials is completing certification tests of a new zirconium alloy with a high
threshold of radiation resistance for manufacturing envelopes for heat-emissive el-
ements of nuclear reactors’ active zones; use of this alloy will increase the efficiency
of nuclear fuels by 20 to 30 percent.
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The 1995 Moscow exhibition had two objectives: first, displaying achieve-
ments of SRCs; second, drawing the attention of business circles to S&T results
with the goal of obtaining support for commercialization. In mid-1996, a similar
exhibition took place in St. Petersburg.
The results of the SRC program are currently under review. It is expected that
some centers will lose their SRC designation; others will have their status renewed;
and some additional institutes will be given SRC status. Despite the drawbacks of
the program of SRC development revealed in its implementation, many research
institutes continue to seek SRC status. By the end of 1995, the MSTP received
more than 200 applications.
SRC development must be improved by establishing more reliable links be-
tween applied R&D institutes and industry and by creating more favorable condi-
tions for commercialization. Emphasis must be on enhancing the Russian industry’s
positions in domestic and international high-tech markets. Activities should be in-
troduced that encourage competition in R&D financing. Furthermore, R&D goals
should determine the acquisition of equipment rather than equipment determining
the research conducted.
Finally, the program of governmental support to scientific schools should be
reassessed. In September 1995, the government enacted a decree aimed at reducing
the brain drain from the country and raising the prestige of scientists. In the budget
of the Russian Foundation for Basic Research, R34 billion were appropriated
directly to leading scientists and scientific schools, while another R100 billion
were distributed to these scientists on a competitive basis.
The effectiveness of this program is questionable. Any scientist with a profes-
sor’s title may claim support under this decree, though it is obvious that the number
of leading scientific schools is limited and one can name all their leaders. It is un-
clear what a “leading scientific school” means in this context. This expression has
been used by the scientific community to designate a specific theoretical direction
headed by a prominent scientist who has attracted a group of talented disciples.
However, there is no strict definition which could be used in the implementation
of this decree. In some publications, scientific schools means any type of research
team (Tretyakov and Melikhov, 1995).
Any effort to distribute government funds must define clear and concrete rules.
Criteria must be developed to determine leading scientific schools. Their presence
must be confirmed in certain scientific areas. Lists of leaders in the respective
schools must be available. These criteria will provide a rationale for financing
projects of leading scientific schools and the question of whether they are suitable
for budgetary support can be reconsidered.
142 Andrey Fonotov and Lioudmila Pipiia
7.3 Government Support of Innovation Activity
7.3.1 Budget financing of industrial innovation
Innovation activity was recognized as the weakest part of the Soviet S&T system.
In the reform era innovation was to be directed and financed by enterprises, but in
the difficult times of transition many proposals were made for government support.
In 1994, Russia’s MSTP, together with 11 other ministries and departments, agreed
on a draft entitled the Complex Program of the Development and Governmental
Support of Innovative Entrepreneurship in the Russian Federation for the Period
1994–1996. The measures in this program were aimed at creating legal, organi-
zational, and economic conditions for developing enterprise innovations; forming
a market infrastructure for innovation activity (including establishment and devel-
opment of technopark structures); and involving researchers in innovation. The
program was financed by participating ministries and local authorities and by funds
from private investors.
The most critical issue was financing availability. Where the resources were
sufficient, good results were achieved. For example, with funds allocated by the
MSTP and the Lomonosov Moscow State University, an exemplary scientific park
was established with up-to-date equipment. It is operating successfully. Unfortu-
nately, other projects were not as adequately supported.
The outcome is not surprising. To make a program of innovation support
effective, it is necessary, first, to make the measures proposed consistent with the
available resources and, second, to make the government’s support to innovation-
related investments a major element of the program. This was not the case with the
innovation program, so improvements are clearly necessary.
7.3.2 Infrastructure support
Infrastructure was and still is a weak point in Russia’s economy. Since successful
results in R&D will be increasingly determined by cooperation, the development
of links between research institutes and businesses are essential. Furthermore, the
country’s innovation potential cannot be realized without capable personnel. The
government must provide appropriate support for training personnel for R&D and
innovation with the active involvement of entrepreneurs interested in the develop-
ment of human resources.
In today’s world, effective R&D and innovation activity is impossible without
extensive use of information technologies. Recently, some important improvements
have been made. In 1996, 28 telecommunications networks were operating in Rus-
sia; electronic mail is becoming increasingly available. The MSTP has contributed
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to the establishment of the InfoScience experimental telecommunications system,
which is popular among Russian researchers. Despite these improvements, Russia
lags behind world standards. Researchers still do not have access to unrestricted
exchange of scientific information with colleagues or to various databases both
within the country and abroad. The information revolution is well under way in
other industrialized nations; in Russia it has barely begun. Russia must radically
improve the availability of information to scientists and engineers using advanced
technologies to collect, transfer, process, and analyze the information. Investment
of government funds in the field may be one of the most important elements of the
state’s innovation policy.
Some steps have been taken. In 1995, the interdepartmental program of the
National Network of Computer Communications for Science and Higher Educa-
tion was established. This network will provide leading research and education
centers with access to domestic and international S&T information resources. Ap-
proximately 1 percent of the federal R&D budget was channeled to this program
in 1996.
7.3.3 Applying R&D results to innovations
In August 1995, the government of Russia established the Federal Foundation for
Industrial Innovations (FFII). The financing of this foundation is planned to be
1.5 percent of the government’s centralized capital investments. In practice, the
foundation is to be a tool to pursue the government’s S&T and industrial policy. It
is to early to determine whether the FFII will function efficiently. However, based
on the experience of previous foundations (the RFTD and FPSE) it can be stated
that, to be effective, the foundation must accumulate considerable resources in its
budget account, adhere to the S&T priorities it establishes, observe the principle of
repayable financing of innovation projects during at least the first several years of
its operation, and obtain legal support from the state.
Another way of moving R&D into production is the establishment of invest-
ment groups. About 20 elite scientific institutions in the field of chemistry and
material science, including 10 SRCs, have started an investment group whose ob-
jective is to sell completed R&D. The government, through the MSTP, is assisting
in the creation and operation of this investment group.
To fulfill its tasks, an investment group must obtain private investments and
complete the technology cycle from the R&D project to the final use in mass
production. These groups may advertise their research results to create a demand
for their services, and help the commercial use of innovations with the issuance of
company securities and broker operations.
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Table 7.4. Distribution of the most important R&D projects supported by the
MSTP, by field of S&T.
Average
Investment duration
Number of required of projects
Field projects (in million $) (in years)
Machinery 25 363.8 2.0
Metallurgy 15 372.2 2.7
Construction 29 67.6 1.3
Power generation 30 78.7 2.0
Development of fuel and
energy resources 7 18.2 2.0
Chemistry and new materials 26 93.0 1.7
Forestry-industrial complex 4 99.0 1.8
Informatics and instrument-
making 83 235.1 2.2
Agriculture and agro-
industrial complex 29 651.6 2.5
Medicine and health
services 15 101.8 3.6
Light industry 17 69.1 1.7
Total 280 2,150.1 2.1
Source: MSTP, 1995b.
Still another activity to promote innovation was initiated by the MSTP in 1995.
The MSTP has selected a number of the most important finalized R&D projects for
use in industrial production. A total of 280 projects were chosen from more than
500 applications (see Table 7.4). A majority of the projects had business strategies
that were close to implementation. The Ministry offered to act as a broker between
research institutes that had failed to find customers for their R&D results and
industrial enterprises that might commercialize the results. In spite of favorable
economic evaluations of this effort, entrepreneurs were in no hurry to invest their
money in the commercialization of R&D results. Part of the problem was that
R&D institutions did not have sufficient experience in promoting technologies in
the market. More important, the basic factors favoring innovations have yet to be
established – a macroeconomic equilibrium, a legal base for intellectual property,
marketing institutions, and so forth. As a result, most of the projects selected by
MSTP have yet to be implemented.
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7.4 Indirect Support to R&D and Innovation
7.4.1 Tax concessions
Most industrialized countries, including Russia, provide various tax exemptions
for R&D expenditures. By early 1996, a number of tax and other exemptions
existed for institutions and enterprises performing R&D, as well as for organizations
introducing new equipment and technologies. The tax exemptions and concessions
are as follows:
 The value-added tax (VAT) does not apply to the R&D performed in educa-
tional institutions or to R&D financed by the budget or by foundations such
as the Russian Foundation for Basic Research, the Russian Foundation for
Technology Development, and sectoral non-budget funds.
 Purchases of equipment to be used for R&D are also exempt from VAT; these
include goods and equipment imported through programs of foreign technical
assistance or under contracts with foreign organizations performing joint R&D.
Imports of R&D equipment are exempt from customs duties.
 As much as 10 percent of total profit spent by enterprises and organizations on
R&D is exempt from the profit tax.
 Profit tax does not apply to profits realized on R&D-related activities by edu-
cational institutions and educational services.
 Profits that are spent on construction, renovation of industrial fixed assets, and
new equipment and technologies are exempt from profit tax.
 New small enterprises in the Science and Scientific Services sector are exempt
from profit tax for the first two years after formation if S&T projects constitute
over 70 percent of their total activity.
 Grants from foreign philanthropic organizations to budget-supported institu-
tions and nonprofit R&D organizations are exempt from profit tax.
 The personal income tax does not apply to grants given to Russian residents
by foreign nonprofit organizations.
 Property and land tax exemptions are given to public research and higher
education institutions, R&D institutions of the Academy of Sciences, state
research centers, and other R&D institutionslisted annually by the government.
Many of these tax exemptions are in effect in industrialized countries. In
these countries R&D is given special treatment because of its externalities and
its importance in economic growth. In estimating the size of tax rebates, it is
necessary to note that they are intended for enterprises and institutions that are at
the stage of investing in R&D, new technologies, and technical re-equipment. Tax
exemptions should also be available during the introduction of R&D results. For
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example, there could be tax vacations for profits acquired through the operation of
high-technology products for 3 to 5 years after the innovation’s introduction. It is
also advisable to enact tax exemptions for dividends received by investors from
innovation projects over the first three years.
Real-estate and land tax exemptions for research institutes were intended to
compensate for insufficient budgetary financing. Some R&D institutes have be-
come, in effect, tax-exempt real-estate organizations. Tax exemptions should be
repealed on non-R&D activities of research institutions.
7.4.2 Product standards
The government has a decisive role in setting product and certification standards.
This issue is especially urgent in Russia since, in a number of cases, technical
re-equipment of industry has been accomplished with obsolete technologies and
consequently the new products do not meet current environmental and technical
standards. Some obsolete technologies and products have been imported into
Russia; others are from domestic sources.
Russia inherited a system of state standards (GOST); these standards were
valid both in the entire Soviet territory and in the member countries of Council
for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), but many times they were different
from international standards. Nevertheless, the OECD (1994a, p. 71) reports
that “the former Soviet Union had developed a remarkable infrastructure for the
standardization and normalization of technology.” The centralized network of the
State Committee on Standardization, Metrology, and Certification of the Russian
Federation (Gosstandart) has been preserved, and continues its activities.
In 1993, laws on standardization, uniformity of measurements, and certifi-
cation of goods and services were adopted. The Gosstandart participates in the
International Standards Organization (ISO), developing about 60 new international
standards and executing the examination of another 400 international standards.
The transition from GOST to international standards has been very expensive.
It is extremely important, however, that Russia adopts only those international
standards that are equal to or exceed the level of current GOST standards. It is
completely unacceptable to adopt quality standards for goods and services that are
lower than GOST.
Government activity with respect to standards is limited in several ways. First,
less than a half of goods and services have compulsory certificates. It would be
desirable to speed up the process of certification by allocating the necessary funds
to this process. Second, it has become necessary to subject technologies imported
into Russia, as well as technologies used in the re-equipment of enterprises partially
or completely owned by the state, to compulsory official examination. The state
Government Policy for Applied R&D 147
must use all necessary economic levers to erect barriers to the import of obsolete
technologies into Russia. Third, technological developments and new machinery
prototypes originating in R&D institutions must be checked for compliance with
domestic and world requirements. This measure will prevent the reproduction of
outdated products under the pretext of introducing new ones.
7.5 Regional Aspects of S&T Policy
The problem of regional development is especially urgent because of Russia’s size
and its variety of natural, climatic, and socioeconomic conditions. Each region of
the country participates, to some extent, in the performance of applied research.
However, as mentioned earlier, regional aspects of R&D were neglected in the
Soviet era and the distribution of R&D potential over the country’s territory has
been uneven (see Chapter 2). The departmental rivalry also present in R&D led
some sectors to dominate in certain regions. The needs of regional development
were largely ignored in the decision-making process if they conflicted with the
interests of central departments.
The current reforms in Russia have moved an important part of economic
decision-making from the central government to regional administrations. The
regions no longer wish to be merely customers of S&T activity and instead are
striving to become participants in R&D and innovation activities directed at their
economic and social problems. Industrial enterprises have already eliminated
their dependence on R&D performed by institutions belonging to corresponding
branch ministries and have become increasingly interested in searching for R&D
partnerships in local markets.
Regional S&T policy can be pursued in different forms and by a variety of
methods, such as founding technoparks or establishing funds to promote small
research-oriented enterprises. Regional measures can be introduced to encour-
age international R&D cooperation, including arranging local exhibitions of S&T
achievements.
Between 1992 and 1993, it became obvious that regions wished to participate
in the selection and implementation of regional and interregional S&T programs
that would be financed in part from the federal budget. Such programs have been
adopted and account for about 1 percent of the federal budget allocations to civilian
R&D in 1994 (CSRS, 1995a , p. 107). The share of federal budget funds in the
programs varies from 18 to 55 percent.
The programs in the regulation On the Procedure of Financing Regional S&T
Programs and Projects from the Federal Budget of the Russian Federation pro-
vide funding of regional S&T activities and ensure the distribution of results of
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Table 7.5. Regional S&T programs and their financing considered by the inter-
departmental board on regional S&T policy in 1993 and 1994.
1993 1994
Number of projects in programs 1,266 1,421
Recommended for federal budget financing 715 896
Not recommended for federal budget financing 551 525
Financing requested from the federal budget
(in million rubles): 8,826.71 30,511.27
Recommended for financing 3,509.85 16,299.20
Not recommended for financing 5,316.86 14,212.07
Source: Center Renatekhs, 1995, pp. 7, 9.
interregional and national importance. R&D that will be beneficial to regions
will also be performed by research institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences,
regional research and education institutions, and research centers established by
local authorities. Finally, funding is available for the development of a market
infrastructure for R&D and innovation activities in Russia’s regions. The federal
funds are allocated to regional S&T programs and projects only on the basis of cost-
sharing. After a project is completed, the ministry, the regional administration, and
the project’s participants become co-owners of the intellectual property.
The selection of projects is done by independent experts at the Center for
Regional S&T Cooperation (Renatekhs). Data for the number and financing of
regional S&T programs and projects are given in Table 7.5.
The experience between 1993 and 1994 shows that the main reasons for the
rejection of regional proposals were the following:
 Duplication of work performed in the framework of federal S&T programs or
regional programs financed by the Russian Federation Committee on Higher
Education.
 Use of budget funds for unauthorized purposes such as recovering enterprises’
current assets, re-equipment of enterprises for new types of production, and
arrangement of sale of products.
 Absence of potential users in a specific area of R&D.
 Absence of the finance sharing.
 Lack of novelty elements in R&D offered and the availability of ready-made
developments in other regions (Center Renatekhs, 1995).
A total of 59 of the 89 regional authorities of the Russian Federation participate
in regional S&T programs which include interregional economic associations,
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such as the Association for Economic Interaction of Regions of the Central Black
Earth Area Chernozemye, the Association Siberian Treaty, and the Association for
Economic Interaction of Regions and Republics of the Urals Area. The Krasnodar,
Irkutsk, Saratov, Kemerovo, Tomsk, and Tula regions are among the most active
participants in regional S&T programs.
In spite of the fact that financing of regional programs is an insignificant part
of the federal budget, these programs are a radically new form of cooperation
between the federal government and the regional governments. The program takes
into account local needs or preferences. Shared financing and the necessity of
funds from local budgets, industrial enterprises, and other sources increase the
responsibilities of local administrators and R&D participants in the projects.
Improvements in governmental S&T policy in the regions are connected with
the implementation of cooperation agreements between MSTP and regional admin-
istrators. They also depend on the capability of regional science centers coordinat-
ing federal and regional S&T policies.
The so-called technopolises present another aspect of regional S&T policy.
Many of these cities were established exclusively for R&D activities; many were
formerly very active in military R&D. There are about 60 municipal technopolises
in the country; more than 20 are close to Moscow. These towns had acute problems
in 1992 and 1993 when demand for their S&T products, previously supported with
government funds, sharply decreased. The military specialization of the majority
of technopolises restricted the possibility of their performing civilian R&D. The
financial crisis caused critical situations in maintaining the industrial safety of
some of the experimental facilities in these towns. Moreover, the average age of
researchers is over 50 in some towns which reduces the chances of launching new
activities.
At least two national tasks can be identified that would help reduce the crisis
of the technopolises. The first is establishing a steady base for the development
of innovation. The idea is to reorient the creative potential in these towns from
an armaments race to a technology race. The highly qualified personnel and high-
quality equipment in these regions make this shift possible. The second task must
address the destruction of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in accordance
with international agreements signed by the Russian Federation. New technologies
must be created for the safe and economic disposal of stocks of these weapons.
The knowledge and skills of specialists who participated in creating such weapons
are likely to be valuable for devising ways of destroying them.
The program for the development of technopolises requires recognition of their
specializations and locations. In this connection we should single out a group of
technopolises whose R&D institutions are located near Moscow and St. Petersburg.
Programs for these technopolises should be linked to the development programs of
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these two megalopolises. The development of other technopolises should be dealt
with in agreements between federal and local authorities.
The conversion of dying technopolises into centers of innovation will require
large expenditures. Federal budget allocations will not be enough. It is necessary to
combine federal and local resources and to transfer part of the budget originally tar-
geted for the economic development of technopolises to social expenditures. These
towns should also receive funds allocated in international disarmament treaties.
7.6 Conclusions
The S&T policy pursued between 1992 and 1995 gradually shifted from budgetary
support of R&D institutions to goal-oriented activities and the development of
non-state financing. The emphasis on competition in allocating funds reduced the
monopolistic character inherited from the Soviet era, and promises to raise the
efficiency of S&T activities.
The basic elements of government policy have been formed, and the contract
system of intellectual property is being introduced. Repayable financing for applied
research and innovation projects has already spread to many programs.
Still, S&T public policy is burdened with unsolved problems. The innovation
component of the S&T policy is hesitantly being pursued, reflecting uncertainty
on how to proceed. The gap between R&D institutions and industrial operations
remains large despite various government measures. For this reason it is crucial to
combine government and business efforts in the innovation process. Understanding
and then meeting the needs of industries is the most important task of applied
R&D. Entrepreneurs must help scientists and innovators understand the intricacies
of industrial demand for R&D. The creation of a more definite innovation policy
remains an important task of governmental policy.
Chapter 8
Concluding Comments
Leonid Gokhberg, Merton J. Peck, and Ja´nos Ga´cs
In this chapter we comment on selected points made earlier in this report and
attempt to answer directly the three questions raised in the introduction:
1. Was the decline in applied R&D from 1991 to 1995 too steep or too modest
for the welfare of the Russian economy?
2. How should the organization and structure of Russian applied R&D develop
over the long run?
3. What role should public policy play in applied R&D?
8.1 The Decline of Russian Applied R&D
Chapters 2 (Gokhberg) and 3 (Alimpiev and Sokolov) clearly describe the dramatic
fall in Russian applied R&D from 1991 to 1995. There was a steep fall in real
terms of government funding for research institutes. The institutes responded to
the decrease in their budgets by sharply reducing the salaries of researchers. The
reduction led to an exodus of researchers; employment of researchers in the research
sector fell from 1.22 million in 1990 to 542,000 in 1995, largely in applied R&D.
The process of downsizing was largely a decentralized one, depending on each
researcher’s decision to leave or stay and depending on the outcome of the struggle
of institutes to survive. Many institutes initiated activities far from research and
development such as leasing their buildings or retailing personal computers. Staff
members often took additional jobs.
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All the chapter authors have concluded that the decline in applied R&D was
too sharp. The size of the Russian applied R&D sector is regarded as inadequate
to support Russian manufacturing, particularly its high-technology sectors.
Comparisons of the size of the Russian R&D sector with those in other countries
tend to confirm this conclusion. One of the most striking comparisons is in terms of
gross expenditures on research and development (GERD) as a percentage of gross
domestic product (GDP). In 1994 Russia tied with Greece and Portugal for last
place among the 23 nations for which data are available (see Table 8.1 in CSRS,
1995b). There are problems in making these comparisons since they depend on
purchasing power parity exchange rates and calculations of GDP; all measures are
subject to error.
Other indicators for 1994 show that Russia ranks high in absolute volume of
R&D and the ratio of researchers to all workers. In total absolute R&D expenditures
Russia places immediately after the G-7 countries. In the category of researchers
per 10,000 individuals in the labor force, Russia ranked second after Japan. The
editors put less emphasis on the size of the R&D sector and more emphasis on the
effectiveness of the R&D sector than the chapter authors. In Chapter 2 Gokhberg
reports that facilities and materials are inadequate for effective research. Even
though some researchers may exist on paper and not in reality (like the serfs in
Gogol’s Dead Souls), the high ratio of personnel to expenditures suggests that
Russian R&D may have too many researchers chasing too little money.
Less spending on salaries and more on materials and equipment would improve
efficiency. Further, several chapters find that the links between R&D and production
are weak. This is a significant difficulty for the payoff to R&D comes primarily in
selling technologically advanced products that meet world standards. Achieving
that goal requires manufacturing and marketing expertise along with effective R&D.
Russian enterprises lack the skills necessary to realize the payoff from R&D.
8.2 The Organization and Structure of Applied R&D
8.2.1 The need for enterprise R&D
Earlier work at IIASA concluded that most applied R&D should be performed by
enterprises rather than carried out by separate R&D institutes, as is still the Russian
practice. Manufacturing enterprises should finance applied R&D, determine its di-
rection, and perform R&D within their own organizations. An alternative emerging
in Russia is for enterprises to hire independent R&D institutes to carry out R&D; in
this option enterprises would still finance R&D and determine its general direction,
but they would rely on an R&D institute to actually carry out the R&D activity.
Concluding Comments 153
Experience in industrialized countries shows that contractual R&D is not car-
ried out as efficiently as R&D in facilities directly owned by manufacturing en-
terprises (Mowery, 1993). There are several reasons for this. First, applied R&D
benefits from interactions with other activities of the firm, particularly manufactur-
ing and marketing. These interactions between researchers and others occur more
easily when all are employed by the same firm. Informal contacts are much more
difficult across organizational boundaries than within them. This is sometimes a
problem even for departments in the same firm, and the barriers increase when the
organizations are separate.
Second, it is difficult to draw up effective contracts for applied R&D. A good
contract specifies the tasks to be accomplished. In this case, however, clarity may
be difficult because R&D tasks by nature involve considerable uncertainty. One can
enforce a contract that requires the delivery of five tons of coal by the first of next
month; one cannot enforce a contract that requires an improvement in integrated
circuits by the first of next month. Managers are better able to monitor and evaluate
R&D within organizations than outside them. R&D requires feedback. Alimpiev
and Sokolov in Chapter 3 recognize the importance of feedback; they point out that
in the linear model of R&D during the Soviet era much failed without it.
Third, an enterprise cannot be an effective buyer of R&D if it relies primarily
on contractual R&D. Purchasing R&D requires knowledge about current technol-
ogy, about R&D results that fit well into the productive process, and about costs.
Such expertise usually comes from engaging in R&D within the organization and
developing a core of researchers loyal to an enterprise.
These three factors have been used to explain why enterprises in industrialized
countries rely primarily on in-house R&D. The American computer firm IBM, the
German electric and electronics firm Siemens, the British chemical firm ICI, and
the Japanese automotive giant Toyota make relatively limited use of contractual
R&D.
Nevertheless, independent R&D organizations have a modest role in industri-
alized economies. They are useful at carrying out applied R&D when interactions
with other activities of the enterprise is unnecessary and when the task can be
clearly specified. Independent research units are also an efficient organizational
form when there are significant economies of scale in carrying out R&D. For this
last case, the most efficient organization is the research center serving many firms.
Major users of independent research organizations are enterprises that are also
conducting significant in-house research activities. Gokhberg in Chapter 4 finds
this is also true in Russia; enterprises in industries with considerable in-house R&D
are likely to be the ones with considerable contractual R&D. These facts support the
proposition that carrying out in-house research enables a buyer to use contractual
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R&D effectively. Thus contractual R&D does not substitute for in-house R&D but
rather complements it.
The implications of these organizational considerations are that Russia must
promote R&D performed by manufacturing enterprises. In Russia enterprises are
considered requesters for applied R&D from institutes rather than performers of
it. The current low demand for R&D by enterprises is explained primarily by
macroeconomic conditions that are external to the R&D sector. There is no doubt
that general economic conditions have precluded enterprises from playing a major
role in financing R&D. However, organizational factors within the sector have also
discouraged R&D activity. Alimpiev and Sokolov point out in Chapter 3 that the
Soviet experience with research production associations largely failed to overcome
the problems presented by the independent research institutes. The associations
lacked the power to direct research or control finances. The newly established
financial-industrial groups described by the authors may also suffer from the loose
coupling of R&D institutes to production enterprises. It should be recalled that
members of Japanese keiretsu such as Mitsubishi Electric look not to the group but
to their in-house research organizations for new products and processes.
We suggest consideration be given to promoting enterprise takeovers of re-
search institutes to create enterprise-owned research activity. This type of policy
is described by Fonotov and Pipiia in Chapter 7; the authors propose that R&D
institutes serving primarily one enterprise should be taken over by them. They also
suggest consortium organizations for R&D institutes serving several enterprises.
Research centers remaining independent would correspond roughly to organiza-
tions with economies of scale that are sometimes independent in industrialized
countries. We endorse such plans, particularly if emphasis is given to the creation
of in-house R&D – the organizational form that has great promise of improving the
efficiency of Russian R&D activity.
8.2.2 Intellectual property rights and competition
R&D activity in a market economy requires that inventors or those who finance
them realize a profit from new products or processes that succeed in the market. If
competitors can quickly imitate new products or processes they will eat away the
profits. On the one hand, those who have invested time or money into an invention
must have exclusive use of the innovation as a reward for their efforts. On the other
hand, there must be widespread diffusion of an invention if society is to reap the
maximum benefits. Patents that allow innovators to monopolize inventions for a
limited number of years fulfill the requirement for exclusivity and still encourage
inventions and diffusion of their benefits.
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Russia has instituted patent laws but, as Alimpiev and Sokolov state, it does not
yet have an effective patent system. The government has been unable to implement
patent laws, so there are few sanctions for patent infringement. We join the two
chapter authors in urging for the early establishment of an effective patent system
as it is essential for an effective applied R&D. Alimpiev and Sokolov also point
out that there are analogous issues with respect to trademarks and copyrights.
The Russian patent law specifies that the individual inventor must receive rea-
sonable compensation from his or her employer. This provision is not in patent
laws in other countries; arrangements between employer and researchers are left
unregulated. The provision reflects the time when state-financed research insti-
tutes dominated R&D activities, and there was little concern about the incentives
to finance research and more concern about creating incentives for individual re-
searchers. In a market economy, however, if the necessary intellectual base is
available a major problem is ensuring incentives to finance R&D. State regulations
in relations between an inventor and his or her employer create uncertainty about
what is “reasonable compensation.” Furthermore, financing inventions is a pro-
cess that requires very high returns from a successful invention to offset the costs
of inevitable failures. At present the Russian patent provision, along with many
measures in the patent law, is not in effect. In the future, however, the provision
may discourage enterprises, including foreign ones, from financing R&D.
Patent laws are important, yet most innovations are not patented. Many do
not meet the standards of novelty and most discoveries of science are unpatentable.
Trade secrecy is used as an alternative way to allow innovators to realize profits
although most trade secrets eventually become known. The most significant way
returns from innovation are realized is by the head start that the innovator obtains
by placing a new product on the market first or by using a new process before others
(Levin et al., 1987). This advantage has been shown to be even more significant
than patents in yielding temporary profits in many industries such as electronics and
transportation equipment. A head start, in turn, requires knowledge of the market,
expertise in advertisement, and efficient pricing and distribution mechanisms.
Innovation activity, however, is not solely or perhaps even primarily a question
of positive incentives. Much innovation activity in the current global economy is
determined by the character and pace of competition. Enterprises in industrialized
economies innovate largely because the failure to do so will mean a loss of sales to
the innovative rivals. Ultimately the failure to innovate in most industries means
the firm will not survive. In this environment, enterprises regularly set aside a
percentage of their revenue for R&D activity. Innovation, as the great Austrian
economist Schumpeter stated, has become routinized. For example, the firm that
introduces a 16K RAM integrated circuit immediately sets to work to develop a
64K RAM circuit, the next step in what has been called a technical trajectory, or
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the path in the evolution of technology. The firm launches the next step, costly as
it is, because it knows that its competitors will be at work on the next stage, and it
cannot risk falling behind.
Most Russian enterprises are not accustomed to thinking of product and process
improvement as an ongoing activity. Innovation in the Soviet system was a distinct
event of applying R&D results – not an everyday activity. The threat of competition
was not as important as it was, and is, for firms in industrialized economies.
The chapter authors, particularly Glaziev, Karimov, and Kuznetsova in Chapter
5, report on the low level of innovation in the Soviet system. They stress that
innovation has declined in the past five years primarily because of the adverse
macroeconomic situation. We would add that Russian enterprises have yet to
consider innovation a requirement for survival, even though they face intense
competition from foreign enterprises. They still think innovation is an infrequent
event, as it was in the Soviet system. They are unlikely to be successful in
competing with firms that regard continual innovation as a necessity even if it
requires sacrificing other activities.
8.2.3 International transactions
Mindeli in Chapter 6 provides a very complete account of Russia’s entry into the
international S&T system, which has taken many forms, and which has resulted in
many promising initiatives. Still the overall impression is that the integration of
Russian R&D is modest, given its size and industrialized character.
A comparison of the postwar economies of Japan and Russia identifies some
of the problems. Japan, somewhat like the Soviet Union, was isolated from world
technology developments by the depression of the 1930s and World War II. By 1945,
its technology level was significantly below Europe’s and particularly the US’s. An
opportunity existed for increasing economic growth by importing technology and
realizing the gains of a catch-up. The Japanese were not content with buying know-
how; they used domestic R&D to adapt and improve their technology imports.
No similar development has occurred yet in Russia. There has been no catch-
up or Japan-style double-digit economic growth. There has been limited import
of technology; rather, the emphasis has been on exporting technological services
to raise money for the research institutes. Yet many studies have shown that a
major factor in Japanese economic growth was the combination of imported tech-
nology and domestic adaptation and improvement. The importance of importing
technology has not been recognized in Russia.
A closely related point is that trade in know-how tends to be greatest between
nations that are strong in the same industries. Thus Japan and the USA both
have large electronics industries and both carry out substantial R&D in this field.
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Yet, along with being major competitors, they are also major trading partners in
know-how. The reason is that as already mentioned; enterprises that conduct in-
house R&D are also effective buyers of R&D results from external sources. Thus
Du Pont is a big purchaser of patent rights despite its large in-house R&D; some
of its best-known inventions such as rayon were acquired abroad. Just as domestic
contract R&D is bought by those with in-house R&D, so is international know-how
bought by enterprises that are themselves active in research. And what is true for
enterprises is mostly true for nations.
This is not widely recognized in Russia. As Mindeli reports, there is still a
tendency to think of international activity of all sorts as a way to acquire what
is not produced or developed at home. There is little need, it is thought, for
participation in international activity in areas in which Russia is strong. Such a
view runs counter to the view that trade is valuable when it involves the same group
of products because trade gives consumers choices and promotes competition. As
with products, so it is with technology. Only a fraction of inventions occur in any
one nation, even when it is strong in a field.
One final comment. Mindeli’s chapter is largely devoted to government policy.
Yet in all the market economies technological activity in applied R&D across inter-
national borders represents largely unilateral moves of transnational corporations to
export and to locate production and research in various countries. The other major
forms of international transactions is joint activity between companies of differ-
ent national origin. The pattern of international activity that emerges represents
enterprises’ responses to market factors. Governments have a minor role. There
are exceptions that attract media attention such as US trade sanctions against some
countries. And many governments do provide tax and other concessions to attract
foreign direct investment. Still most economists view the process as an enterprise
activity with governments in a supporting role. Chapter 6 stresses the need to place
governments in a leading role and enterprises in a supporting one. This is probably
the case for Russia today, given the weakness of Russian enterprises. In the future,
however, enterprises must be recognized as a central institution in international
aspects of applied R&D.
8.3 Public Policy
To the final question – what role should public policy play in applied R&D – it is
relatively easy to give a general answer to: enterprises should finance, direct, and
perform applied R&D. Applied R&D should be closely linked to innovation.
The problem is how to achieve this outcome. Russian enterprises are not typical
market economy enterprises. The reason is not just the lack of macroeconomic
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stability. Russian enterprises have no effective systems for controlling managers
or applying rules for corporate governance. Enterprises have little experience
in marketing and related activities such as advertising, packaging, and product
design. The tax burden is heavy, and the rules frequently change. Labor relations
combine paternalism with worker resistance to lay-offs and efforts aimed at higher
productivity. Suppliers, workers, and taxes may frequently be left unpaid, and
the opportunities to obtain special deals for loans are also often utilized. Such
advantages taken by an enterprise may drastically hurt the system. In this economic
environment, the gains from innovation are insignificant compared with those from
exploiting the market imperfections that abound in Russia. These conditions reduce
demand for innovations.
This situation makes the creation of an effective S&T policy extremely difficult.
Clearly S&T policy alone cannot remedy all these defects. S&T policy, however,
can recognize that supporting applied R&D alone is unlikely to contribute to the
development of high-technology exports or to economic growth. We have stressed,
and the chapter authors have recognized, that applied R&D is only one element in
an enterprise’s innovation activities. Applied R&D alone is of little value; it must
be combined with all the enterprise activities mentioned in Chapter 5 by Glaziev,
Karimov, and Kuznetsova, such as investment in equipment, worker training, and
marketing.
Given the central role of enterprises we support the use of sectoral R&D funds
to assist innovation in enterprises as described by Fonotov and Pipiia in Chapter 7.
This program, initiated in 1992, recognizes that enterprises are important and rep-
resents a shift away from almost exclusive support of industrial research institutes.
Since the funds are collected by a levy on enterprises and since representatives of
enterprises play a role in the selection process, the funds can be considered one part
of the measures toward private financing. We know, however, that partial efforts
in the Russian context, if sustained, can mean the death of promising initiatives.
The sectoral program is one element in an essentially new governmental policy
for applied R&D. Fonotov and Pipiia describe the history of the first years of the
transition as a period in which “a preservation role [for the R&D sector] dominated
restructuring.” Since 1995 the government has been considering steps for restruc-
turing the R&D sector to free itself of the preservation role. This shift has allowed
government policy to play a more decisive role in shaping S&T organization. The
key words in the policy shift are selectivity, competition, and repayment. Selec-
tivity means funding will no longer be determined by the financial requirements
of existing institutes. Instead financing will be associated with projects selected
for their technical merits and relevance to the problems of Russian society. Com-
petition means that the allocation process will utilize competition among research
teams and projects with the hope of improving efficiency. Repayment means that
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financial support will be regarded as loans to be recouped by the government when
the R&D project makes a profit.
These are admirable principles, consistent with tested practice of governmental
R&D financing in other countries. It is regrettable that the opposition from some
R&D institutes will slow down the introduction of this approach.
8.4 Conclusions
It is easy to develop a long list of the problems in Russian applied R&D. This
has been done in the chapters in this report. It was shown, particularly in Chapter
2, that many of the characteristics from Soviet era persist. Our title is “Russian
Applied R&D: Its Problems and Its Promise.” We think the title is apt because we
found many problems.
It is easy to take a skeptical view of the word “promise” in our title. The
chapters have shown that the problem of applied R&D cannot be separated from
those of the enterprises and the problems of the enterprises from those of the
economy. Applied R&D by itself will have its impact limited by the economic
conditions. Even though in 1996 there are many hopeful signs that the economy
is improving, the performance falls well short of that needed to create a market
system that will sustain a technologically advanced R&D sector.
Yet R&D reorganization need not wait for a full recovery. R&D activities
can become a factor promoting the restructuring of enterprises, and R&D institutes
can be organized centers for change. To encourage that development requires
moving from widespread support of the numerous R&D institutions inherited from
the Soviet era to a system more consistent with a market economy. The shift
is occurring, albeit slowly; in Chapter 7 Fonotov and Pipiia describe the many
measures in public policy that focus on selectivity and economic payoff. Enterprises
are slowly adjusting to a market economy, and are providing greater support for
applied R&D. Russian enterprises are taking the first steps toward participation in
international activity. Slow progress, but Rome was not built in a day, and neither
will the applied R&D sector necessary for a prosperous market economy.
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Annex: Methodological Notes
and Statistical Tables
Natalia Gorodnikova
A1 R&D Indicators: 1989–1993
Basic classifications
The national industrial classification – namely, the so-called All-Russian Classifi-
cation of Branches of the National Economy – was based on the material product
concept. It was designed to meet requirements of the centralized planning system
and was not similar to other international classifications. Therefore, only few in-
dicators on R&D were derived from this classification, particularly labor statistics
that were related to the Science and Scientific Services sector of this classification.
Up to 1992 the Science and Scientific Services sector had included the following
types of institutions:
1. Establishments performing R&D: academies (other than the educational insti-
tutions), research institutes, independent research laboratories, observatories;
design organizations; experimental and research stations, experimental bases
performing R&D; state archives performing research; environmental research
institutions; and museums and libraries.
2. Independent design bureaus, excluding those for construction and forestry
research.
3. Nonmanufacturing experimental enterprises.
4. Hydrometeorological service organizations.
5. Geological prospecting organizations.
6. Organizations researching marine life; experimental and technical laboratories;
research and testing stations; central technical information bureaus; computer
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centers of research organizations; and other organizations serving research
institutions.
Higher education institutions, industrial enterprises, construction industries,
and exploration organizations were not incorporated in the Science and Scientific
Services sector regardless of whether or not they performed R&D. Due to the
deficiencies data on the employment in the Science and Scientific Services sector
were of minor use in R&D statistics and analysis. A new national industrial
classification compatible with ISIC, Rev. 3, and Eurostat NACE, Rev. 1, is currently
being introduced.
The sectoral classification accepted in Russian R&D statistics (i.e., not in the
national industrial classification) also did not reflect the sectoring recommendations
of the Frascati Manual, the major document of the OECD for measurement and
survey of R&D activities (see OECD, 1994c). The peculiarities of this classification
could be explained by the following institutional reasons:
 There was strong administrative subordination of R&D units to ministries and
other governmental bodies under the centrally planned economy. Ministries
were only interested in the data on affiliated R&D units,and the official statistics
had to satisfy such requirements.
 The existence of the Academy of Sciences and branch academies as the bodies
administering a network of R&D institutes was separated from industry and
higher education.
 In the institutional structure of the R&D system in the former USSR, a large
number of R&D institutions were separated from industry and higher education.
As a result, the national industrial classification was based on criteria such
as administrative subordination, type of institution, and function of R&D units.
For analytical purposes the R&D resources (personnel, expenditure, fixed assets)
were traditionally grouped into four sectors. The academy sector included research
institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the branch academies (the
Russian Academy of Agricultural Sciences and the Russian Academy of Medical
Sciences). The higher education sector comprised R&D units of universities and
equal higher education institutes. The industrial R&D sector covered the research,
projecting, design, technological, experimental organizations that served industry
but worked independently of industrial enterprises and such organizations that
served the government. Other R&D units, not elsewhere classified, for example,
hospitals and medical centers that performed R&D, were also included under this
heading. The enterprise sector consisted of R&D units of industrial enterprises
(research, design, technological, experimental units, etc.).
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Major groups of R&D indicators
Until 1989, there were two primary indicators of R&D statistics in Russia: number
of scientific workers and expenditure on S&T. The category of scientific workers
included those employed at research institutes, but formally also included (on
the basis of a scientific degree, place of employment, etc.) the teaching staff of
higher education institutions notwithstanding their actual participation in R&D
and advanced degree holders not necessarily engaged in R&D (administrative and
management personnel in industry, agriculture, and other sectors; artists teaching
in higher education institutions). However, postgraduate students as well as R&D
personnel employed in many design organizations and industrial enterprises were
not included.
Expenditure on S&T included the total value of work performed by indepen-
dent R&D institutions, units of enterprises, research production and production
associations, higher education institutions, and other legal entities, as well as the
capital investment in construction of installations connected with the development
of science.
Contracted project expenditures were reported by both performers and fun-
ders – that is, they were counted twice. The part counted twice reached, according
to our estimates, almost one-third of the overall S&T expenditure registered. This
indicator included not only expenditure but also profits obtained by reporting units
and expenses for R&D, S&T services, and other activities. Due to the data col-
lection procedures, data were not available for the Russian Federation and other
ex-USSR republics; they were only recorded for the whole of USSR.
In 1989 Russian R&D data were collected separately for the first time. The
main groups of R&D indicators collected and calculated in 1989–1993 were the
following:
R&D Input R&D Output
Personnel Inventions, patents, licenses
Expenditure Prototypes of new machines and equipment
Fixed assets Uses of inventions and new prototypes of machines and equipment
Production of new products
R&D Personnel
Data on personnel are for the end of the year. Employment in R&D institutions
comprised personnel employed in the main activity of R&D institutes, e.g., those
engaged in R&D or in direct service to R&D activity, including:
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 Personnel engaged in activity in independent research institutes and design
organizations.
 Personnel of R&D units in higher education institutes.
 Personnel of R&D units of enterprises and other organizations.
R&D specialists included personnel with higher or secondary special educa-
tion (including postgraduate students) directly engaged in R&D. Administrators
and staff of the planning, economic, financial, material-and-technical supply, and
scientific information units were not included in this category.
Indicators of R&D personnel were based on the mixed occupation/qualification
concept. Thus, R&D specialists who were graduates of higher education institutes
with four to five years training were defined as researchers. Classification of
researchers by field of S&T corresponded to the national Nomenclature of Occu-
pations of Scientific Workers. It included 24 fields of S&T that incorporated more
than 600 detailed specialities. On the whole, they could be grouped into major
fields of S&T stipulated by the Frascati Manual.
R&D specialists with secondary special education with three to four years
training were usually classified as technicians. The two-level postgraduate training
system in Russia comprised candidates of science and doctors of science. The
support staff comprised employees carrying out the auxiliary functions connected
with performing R&D and with S&T services. Other staff included employees in
accounting services, material supply units, and so on.
Data on teachers working as part-time researchers, i.e., those engaged in R&D
along with their pedagogical activities, were gathered from higher education insti-
tutions. These researchers were not staff members of R&D units, but they were
engaged in R&D in these units or in departments of higher education institutes and
were working according to the approved research plans or on a contractual basis.
This indicator had been included in the statistics since 1990.
Data on distribution of researchers by field of science and discipline were
collected in 1990, 1991, and 1993. Information on distribution of R&D specialists
by position, scientific degree, age, and gender was collected in 1993. All personnel
data were usually expressed as head counts without estimation of their full-time
equivalence.
R&D Expenditure
The primary source of financing was budget funds, centralized (non-budget) funds,
and own funds of enterprises.
When estimating the indicators of R&D financing and actual expenditures,
the category of financial appropriations were considered, i.e., the monetary funds
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intended for R&D. Data on budget appropriations on R&D for Russia have existed
only since 1991.
The value of projects of R&D institutions included the value of all types
of projects performed by R&D institutions during the year. Along with S&T
projects, which comprised R&D and S&T services, the value of projects of the
R&D institutions included all products, work, and services that were intended for
other enterprises and institutions, as well as services provided to the population. The
value of projects of R&D institutions was measured at contract prices (including
calculated profit) and at actual costs. The value of R&D was defined as the value of
S&T projects minus S&T services. R&D included basic research, applied research,
and development.
Since 1989 the definitions of types of activity have been in line with the Fras-
cati Manual recommendations. Basic research comprises the experimental and
theoretical research aimed at obtaining new knowledge that is not oriented to any
concrete objective connected with its practical use. The results of basic research are
hypotheses, theories, methods, and recommendations for arrangement of applied
research. Applied research is aimed at obtaining new knowledge with the view
of its practical use for development of technological innovations. Development
includes carrying out the following activities: design and technological projects,
production of prototypes, and construction projects. Design and technological
projects focus on the development of new types of materials, products, and pro-
cesses; devices, documents, techniques, and the creation of their prototypes; and
major modifications of available technology.
Construction projects include projects on development and location of branches
of the national economy and branches of industry, feasibility studies of design and
construction of enterprises (facilities), experimental designs; elaboration of new
standardized documents and state standards for design, construction, and archi-
tecture; plans for regional designs; and projects aimed at improving processes,
machinery, and equipment in production, mechanization, and automation of pro-
duction processes.
Along with research and development, the activities of R&D institutions
also include scientific and technological services, i.e., the activity in the field of S&T
information, patents, licenses, S&T consulting, introduction, and other activities
encouraging creation, dissemination and application of scientific knowledge.
As a summary we conclude that international comparisons of indicators of
R&D expenditure are limited for the following reasons:
1. Breakdowns of R&D expenditure by source of funds, socioeconomic objective,
field of science, and types of costs were not provided in the Russian national
R&D survey.
166 Annex
2. The industrial classification used in the Russian R&D statistics was not com-
patible with the Frascati Manual recommendations.
3. According to the Russian system, current R&D expenditure included the de-
preciation of fixed assets, whereas according to the Frascati Manual it should
have been excluded from R&D expenditure. At the same time, the Russian
national R&D survey did not cover capital expenditure because this survey
was organized in the framework of investment statistics.
R&D Fixed Assets
The R&D fixed assets comprised those directly intended for R&D performance.
Statistics on R&D fixed assets were collected from three samples of R&D
institutions:
1. R&D institutions of the academy, industrial, higher education, and enterprise
sectors.
2. Organizations in the Science and Scientific Services sector.
3. R&D institutions of the academy, industrial, and higher education sectors
(excluding enterprises). For this group the most complete information was
collected in ad hoc surveys in 1989 and 1992.
The absence of detailed primary accounting and statistics resulted in two
shortcomings in the indicators of distribution of R&D fixed assets by field of
science. First, the distribution of equipment by field of science was performed
not according to its real destination, but by name of R&D institutions. Second,
only research institutes and design organizations were considered; higher education
institutes were not taken into account due to the multi-profile character of R&D.
Inventions, Patents, Innovations
R&D output indicators are related to inventions, patents, and prototypes of
equipment.
An invention is defined legally as R&D and production activity that results
in a new and positive technical solution of a problem in the economy, society, or
national defense. The result of innovation can be protected by law.
The registration of inventions, i.e., the registration in the State Register, in-
volves the issuance of a protection document, which prior to 1991 was represented
by an author certificate, stating the application of an invention, its priority, and au-
thorship and the exclusive right of the state to use and take charge of the invention,
as well as securing the rights and privileges of the author as specified by legislation.
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In contrast, a patent certifies the exclusive right of the author (the patent
owner) to the invention. The patentability is the juridical property of an object
expressing that it can be protected by a document of an exclusive right (patent) on
the territory of the concrete country at a given time. In the former USSR, the term
“protection potentiality” had been used instead of the term “patentability” since
author certificate was the main form of protective document rather than patent for
a number of objects (e.g., for methods of diagnostics and treatment of diseases, for
chemical substances, etc.) until 1991.
New prototypes of machines, equipment, apparatuses, instruments and devices
that were developed in the country for the first time and that are essentially different
from previously manufactured devices. This description provides information on
the data included in innovation statistics, which in the former USSR were mainly
limited to product innovations, notably to machinery products. Currently inno-
vation statistics give information on indicators that are divided into the following
groups:
1. Utilization of inventions: their use in a manufactured or consumed product
or in the technological processes; transfer of inventions (by license) abroad in
accordance with the established procedure; and use of inventions in prototypes
to be transferred to exploitation.
2. Production of new machinery products by type, industry, and region (expressed
in units and rubles).
New types of machinery products were regarded as introduced if the design
and technological documentation have been developed; the technological equip-
ment, tools, fixtures, press tools, and other machine-tool attachments necessary to
manufacture those kinds of products were prepared for use; the regular production
had been organized according to the technological process developed; and technical
characteristics of products fully met the requirements specified.
According to the degree of novelty, both prototypes and products introduced
were classified as new, modernized, or modified ones.
Reporting on innovations established under conditions of centralized planning
is still mandatory for enterprises. Data series have been available since the early
1970s, and provide a large information basis for the analysis.
However, this system was designed many years ago and is not similar to
international standards; it does not satisfy international requirements. First, the
concept of an innovation process has not been introduced into the old Russian
statistics. As a result, the data available do not allow us to analyze the structure
of the innovation activities by type (R&D, patenting, etc.). Related input cannot
be measured. The objectives of innovation, hampering factors, and the forms of
technology transfer have not been investigated statistically.
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A2 Implementation of International Standards
in Russian R&D Statistics since 1994
Transformation of R&D statistics in Russia has resulted in new national surveys
developed by the CSRS and aimed at applying international statistical standards
to the national system. Nowadays the revised system of annual R&D surveys
consists of the national R&D survey, the survey of government R&D funding, and
the national innovation survey.
The annual national R&D survey was launched in 1995. It is designed in ac-
cordance with both the OECD standards and national characteristics. The statistical
data cover R&D institutions (units) regardless of sector of the national economy.
R&D data are gathered on both civilian and defense institutions.
Following the Frascati Manual recommendations (OECD, 1994c), an inter-
nationally accepted sectoral classification has been developed; it includes the gov-
ernment, business enterprise, higher education, and private nonprofit sectors. The
government sector comprises institutions subordinated to ministries and depart-
ments responsible for state administration of public needs in general, nonprofit
institutions completely or mainly financed and controlled by the government. The
business enterprise sector comprises all organizations and enterprises whose main
activity is the production of goods and services for sale, including those owned by
the state; private nonprofit institutions serving the above-mentioned organizations
are also included. The private nonprofit sector consists of nonprofit private insti-
tutions (professional societies, voluntary associations, etc.) and private individual
organizations. The higher education sector is made up of universities and other
educational institutions irrespective of sources of financing and legal status, as well
as research institutes, experimental stations, and clinics controlled by or associated
with them.
Data are collected for the natural sciences and engineering as well as social
sciences and humanities.
R&D Expenditure
Gross expenditure on R&D (GERD) is the expenditure on R&D performed within
R&D institutions, including both current and capital expenses. Value-added tax is
not included in R&D expenditure. GERD data are available for different subclas-
sifications. GERD includes intramural and extramural expenditures. Intramural
expenditures are all expenditures (current and capital) for R&D performed within
a statistical unit or sector of the economy, regardless of the source.
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GERD sources include an R&D institution’s own funds, budget funds (fed-
eral budget, local budgets), general university funds (higher education sector),
non-budget funds (non-budget funds are established under industrial groups and
associations from the levies paid by enterprises of 1.5 percent of sales for financ-
ing important sectoral and intersectoral R&D), higher education sector, private
nonprofit sector, and foreign funds.
The classification of socioeconomic objectives is applied to total intramural
expenditure. This classification of socioeconomic objectives is based on the NABS
(Nomenclature for the Analysis and Comparison of Scientific Programs and Bud-
gets) of Eurostat and also reflects national traditions.
If it is impossible to assign a concrete objective to the research project the
general Advancement of Research objective is used. This category comprises
usually basic research projects intended for the general development of natural
sciences and humanities. Research in economics, policy, and management of
science is also included in this group.
R&D Personnel
R&D personnel include all persons employed directly in R&D, as well as those
providing direct services such as R&D managers, administrators, and clerical staff.
Researchers are professionals engaged in the conception or creation of new knowl-
edge, products, processes, methods, and systems, and in the management of the
projects. Researchers usually have university or equivalent degrees. Technicians
and equivalent staff are persons whose main tasks require technical knowledge and
experience in one or more fields of engineering, physical and life sciences, or social
sciences and humanities. They participate in R&D by performing scientific and
technical tasks normally under the supervision of researchers. Other support staff
includes skilled and unskilled artisans, secretaries, and clerks.
The classification of R&D personnel by formal qualification is based on cate-
gories related to the Russian educational system. Personnel size is counted annu-
ally. Data for age and sex, inflows and outflows of R&D personnel are collected
biannually. On the base of the national R&D survey full-time equivalents are to be
calculated.
Statistics of R&D Funding from Government Budget
Along with the new national R&D survey, special importance is given to statistics
of government budget funding of R&D, which is still a major source of the na-
tional R&D base. Several principal requirements for estimating government R&D
funding are taken into consideration:
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1. To meet the current practice of R&D budget planning and analysis. The
procedure of R&D budget analysis includes accounting of actual expenditures
of the previous year, development of a plan, and estimation of outlays required
for the year. In the framework of the federal budget R&D-related capital
investments are separated from plans for current outlays.
2. To provide information for detailed comprehensive analysis of budget R&D
funding. This supposes available data on budget R&D expenditure by type of
expenditure, type of activity, discipline, and socioeconomic objective.
3. To agree with the general revision of concepts, definitions, and classifications
of R&D statistics in Russia in accordance with the international standards, and
with the national R&D survey.
4. To reflect national characteristics of R&D management, accounting, and statis-
tics in Russia. It is important to combine the Eurostat NABS and Frascati rec-
ommendations with specific elements of national classifications, e.g., socio-
economic objectives and types of expenditures. These classifications allow
comparisons to be made with international data.
The overall survey consists of four particular surveys: R&D funding in min-
istries and governmental agencies from the federal budget; R&D funding of state
science and technology programs from the federal budget; funding of R&D in the
federal goal programs from the federal budget; and funding of state research centers
from the federal budget.
Innovation Statistics
The CSRS has also established new types of innovation statistics. The medium-term
objective is to develop and implement an innovation survey in industry compatible
with the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) and based on the OECD standards
(OECD, 1992). (The new innovation survey is being developed in the framework of
the Project on R&D and Innovation Statistics in the Russian Federation by Eurostat
and CSRS under the TACIS Program.) This survey has two stages (Gokhberg and
Kuznetsova, 1996). The first stage is the so-called introductory survey. It was
implemented in 1995 for enterprises that respond to industrial censuses.
In line with the Oslo manual the basic objectives of the introductory survey
are to focus on technological innovations; to consider an enterprise as a statistical
unit; and to distinguish between product and process innovations.
Taking into account the current economic situation in Russia the set of types of
innovation activities has been broadened for the survey in order to include all types
of innovation activity. Thus, the enterprises contributing to innovation include
those engaged in R&D, as well as those introducing new or improved products,
Annex 171
new or improved technological processes, and that have purchased disembodied
technological developments. These disembodied innovations include:
 Acquisition of rights for patents – patents on inventions, industrial prototypes,
certificates on utility models the rights for which are ceded by the patent holder
to an enterprise according to a contract on patent cession, registered at the
Committee of the Russian Federation for Patents and Trademarks (Rospatent).
 Acquisition of patent licenses – licenses for the same items as above.
 Acquisition of unpatented licenses – contracts signed with organizations, en-
terprises, individuals on acquisition of works, services, or other information
not protected with patents connected with enterprise-based development and
introduction of new or improved products and new or improved technological
processes. Generally, two types of unpatented licenses are distinguished –
contracts for external R&D and contracts with enterprises or organizations
for acquisition of know-how connected with introduction of new or improved
products or new or improved technological process.
The survey covered 17,000 medium-size and large industrial enterprises of all
types and forms of property. Small enterprises employing fewer than 200 persons
constituted only 6.5 percent of the surveyed population due to official restrictions
on surveying small enterprises.
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Annex 1 Exhibits: Institutions
Exhibit A1.1. R&D institutions by type (and percentage distribution in 1994).
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Research institutes 1,762 1,831 2,077 2,150 2,166 (54.6)
Design organizations 937 930 865 709 545 (13.7)
Construction design and
exploration organizations 593 559 495 395 297 (7.5)
Experimental enterprises 28 15 29 17 19 (0.5)
Higher education institutions 453 450 446 456 424 (10.7)
Industrial enterprises 449 400 340 299 276 (7.0)
Others 424 379 303 243 241 (6.0)
Total 4,646 4,564 4,555 4,269 3,968(100.0)
Exhibit A1.2. R&D institutions (and percentage distribution) by sector in 1994.
R&D institutions
Government sector 1,150 (29.0)
Business enterprise sector 2,300 (58.0)
Higher education sector 511 (12.9)
Private non-profit sector 7 (0.1)
Total 3,968(100.0)
Exhibit A1.3. R&D institutions by type of ownership in 1993 and 1994 (and
percentage distribution in 1994).
1993 1994
Russian property 4,267 3,968
Public property 3,597 2,999 (75.6)
Federal 3,385 2,801
Regional 212 198
Municipal property 21 10
Property of voluntary associations 8 13
Private property 116 150 (3.8)
Joint property (w/o foreign participation) 525 796 (20.1)
Foreign and joint property (Russian and
foreign participation) 2 –
Total 4,269 3,968(100.0)
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Exhibit A1.4. Academy R&D institutions (and percentage distribution in 1994).
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Russian Academy of Sciences 297 321 369 396 409 (53.5)
Russian Academy of Agricultural Sciences 188 213 296 291 295 (38.6)
Russian Academy of Medical Sciences 50 52 64 59 60 (7.9)
Total 535 586 729 746 764(100.0)
Exhibit A1.5. State research centers (SRCs) of the Russian Federation.
1993 1994 1995a
State research centers 42 61 61
Budget funds for SRC programs (in million rubles) 57,920 202,302 339,000
Basic research – 118,034 209,163
Applied R&D – 84,268 129,837
R&D personnel 92,361 96,904 108,533
aProjected.
Source: CSRS, various years.
Exhibit A1.6. State research centers (SRCs) by field of science and technology.
Field of science and technology Number of SRCs
Nuclear physics and atomic power engineering 10
Chemistry and new materials 10
Aviation 4
Ship-building, navigation, and hydrophysics 6
Medicine and biology 3
Biotechnology 4
Oceanology, meteorology, and engineering hydrotechnology 3
Informatics and instrument-making 5
Machine-building 4
Optical electronics, laser systems, robot
technology, and special chemistry 5
Agro-industrial complex 2
Mining and metallurgy 3
Construction 1
Astronomy 1
Total 61
Source: Ministry of Science and Technological Policy of the Russian Federation.
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Annex 2 Exhibits: Personnel
Exhibit A2.1. Russian R&D personnel.
Support staff
Researchers Technicians and others Total
1989 1,118,800 270,500 826,300 2,215,600
1990 992,600 234,800 716,000 1,943,400
1991 878,500 200,600 598,700 1,677,800
1992 804,000 180,700 547,900 1,532,600
1993 644,900 133,900 536,200 1,315,000
1994 525,300 115,500 465,400 1,106,200
Source: CSRS, various years.
Exhibit A2.2. Percentage distribution of R&D personnel by occupation.
Doctors Candidates Support staff
Researchers of science of science Technicians and others Total
1989 50.5 0.7 6.3 12.2 37.3 100
1990 51.1 0.8 6.5 12.1 36.8 100
1991 52.3 1.0 7.0 12.0 35.7 100
1992 52.5 1.1 7.3 11.8 35.7 100
1993 49.0 1.4 8.0 10.2 40.8 100
1994 47.5 1.6 8.8 10.4 42.1 100
Source: CSRS, various years.
Annex 175
Exhibit A2.3. R&D personnel by occupation, qualification, and sector of perfor-
mance (and percentage distribution) in 1994.
Other
University postgraduate Total R&D
degrees degrees Others personnel
Government
sector
Researchers 143,685,000 – – 143,685,000 (49.6)
Technicians 10,287,000 16,308,000 5,111,000 31,706,000 (11.0)
Supporting staff 16,154,000 14,826,000 39,371,000 70,351,000 (24.3)
Others 9,803,000 9,831,000 24,048,000 43,682,000 (15.1)
Total 179,929,000 40,965,000 68,530,000 289,424,000(100.0)
Business
enterprise
sector
Researchers 343,346,000 – – 343,346,000 (45.2)
Technicians 12,394,000 57,197,000 9,780,000 79,371,000 (10.4)
Supporting staff 45,128,000 50,738,000 116,630,000 212,496,000 (28.0)
Others 22,662,000 27,896,000 74,039,000 124,597,000 (16.4)
Total 423,530,000 135,831,000 200,449,000 759,810,000(100.0)
Higher
education
sector
Researchers 38,190,000 – – 38,190,000 (67.2)
Technicians 959,000 2,989,000 437,000 4,385,000 (7.7)
Supporting staff 2,828,000 2,019,000 3,600,000 8,447,000 (14.9)
Others 1,012,000 795,000 3,989,000 5,796,000 (10.2)
Total 42,989,000 5,803,000 8,026,000 56,818,000(100.0)
Private
nonprofit
sector
Researchers 98,000 – – 98,000 (49.5)
Technicians 8,000 4,000 – 12,000 (6.1)
Supporting staff 9,000 14,000 10,000 33,000 (16.6)
Others 8,000 13,000 34,000 55,000 (27.8)
Total 123,000 31,000 44,000 198,000(100.0)
Total 646,571,000 182,630,000 277,049,000 1,106,250,000
Source: CSRS, various years.
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Exhibit A2.4. Percentage distribution of R&D personnel by qualification and
sector in 1994.
Business Higher Private
Government enterprise education nonprofit Total
Candidate of science 62.2 55.7 75.7 62.1 58.4
Doctor of science 14.1 17.9 14.1 15.7 16.9
Other 23.7 26.4 10.2 22.2 25.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: CSRS, various years.
Exhibit A2.5. Percentage distribution of business enterprise R&D personnel by
type of institution in 1994.
Sectoral Design & Construction &
R&D technology exploration Industrial Experimental Others Total
62.1 21.7 4.2 7.9 0.4 3.7 100.0
Exhibit A2.6. Researchers and technicians by qualifications (and percentage dis-
tribution in 1994).
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Candidate of science 1,118,800 992,600 878,500 804,000 644,900 549,000(85.7)
Doctor of science 270,500 234,800 200,600 180,700 133,900 76,500(11.9)
Source: CSRS, various years.
Exhibit A2.7. Researchers with scientific degrees (and percentage distribution in
1994).
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Candidate of science 139,086 126,975 118,011 111,422 105,221 97,384(84.3)
Doctor of science 15,612 15,475 16,165 17,422 18,184 18,140(15.7)
Annex 177
Exhibit A2.8. Researchers by sector (and percentage distribution) in 1994.
Business Higher Private
Government enterprise education nonprofit Total
Researchers 143,685(27.3) 343,346(65.4) 38,190 (7.3) 98 525,319(100.0)
Doctor of
science 12,586(69.4) 3,920(21.6) 1,624 (9.0) 10 18,140(100.0)
Candidate
of science 47,350(48.7) 36,345(37.3) 13,588(14.0) 23 97,306(100.0)
Exhibit A2.9. Researchers by field of S&T (and percentage distribution) in 1994.
Doctor Candidate
Researchers of science of science
Natural sciences 116,391 8,743 (48.2) 40,694 (41.8)
Engineering 345,921 3,441 (19.0) 34,341 (35.3)
Medical sciences 18,866 2,638 (14.5) 7,287 (7.5)
Agricultural
sciences 18,228 852 (4.7) 6,139 (6.3)
Social sciences 17,917 994 (5.5) 5,270 (5.4)
Humanities 7,996 1,472 (8.1) 3,575 (3.7)
Total 525,319 18,140(100.0) 97,306(100.0)
Exhibit A2.10. R&D personnel by occupation and by type of property of R&D
institutions in 1994.
R&D Support
Type personnel Researchers Technicians staff Others
Public 883,356 427,856 86,479 227,436 141,585
Federal 860,515 418,135 83,798 220,869 137,713
Regional 22,841 9,721 2,681 6,567 3,872
Municipal 910 480 105 144 181
Voluntary
associations 416 231 28 47 110
Private 24,541 10,737 3,777 6,549 3,478
Joint
(w/o foreign
participation) 197,027 86,015 25,085 57,151 28,776
Total 1,106,250 525,319 115,474 291,327 174,130
Source: CSRS, various years.
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Exhibit A2.11. Annual growth rate of R&D personnel by property type of R&D
institution in 1993–1994 period (1993 equals 100%).
Exhibit A2.12. Number of employees in the science and scientific services sector
emigrating from Russia.
1980 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
140 950 2,100 1,800 2,100 2,300 2,100
Source: CSRS, 1996b, p. 31.
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Annex 3 Exhibits: R&D Expenditures
Exhibit A3.1. Russian GERD (in million rubles).
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
At current prices 10,903.7 13,077.8 19,991.3 140,590.7 1,317,199.5 5,146,102.0
At constant
1989 prices 10,903.7 10,898.2 7,243.2 3,203.7 3,031.9 2,517.2
As % GDP 1.90 2.03 1.43 0.74 0.77 0.82
Source: CSRS, various years.
Exhibit A3.2. Russian GERD by socioeconomic objective and sector in 1994 (in
million rubles).
Socioeconomic Business Higher Private
objective Government enterprise education nonprofit Total
Economic
development 417,060.1 1,940,404.3 167,109.4 140.0 2,524,713.8
Social development 177,195.4 68,286.9 39,653.8 268.1 285,404.2
General advancement 460,965.4 102,367.6 77,931.8 – 641,264.8
Exploration of the
earth and atmosphere 93,338.9 55,995.7 8,224.2 – 157,558.8
Civilian space
exploration 67,510.6 143,632.5 3,552.2 31.0 214,726.3
Defense 229,057.2 1,086,038.2 7,338.7 – 1,322,434.1
Total 1,445,127.6 3,396,725.2 303,810.1 439.1 5,146,102.0
Source: CSRS, 1996b.
Exhibit A3.3. Russian GERD by sector and source in 1994 (in million rubles).
Business Higher Private
Government enterprise education nonprofit Total
Own funds 68,152.5 463,504.0 11,356.9 – 543,013.4
Government budget 1,186,114.3 1,746,770.0 175,794.7 184.0 3,108,863.0
Priority objectives 277,327.7 474,457.8 59,727.6 31.0 811,544.1
General university
funds 2,297.0 1,054.2 26,265.1 – 29,616.3
Nonbudget funds 40,565.4 266,191.9 18,389.3 – 325,146.6
Business enterprise 110,238.8 850,472.6 63,688.2 255.1 1,024,654.7
Higher education 771.6 1,621.6 6,017.3 – 8,410.5
Private nonprofit 1,213.3 4,172.1 197.7 – 5,583.1
Foreign funds 35,774.7 62,938.8 2,100.9 – 100,814.4
Total 1,445,127.6 3,396,725.2 303,810.1 439.1 5,146,102.0
Source: CSRS, various years.
Annex 181
0
20
40
60
80
100
Own funds
Non-budget funds
General
university funds
Government 
R&D expenditures
Business enterprise
Total Govern-
ment
Business
enterprise
Higher 
education
Private
nonprofit
%
Others
10
30
50
70
90
0.02
Exhibit A3.4. Percentage distribution of GERD by source of funds and sector of
performance in 1994. (Source: CSRS, 1996b.)
Exhibit A3.5. Intramural current expenditures on (and percentage distribution of)
R&D by type of activity and sector in 1994 (in million rubles).
Basic research Applied research Development Total
Government 560,065.4(40.8) 314,528.2(22.9) 497,350.9(36.3) 1,371,944.5(100.0)
Business enterprise 149,218.6 (4.5) 599,407.7(18.0) 2,575,009.5(77.5) 3,323,635.8(100.0)
Higher education 132,712.2(44.1) 107,588.9(35.8) 60,612.0(20.1) 300,913.1(100.0)
Private nonprofit 34.1 (8.1) 386.3(91.5) 1.8 (0.4) 422.2(100.0)
Total 842,030.3(16.9) 1,021,911.1(20.4) 3,132,974.2(62.7) 4,996,915.6(100.0)
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Exhibit A3.6. Intramural current expenditures on R&D by the Academy institutes
by type of activity (in million rubles).
Basic Applied
research research Development Total
Academy of Sciences
1990 884.5 384.2 169.4 1,438.2
1991 1,148.6 596.6 169.4 1,914.6
1992 9,001.3 4,221.1 979.3 14,201.7
1993 69,251.4 42,045.9 6,707.1 118,004.5
1994 409,547.3 87,931.9 47,401.9 544,881.1
Academy of Agricultural Sciences
1990 43.6 155.1 41.9 240.6
1991 53.1 302.1 47.7 402.9
1992 856.8 2,210.9 548.6 3,616.3
1993 6,800.1 17,380.3 3,912.9 28,093.3
1994 34,894.8 63,986.1 24,482.5 123,363.4
Academy of Medical Sciences
1990 47.2 63.0 0.9 111.2
1991 77.3 98.8 1.6 177.7
1992 529.7 1,098.5 10.7 1,638.9
1993 5,877.7 6,658.0 1,057.8 13,593.5
1994 39,144.5 15,585.2 3,276.0 58,005.7
Source: CSRS, various years.
Exhibit A3.7. Intramural current expenditures on (and percentage distribution of)
R&D by type of activity and field of S&T in 1994.
Basic research Applied research Development Total
Natural
sciences 486,747.1(55.4) 237,610.0(27.0) 155,101.7(17.6) 879,458.8(100.0)
Engineering 181,385.2 (5.0) 581,548.8(16.0) 2,862,844.5(79.0) 3,625,778.5(100.0)
Medical
sciences 58,089.1(38.4) 69,181.5(45.8) 23,896.4(15.8) 151,167.0(100.0)
Agricultural
sciences 39,873.9(22.2) 86,232.0(48.0) 53,551.9(29.8) 179,657.8(100.0)
Social
sciences 38,185.2(35.0) 35,452.0(32.4) 35,670.3(32.6) 109,307.5(100.0)
Humanities 37,749.8(73.2) 11,886.8(23.1) 1,909.4 (3.7) 51,546.0(100.0)
Total 842,030.3(16.9) 1,021,911.1(20.4) 3,132,974.2(62.7) 4,996,915.6(100.0)
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Exhibit A3.8. Federal budget appropriations for R&D.
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Exhibit A3.9. Federal budget appropriations for R&D as a percentage of GDP and
a percentage of federal budget expenditures.
184 Annex
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Goal-oriented budgetary funds
Academy sector and higher education institutions
Government programs and priority objectives
Defense sector R&D institutions
Agro-industrial R&D institutions
Production sector R&D institutions
Nonproduction sectors R&D institutions
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 1  2  3  4  5  6  7
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
%
1  2  3  4  5  6  7
Exhibit A3.10. Percentage distribution of the federal budget appropriations for
civilian R&D: 1992–1996.
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Exhibit A3.11. Federal budget appropriations for civilian R&D (in billion rubles).
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a
Russian Fund for Fundamental Research 0.27 3.07 18.1 102.2 196.4
Fund for Promotion of Small Enterprises
in Science and Technology – – – 10.8 23.4
Russian Academy of Sciences 2.28 16.18 119.6 515.0 1,088.1
Siberian branch 0.28 3.30 27.0 110.4 300.7
Urals branch 0.08 0.99 8.0 37.3 61.9
Far Eastern branch 0.11 1.24 11.1 51.2 86.7
Russian Academy of Agricultural Sciences 0.30 2.45 18.4 94.6 173.6
Russian Academy of Medical Sciencesb – 1.76 12.6 41.0 99.9
Siberian Branch 0.03 0.28 2.1 7.3 17.8
Russian Academy of Education 0.02 0.40 2.6 9.8 17.1
Russian Academy of Arts – 0.06 0.6 4.0 6.6
Russian Academy of Architecture
and Civil Engineering – – – 1.8 3.1
Government S&T programs 1.33 7.50 23.3 64.2 162.4
Major programs and projects
of the national economy 0.46 8.58 17.9 28.4 44.9
International programs and projects 0.21 1.09 6.6 20.5 40.1
SRCs – – 57.9 202.3 321.1
Development of universities
in Russia 0.21 1.50 7.4 n.a. n.a.
S&T innovative infrastructure
development (technoparks, techno-
polises, business incubators) – – 1.7 1.6 4.5
Funds for regional centers and programs – – 4.2 6.7 13.9
R&D performed in defense industry n.a. 31.30 418.3 1,121.8 2,056.8
Civilian Aviation Development
Program – 10.64 73.8 249.9 504.9
Federal Space Program 0.04 8.72 148.8 425.2 899.6
Program of Development of the
“Kurtchatov Institute” SRC – – 6.5 23.6 48.3
Reserve of the Ministry of Science
and Technological Policy 0.18 1.20 8.4 17.5 51.9
Totalc 13.44 103.16 848.9 2,791.5 5,228.6
aEstimation.
bFinanced by the USSR Ministry of Health.
c Includes elements not listed.
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Exhibit A3.12. Budget funding of R&D in the federal economic programs (in
million rubles).
1991 1992 1993
Power engineering strategy – – 248.8
Soil fertility improvement (“Fertility”) – – –
Development of machine building for agro-industrial
complex (including the “Farmer” program) – – –
Development of medical industry and
provisions for medicines and medical
equipment – – 6,395.4
Development and production of new
medical equipment – – 4,804.8
Federal space program 40.0 8,720.0 105,140.0a
Housing – – 350.0
International thermonuclear reactor – – 9,969.1
Development of nutrition industry – – 2,200.0
Development, production, and supply of technical
rehabilitation for the disabled – – 960.8
Improvement of funeral services – – –
Development of electronics – – –
Civil aviation development – 10,641.0 97,998.4
Technology for North Russia – – –
Environmental protection – – 5,839.5
aIncludes appropriations for the Russian Space Agency (except the Program of Basic Space Research).
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Exhibit A3.13. Federal budget R&D appropriations for S&T programs (in million
rubles).
1991 1992 1993 1994
Agricultural technologies 158.0 449.6 1,240.1 2,828.5
Technologies for processing industries
of agro-industrial complex – 363.6 945.3 2,130.4
Information technologies 60.0 210.4 560.3 1,261.0
Telecommunications and integrated
communications systems 30.0 104.9 430.5 962.7
Distribution of information 60.0 210.5 484.8 1,034.3
Microelectronics, computers, and
automation means – 60.3 – –
Micro- and nanoelectronics technologies – 120.5 442.8 898.5
Human genome 32.0 130.5 360.8 812.6
Priority genetics objectives – 119.8 360.8 830.7
Bioengineering methods 40.0 207.8 640.4 1,491.1
Research in physico-chemical biology
and biotechnology – 56.2 168.4 400.9
New materials 58.0 535.4 1,461.8 3,377.5
Clean power engineering 66.6 400.6 1,078.1 2,459.4
Resources-saving and clean technologies
in mining and metallurgy – 125.2 357.6 929.9
Technologies for fuel and energy exploration – 70.4 424.2 950.6
Zeolites of Russia – 29.8 – –
Social revival and progress – 79.2 253.9 573.3
Educational information – 50.1 – –
Higher education – 20.3 – –
Educational progress – 98.2 306.0 689.9
Ecologically safe and resources-saving
chemical technologies 43.4 347.4 855.4 1,926.0
Chemical research and technology objectives – 70.4 – –
Research-intensive chemical technologies – 70.4 – –
Secondary processing of polymers – 20.3 – –
Methods for obtaining chemicals and materials – 140.8 372.2 831.8
High-energy physics 100.0 422.6 1,269.8 3,455.0
Basic space research 40.0 200.4 2,163.9 –
Basic nuclear physics – 158.6 501.9 1,525.9
Synchrotron radiation, radiation applications – 125.2 356.4 1,516.4
High-temperature superconductivity 130.0 455.4 1,084.3 2,146.0
Controlled thermonuclear synthesis
and plasma processes 30.0 120.0 285.7 1,226.6
Medicine and health services 71.0 306.4 829.2 1,582.1
Health – 66.5 469.0 1,054.7
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Exhibit A3.13. Continued.
1991 1992 1993 1994
New medicines from chemical and
biological syntheses – 7.1 460.3 1,307.5
Environment and climate changes 50.0 220.7 631.9 1,420.3
Plans in case of natural and
technological catastrophes 40.0 180.0 473.6 1,032.0
Exploration of oceans and seas – 381.2 1,072.2 2,414.3
Construction 50.0 295.0 968.8 2,048.8
Utilization and reproduction of wood – 143.1 508.2 1,154.8
Future technologies, and machinery 75.0 421.1 1,035.7 2,329.1
Research-intensive technologies – 39.9 838.9 1,813.7
High-speed ecologically clean transport 50.0 200.4 529.5 1,135.4
High-efficient technologies in the social sphere – 55.2 326.2 730.5
Federal fund for S&T information – – 233.1 526.4
Physics of solid nanostructures – – 303.2 926.8
Astronomy – – 75.0 1,164.9
Basic metrology – – 180.0 1,106.9
Optics, laser physics – – 72.6 1,080.4
Source: CSRS, various years.
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